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CHAPTER I 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
 
This chapter has as objective to indicate the approach of the Doctoral research. So 
it denotes the problem to be studied and the motives that arise it as a study case. 
The drive for developing this research is rooted in the outcomes of my Master 
Degree research, which is titled ‘The ideology of the globalization as trigger of the 
environmental crisis’.  
At this point I must stress that the concept ideology comprises a set of criteria by 
which society judges and interprets the reality, thence influencing the way in which 
the society relates to reality, it should be stressed the fact that in all of the historical 
social systems has always ruled the ideology that is most convenient to the 
dominant class. 
That research demonstrated that the function of the dominant discourse, namely 
‘the ideology of the globalization’, is to make sure that capital flows along the 
same paths as it has always done, at the expense of environmental degradation 
and the high social and environmental costs, seeking to promote a sustained 
economic growth, ignoring the ecological conditions that set limits to the capitalist 
appropriation and transformation of nature. As Burkett (1999, p215) stated:  
 
“For capital, nature is merely an unavoidable prerequisite for the extraction of 
surplus labor from free labor power and the objectification of this surplus labor in 
vendible use values”. 
 
In this manner the nature is being incorporated into the capital through a double 
operation: first it tries to internalize the environmental costs of progress, 
meanwhile, a symbolic operation recognized as a "signification adjustment" takes 
place, this adjustment recodes man, culture and nature as apparent forms of the 
same essence: the capital. Thus, ecological processes are designated as different 
expressions of capital and therefore are denominated as natural, human or cultural 
capital. 
In order to be assimilated by the process of reproduction and expansion of the 
economic order, restructuring in this manner the production conditions through a 
rational economic management of the environment. 
Thence, the ideology of sustainable development unleashes an uncontrollable 
momentum of growth that seems to neglect the laws of conservation or social 
reproduction in order to comply with the metastases of the economic system, a 
process that goes beyond any standard, reference and sense to control it. In this 
way the rhetoric about sustainability operates as a fatal strategy, directed towards 
catastrophe. 
Theoretical considerations lead to think that development itself, as well as the use 
of resources and how to use them should be subjected to moral demands arguing 

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that a society based solely on consumption and competitiveness could not be claim 
to be sustainable. 
In this direction it should be noted that the economy, without ethics or moral 
counterweights could lead to a long-term destruction of the globe and its 
inhabitants. And by destroying nature, the man demonstrates the ignorance 
regarding its own origin, and reveals an ontological error. In this sense the nature 
is no longer ruled, but tyrannized by the greed of man and his insane desire for 
economic expansion and consumption 
Theoretical Economics are trying to develop acceptable solutions to environmental 
problems. Scientific and technological advances are also trying to provide long-
term answers. Environmental problems arise in the transitional stage in which we 
find ourselves. At this stage it is necessary a global and interdisciplinary vision 
between Ecology, Economics, Politics and Ethics. The peoples and nations of the 
world can only escape ecological disaster by incorporating principles of austerity. 
So, at this point is when I started to think about the continuation of that research, 
how to be aware of what each country is doing regarding sustainability at the 
three dimensions: social, economic and environmental. 
So roughly and considering also that I cannot develop a research including all the 
countries in the world I started to think about the scope and structure of this 
research, in this way, I focused in Europe, one of the most progressive regions of 
the world among sustainability issues, in which almost every country has developed 
a National Sustainable Development Strategy and also the European Union at the 
top has a Sustainable Development Strategy. So the region was clear, but making 
a research about the sustainability issues of every European country seems also a 
lot of work to develop in the framework of a PhD research. Thence, after taking in 
consideration many aspects such as the global economic system in which we live 
immerse and the need of implementing some principles of austerity in order to 
avoid the ecological disaster, as stated in my master degree, I started to clear my 
mind, and after a long literature survey I decided to develop a cross national 
comparison of the environmental governance - focusing therefore in the 
governmental, political, and economic issues -  among two developed European 
National States. Considering each one as an example of different capitalist 
scheme, in this sense, Germany was selected as an example of a coordinated 
market economy and the United Kingdom, as a case of a liberal market economy, 
in order to evaluate how the overarching infrastructure context of each country 
may influence the way in which the environmental issues are being handled, thus 
dealing directly with environmental governance issues.  
All of this trying to find an answer to the question: 
 
Can the sustainable development be reached even when we live in an economic 
system, which is unsustainable in its own nature? 
 
The different capitalist schemes could provide valuable info regarding the general 
overarching context of each country and demonstrate if there’s any difference 

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regarding the concept of sustainable development and the efforts made towards 
reaching it. I hope to have positive outcomes at the end of the research and 
demonstrate the ways in which a market economy could support a rational and 
nature-respectful development, but I’m also aware that a neoliberal overarching 
context offers little hopes regarding improvements in the conception of 
sustainability, but in this case the research could also be very productive because it 
could demonstrate that the discourse of sustainability is nothing but an 
environmental euphemism which pretends to allow an improved context for 
economic growth, disregarding the different schemes in which it could be 
presented. 
 
1.1)   Motives and Problematic of the Research 
 
“Despite the evolution of the global thinking regarding the development crisis, 
manifested in turn in the form of the environmental crisis, a general evaluation of the 
proposed alternatives reveals that there are no great accomplishments in searching for 
definitive solutions. The cookbook keeps obeying to the neoliberal pharmacopeia, and 
keeps including the structural adjustment programs, the reduction of public spending 
and greater openness in relation to trade and foreign investment.” 
(Guimarães 1994) 
 
Economic development has been often equated with progress driven by 
technological innovation. In this way, the quest for economic growth may have 
produced some benefits, but it has been questioned because it failed to reconcile 
some basic objectives of human development, such as poverty reduction and 
environmental sustainability. The economic growth, namely the expansion of the 
production goods and services has required large amounts of labor, materials, 
energy and capital, at the end of the equation the economic development has 
come to a cost to the natural environment that is not reflected in the balance sheet. 
The concern for the environment could be considered as the global goal. One of 
the reasons for its widespread appeal is that it does not necessarily challenge the 
predominant economic paradigm, which considers a free market and economic 
growth as essential for the human existence. It is a strong concept because it is 
very vague, it looks to protect the environment while it tries to foster economic 
development and this is precisely why governments, industries and NGOs have 
adopted this concept. In this sense the concept ‘sustainable development’ is 
applied in any imaginable way, it must be outlined that the meaning of such 
concept may reflect marketing or commercialization techniques which demonstrate 
the reasons behind it, the pursuit of an economic development at all costs and 
thence is a clear example of how the ‘sustainable development’ is used as a tool 
towards allowing the expansion of neoliberal policies. 
It is clear that the sustainable development assumes the significance in the same 
moment in which the global centers of power propose the market as the engine of 
development.  The thesis of sustainable development focuses on the policy level. It 
wants to regulate the capital and make capital internalize social and environmental 

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costs, as it deems most beneficial to the capital and the environment as a whole. 
This means sustainable development equals sustainable remuneration (i.e. 
sustainable capitalism). 
But leaving aside the dominant discourse behind ‘sustainable development’ it 
must be remarked that a real ‘sustainable development’ isn’t just about ecological 
and environmental issues, in order to set-up a successful environmental policy, the 
concept must consider and include political, economic and social processes, which 
are intertwined with socio-spatial notions of dynamic restructuration of the modes 
of governance and regulation, and that in turn, involve changes in the ‘state – 
society – market cycle’ as a permanent process of selection and institutionalization. 
So I’ll try to make a general overview about the way in which all these concepts 
are interrelated. 
 
1.1.1)  Regarding National Sustainable Development Strategies 
 
There’s now 42 years since the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment  (UN 1972), which was held 5-16 June of 1972, in Stockholm, and 
for that moment on, it could be considered that the environmental crisis occupied a 
hierarchical place among the considerations of a new world order, inducing a 
process of awareness about the need of incorporate preventive and corrective 
ways over the environmental impacts of the productive and consumption practices 
inside the national development policies. 
From there, it is promoted the creation of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), increasing the efforts that the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) has been doing since 
19481along with international organisms, from which the MAB program of the 
UNESCO (successor of the International Biological Program) it is the most 
prominent, to offer solutions to the accelerated destruction of natural resources and 
to the degradation of the environmental quality. At the same time, many 
governments, as well in the highly industrialized as in the economically depending 
countries, incorporate inside their institutional structures, ministries and official 
agencies that are in charge of caring about the environmental dimension in the 
process of development planning. 
This led to a wide process of evaluation and world concordance promoted 
by the general secretary of the UN, establishing a World Commission on 
Environment and Development. From the inform of the commission, published in 
1987 with the title ‘Our common future’ (Brundtland 1987) , which defined 
Sustainable Development “as the development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". 
This concept had ignited the movements towards sustainability, in this report, the 
Brundtland Commission found that poor distribution of resources, economic 
dependency on fossil fuels and overcrowding were the structural problems of the 
 
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global ecological deterioration. The Brundtland Commission emphasized the need 
for a change in the political level and that Sustainable Development could be 
reached only with common efforts of different governments. 
This process gave way to the organization of the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) that was held from June 3 through 
June 14, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, congregating the state chiefs of all 
around the planet. The commitments for the development of Sustainable 
Development Strategies following the recommendations of the program of action 
towards a socially and ecologically sustainable development, called agenda 21, 
which was a conjunct goal of the 178 governments that voted to adopt in this 
World Summit signaled a key point regarding the management of environmental 
issues. 
 
1.1.1.1)  About Sustainable Development Strategies in Europe 
 
Following this, in the 1997 Rio+5 meeting, the governments decided to set 
2002 as target date to introduce the Strategies. In June 2001 the European 
Council in Gotheburg reiterated the invitation to its member States to present their 
strategies in 2002. All of these were successfully efforts and by 2002 many 
European States presented their Strategies. In 2006 with the development of the 
Renewed European Union Sustainable Development Strategy (European Council 
2006) the EU has invited their newer members to develop their National 
Sustainable Development Strategies, and to the other member States to review 
their approaches.  Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sustainable Development Strategies in Europe 
Source: Table arranged by author 
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Of course the socio-environmental conflict generated by the worldwide dominant 
economic rationality has not been settled in the Río agreements. The process of 
environmental degradation hasn’t been stopped.   
It is important to note that environmental strategies do not require radical changes 
and can be easily added to the existing regulatory structures, this has enabled that 
some governments establish them in the way that Jorgens (2004) indicates  "(as) 
the application of an international standard for sustainable development, 
demonstrating that the government acted appropriately " but without introducing 
far-reaching political structural changes. 
 
1.1.1.2)  Major Problems 
 
It is important to notice that sustainable development hasn’t almost any 
detractor, as Guimarães(1994, p47) remarked, “it is nearly impossible to find just 
one social actor of importance who declares to be against it”, this unanimity 
regarding sustainable development can be helpful to understand why many 
governments have signed agreements towards environmental degradation 
mitigation, or even developed Sustainable Development Strategies, but they don’t 
have implemented any kind of radical solution towards the objective of instaurate a 
‘real sustainable development’ or to at least reduce the environmental 
degradation. 
Here a ‘real sustainable development’ is signaled to differentiate it from the 
ideological notion of sustainability that is used actually to introduce an equivalent 
of an environmental restriction in the capitalist accumulation process, without 
confronting yet the institutional and political processes that regulates the property, 
control and use of the natural resources. Neither evident are some essential actions 
to change consumption-patterns in the industrialized countries, which determines 
the internationalization of the model. (Guimarães 1994, p49) 
The impulse that the Sustainable Development has gained among the actual 
speech involves many paradoxes, it has assumed the importance in the moment 
when the global power centers declared the shortcoming of the State as promoter 
of development and proposed the market as its replacement, while declaring also 
flaws within governmental planning. All of these factors denote a deep 
restructuration on the modes of governance, caused in turn by an evolution and 
succession of intertwined social, economic and political processes. Anyway, it 
could be considered that they all had a common root on the contemporary 
processes of globalization and the economic changes it has unleashed. See Figure 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Figure 2. Globalization – Neoliberalism – Scale – Rescaling – 
Governance – Environmental Governance.  
Source: Table arranged by author 
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Brief explanation of Figure 2 
 
1.1.1.2.1) Regarding Globalization 
 
The book ‘1688: A global history’ (Wills 2001), demonstrates that since those 
times, it was hard to find a place in the planet that hasn’t any relation with 
foreigners and world trade, when it could take twelve years to circle the earth, and 
when the processions of wooden ships from Arabia, China, England, France, 
Holland, Portugal and Spain were perfect examples of a global network.  
Even when this globalization process has been present for quite a long part of the 
history of mankind, its effects now are stronger than ever, unleashing through 
financial, political and economic adjustments a cultural homogenization of the 
world, and because it is an economic based phenomenon it denotes a very strong 
interests towards chrematistic issues. 
In their post-1945 phase, the contemporary processes of globalization are 
unparalleled, at least in terms of scale and extension, for the first time in history 
there is ‘a single, increasingly integrated and universal world economy largely 
operating across frontiers and therefore increasingly across the frontiers of state 
ideology’ (Hobsbawm 1996) 
Very broadly, (and at risk of generalizing too much) the late 60s and early 70s 
were dominated by political economic theories and political activists movements 
inspired by a strongly international analysis and agenda, which considered that the 
capitalism was, since its beginning, a geographical project of spatial expansion 
and spatial integration, this wasn’t labeled then as globalization but rather as very 
political concepts such as imperialism, neo-imperialism, neocolonialism, uneven 
development, etc. (Baran, Sweezy, Mandel, Amin).  
Many progressive economists were questioning the laissez-faire argument and 
viewed the 1970s lurch towards liberalism as a temporary response to the 
economic instability of that decade. 
 
 “As corporate interests decided that the Keynesian regulationist approach no 
longer worked to their advantage, they looked for an alternative and found only 
the old liberal ideas, which could at least serve as an ideological basis for cutting 
those state programs viewed as obstacles to profit-making”. (Kotz 2002) 
 
‘Globalization’ therefore appeared as the rhetorical vehicle and analytical device 
used to describe this allegedly important shift in the economic and political 
organization of the world economy and the concept soon moved into the cultural 
domain too (Featherstone et al. 1995) as cited in (Swyngedouw 2004, p27). 
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1.1.1.2.2) About Neoliberalism 
 
In the 80s, a strongly intense discursive shift took place, formalized in the 
Washington consensus (1989) and propagated throughout the world - through the 
stabilization and structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank. It is what Stephen Gills called ‘Market civilization’ 
 
“The concept entails, on the one hand, cultural, ideological, and mythic forms 
understood broadly as an ideology or myth of capitalist progress. These 
representations are associated with the cumulative aspects of market integration 
and the increasingly expansive structures of accumulation, legitimation, 
consumption and work. They are largely configured by the power of transnational 
capital”. (Gill 1995b) 
 
These neoliberal policies posits in its most radical statement: 
 
“… the open, competitive and 'unregulated', which are not subject to state 
interference or the actions of social groups, represent the best mechanism for 
economic development”. (Brenner & Theodore 2002) 
 
Through the implementation of these policies the state is assigned with a very 
limited economic role: defining property rights, enforcing contracts, and regulating 
the money supply. 
 
“Regional and national states develop a feeling of progressive pressure towards 
having the capacity to assure an entrepreneurial culture. This feeling is sparked by 
threads (either real or not) of hyper-mobile capital relocating their activities, and in 
order to inhibit this scenario, they practice fiscal constraints; flexibilize labor 
markets; minimize environmental and social regulation, etc.  
This kind of behavior is recognized as the definitive way to competitiveness and 
sustained growth for regional and national economies”. (Swyngedouw 2004) 
 
“…virtually every government, at every conceivable scale of governance, has taken 
measures to align its social and economic policy to the exigencies and requirements 
of this new competitive world (dis)order and the forces of a new truly free-market 
based world economy”. (Peck &Tickell 1995) 
 
But how, precisely, are these constantly agitated spaces of restructuring to be 
conceptualized? 
 
1.1.1.2.3) Concerning Scale 
 
Gualini (Gualini 2006) stated that all of these changes in the world order have 
leaded to rethink the notions of socio-spatial structuration which in turn has been 
key to inquiring into the spatial effects of supra- and trans- nationalization 
phenomena, challenging regional integration and inter-governmental theories 

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based on the centrality of the nation state as a primary unit, he cites Jessop by 
saying that ‘research about the political economy of globalization has thus focused 
progressively on changes in the nature of the capitalist state’ (Jessop 2002a).  
Looking to articulate and apprehend in a more abstract level with what spatial 
research were dealing for quite a time, and after a questioning of terms related to 
spatial disciplines such as space, territory, region, place, locality, etc. The ‘scale’ 
concept (and its derivatives) emerged as a valuable tool, providing an opportunity 
to ’apprehend the world in a dynamic, processed-based manner’(Swyngedouw 
2004).  
Keil& Brenner (2003) signaled that many authors (Harvey, Swyngedouw, Smith, 
etc.) consider the globalization as a geographical euphemism, ‘a deeply 
controversial reorganization and de- territorialization of capitalist spatiality and the 
power relations on a whole range of spatial dimensions and institutional sites 
throughout the world system’. 
 
“The discourse of globalization is shifting, therefore, towards a questioning about 
the unequal dynamics of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of capitalist 
spatiality and the rescaling, under an ongoing capitalist crisis”. (Keil & Brenner 
2003) 
 
For them the ‘scalar’ methodologies developed around the analysis of the 
emerging geographies of political power, from struggles and resistances in the 
entire global system. 
Keil& Brenner (2003) listed the most mentioned assumptions regarding scales: 
( Scales from the urban and regional to the national and global are not given 
but can also be socially produced and are historically variables. In the same 
direction, Gualini (2006) signaled that ‘scale is not a given order, but a 
constitutive dimension of processes of social, economic and political 
ordering’, and also cites Neil Smith “(scale is)…socially produced as 
simultaneously platform and container of certain kinds of social activity” 
(Smith, 1995) to remark that is not a pre-given “platform”, also 
Swyngedouw sees scalar configurations as the outcome of socio-spatial 
processes that regulate and organize social power relations. As a 
geographical construction, scales become arenas around which socio-spatial 
power choreographies are enacted and performed (Swyngedouw 1997).  
( A geographical scale is a process and not a thing: the scaling processes 
contain the territorialization of social relations in a certain geographical 
level (global, national, regional and urban as different scaling processes). 
(  Scales are relational: the meaning and function of every single scalar 
dimension essentially depends on the connections and relationships to other 
scale dimensions within a broader hierarchy of scales. 
 
Gualini (2006) outlined another two main assumptions: 
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( The outcomes of processes of scale formation are tangible and have 
material consequences. 
( Scale effects are seen as ‘political’. However, this implies overcoming a 
narrow understanding of ‘politics’ limited to formal state structures and 
governmental institutions. 
 
1.1.1.2.4) About Re-Scaling 
 
The first statement about scales being not a given ‘platform’ but an evolving 
dimension of social, economic and politic process, has a considerable importance 
(by the similitude of its content by the four cited authors, and) because it leads to 
understand the processes of scalar change, also known as ‘rescaling’. 
And to understand better this notion of rescaling, the assumption about the political 
scale effects provides a clear understanding about ‘rescaling’ mechanisms and how 
they’re not limited to the distribution or re-distribution of established state powers 
but they are questioned at some degree ‘as part of a restructuration of the modes 
of governance and regulation involving changes in the state-society relation and its 
influence on spatial relationships’. (Gualini 2006) 
From the view of Swyngedouw (2004) all of this suggests that the continuous 
reshuffling and reorganization of spatial scales are an integral part of social 
strategies and struggles for control and empowerment. 
 
“Globalization is part of a proliferation of scales as institutionalized, narrated 
objects of action, regularization and governance. The number of discrete scales of 
action that can be distinguished is potentially infinite but far fewer scales actually 
come to be institutionalized as explicit objects of regularization and governance”. 
(Jessop 2000) 
 
So it could be assumed that the new geographies produced by state rescaling and 
restructuring have to be understood through what Brenner labels as a “processual 
analysis of how historically specific configurations of state space are produced and 
incessantly reworked” (Brenner 2004) 
 
1.1.1.2.5) As Regards Governance 
 
These mentioned assumptions highlight the connection with a conception of 
‘governance’ as an emergent and experimental practice, and of the redefinition of 
governance scales as a key component of this experimentation. 
For Bob Jessop governance ‘is defined as the reflexive self-organization of 
independent actors involved in complex relations of reciprocal interdependence, 
with such self-organization being based on continuing dialogue and resource-
sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the 
contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations.’ (Jessop 2002b) 
I would like to mention two more definitions that points in Jessop’s direction: 
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“The term governance represents the notion of steering, and can be seen as a 
shared responsibility of representatives from the state, the market and civil society 
dealing with societal problems”. (Glasbergen & Driessen 2002).  
 
“When talking about governance we generally accept that the state no longer has 
the necessary authority or means to produce a ‘political’ position that adequately 
represents the general or collective interest”. (Lamy & Laidi 2002), as cited by van 
Zeijl-Rozema(van Zeijl-Rozema et al 2008) 
 
While there are a multitude of perspectives and interpretations of the term 
governance, it implies a focus on ‘systems of governing’, means for ‘authoritatively 
allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination’, in which state 
actors are not necessarily the only or most significant participants. (Bulkeley 2005) 
For Gualini (2006) an ‘experimental’ understanding of rescaling processes is in 
line with a conception of governance as a trial-and-error process, according to 
Jessop ‘new governance mechanisms, like new structural forms, emerge from a 
trial-and-error search process which operates through evolutionary variation, 
selection and retention’ (Jessop 1995) as cited in (Gualini 2006), which views the 
outcomes of governance-regulation as emergent, relatively stabilized, but 
constitutively unstable systems of relations.  
In this perspective, governance and regulation must be understood as ongoing 
processes of selection and institutionalization, by which the structural coupling and 
co-evolution of governance-regulation mechanisms and their objects are realized 
(Jessop 1990). 
Accordingly, Gualini (2006) uses the notion of “politics of scale” (Smith 1990) to 
put emphasis on “rescaling” as a process constitutively involved in the quest for 
new forms of governance and regulation.  
As such, rescaling processes bear a dimension that is simultaneously strategic and 
discursive, challenging explanations in terms of “economic determination” as well 
as assumptions of institutional determinism, and raising questions about the 
institutional capacity of state actors to achieve effective outcomes and to stabilize 
them through forms of institutionalization. 
 
1.1.1.2.6) About Environmental Governance 
 
The literature on the politics of scale has provided some significant insights into the 
socially and politically constructed nature of scale, and the ways in which 
processes of scaling and rescaling are intertwined with struggles for dominance 
and control. (Bulkeley 2005) He also considers that governing the environment 
involves both political processes of scaling and rescaling the objects and agents of 
governance, as well as attempts to create new, networked, arenas of governance. 
According to Meadowcroft (2002), it is possible to interpret this change in the 
prevailing management paradigm as a reconceptualization of the scales at which 
environmental problems (and potential solutions) are to be approached.  

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Citing Keil& Brenner (2003): ‘Scales are relational: the meaning and function of 
every single scalar dimension essentially depends on the connections and 
relationships to other scale dimensions within a broader hierarchy of scales.‘  
As such, the ‘priority, both theoretically and politically, therefore never resides in a 
particular social or ecological geographical scale; instead, it resides in the 
socioecological process through which particular social and environmental scales 
become constituted and subsequently reconstituted’ (Swyngedouw & Heynen 
2003) 
Levy and Newell had defined the term environmental governance as a signification 
‘of the broad range of political, economic, and social structures and processes that 
shape and constrain actors’ behavior towards the environment’ (Levy & Newell 
2004). So it can be considered that environmental governance refers to the 
various ways in which are regulated the repercussions of the human activities in 
their natural context, as it is developed within political, economic and social 
framework it inherently implies rule creation, institution-building, as well as 
understandings of acceptable behavior towards the environment, in processes that 
engage the participation of a broad range of stakeholders.  
So it appears to be that on each dimension there has been progression from a 
partial view to a wider and more understandable vision. But at the same time it is 
not that easy to shift among scales, (to go from the particular to the general) 
because this process can result in misleading. The wider and more comprehensive 
vision also brings increased diversity, specificity and complexity. 
 
“While the new approach to environmental governance appears to emphasize 
broader scales, and the locating of problems and solutions in wider contexts, it is 
also leading to more variegated and complex practices”. (Meadowcroft 2002) 
 
Meadowcroft signals that there was a tendency for governments to draw social 
partners (including business and NGOs) into dialogue to develop agreed 
responses to environmental challenges (Meadowcroft 1999) to outline that it 
represents a partial opening of previously closed policy networks, and a widening 
of the range of social actors whose input is considered significant for the social 
management of environmental problems.  
 
“Nevertheless, each of these developments has also added to the diversity and 
complexity of the system of environmental governance. Regional and global 
environmental regimes have not replaced national regulation and initiatives, but 
rather have generated an elaborate, multi-tiered system of governance, which 
actors at all levels find difficult to navigate. National plans have provided 
overviews and contributed to certain kinds of policy ‘integration’. But such plans 
have been established alongside existing processes of planning (such as national 
budget cycles, and land use planning systems) creating a more heterogeneous 
whole. Moreover, national plans have been accompanied by the development of 
specific plans of all sorts (for sub-regions and localities, for particular economic 
sectors such as transport, for environmental themes such as waste disposal, and so 
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on). Here general objectives become more concrete, but they also become more 
detailed, specific, and varied; and the result is a patch-work of ever more 
differentiated perspectives, approaching matters at finer as well as larger scales”. 
(Meadowcroft 2002) 
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1.2)  Main Research Questions 
 
As mentioned before, the objective of this research is to find an answer to the 
question: 
 
Can the sustainable development be reached even when we live in an 
economic system, which is unsustainable in its own nature? 
 
It could be considered that the reason that after 22 years and lot of 
environmental agreements and treaties there’s no solution towards environmental 
degradation, is what Leff (2007) had pointed out. 
 
“The discourse of sustainable development seeks to inscribe environmental policies 
in the adjustment paths that bring neoliberal economics to the solution of 
environmental degradation processes and the rational use of environmental 
resources, while responding to the need to legitimize the market economy. These 
strategies of capitalization of nature have entered into the official discourse of 
environmental policies and their legal and regulatory instruments“.  
 
Sustainable development, as is defined in the Brundtland Report (Brundtland 
1987) states:  
 
“Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.  
 
So, after considering Leff’s statement, this definition can also be seen from an 
economic viewpoint, and therefore it could be defined as the maintenance of a 
resources stock and of the environmental quality in order to ensure the satisfaction 
of the basic needs of contemporary and future generations. Thence, it could be 
assumed that from a pure economic perspective, what is pursued is a sustainability 
of development and not a sustainable development. 
Therefore, the research will be guided through the following questions: 
 
Sustainable development or sustainability of the development? 
( Sustainable development within a capitalist framework? 
( Who is supporting this concept of sustainable development? 
( What are the reasons for the support of such concept? 
( Why it seems that the global goal has everything to do with sustainable 
development? 
( Sustainable development? Of what? 
 
Different varieties of capitalism equals different approaches regarding 
Sustainable Development? 
( Is capitalism compatible with democracy? 

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( What could be the reason for the emergence of the environmental policy 
within the European Union? 
( In which ways do the overarching political and economic context of the 
European Union exercises its influence over national governments and the 
way in which it is being handled the environmental governance? 
( There is a significant difference between both national variants of capitalism 
regarding their approach to Sustainable Development? And if so, which is 
the cause of such difference? 
( What is the significance of the environmental discourse in both nation states? 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
  This chapter has as objective to remark the conceptual framework around which 
the research will be developed. It has been structured with five sections that 
support it. In the first section it is presented the design of the research; the second 
section presents the hypothesis that will guide the study; in the third section the 
objective is outlined; the fourth, fifth and sixth sections deals in turn with the 
arguments for the selection of the case study nations as well as with a reflection 
about developing a comparative study focusing in the environmental governance, 
the seventh section offers a description of the methodology to be used in the 
research, the eighth section presents the strategy to be developed within the 
research and as a ninth section it is presented a final reflection about the 
conceptual framework. 
 
2.1) Research Design 
 
The hypothesis was created after a deep literature review trying to give direction to 
the research towards its objective, so it has also been very helpful to have in 
consideration the research questions. The research then follows with the 
development of the theoretical framework, which is closely related of course, with 
the research problem, and this in turn is approached within the research 
conceptual framework. Furthermore, the research topics (which have a strong 
relation towards the objective and the research questions because its function is to 
fulfill the research objectives) along with the evaluation that would result from these 
topics, are the focus of the research since both sections (based on the objective 
and research questions) would collect the data and findings to be discussed in 
order to present the conclusions of the research. Fig. 3 
 
 
 
Fig 3. General structure of the research. 

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2.2) Hypothesis 
 
Based on the literature review and analysis on the context of economics, 
comparative studies and sustainable development, the following hypothesis is put 
forward: 
 
Sustainable development is a concept that although based in a respectful way of 
interacting with the living species in the planet, has been used as an ideological 
tool towards the expansion of the neoliberal system. And because of this, the 
major global financial institutions have supported it, a fact that has provoked the 
institutionalization of the concept at every conceivable scale as a way to sustain 
economic growth. Therefore, following this train of thought, if the concept is being 
implemented within a coordinated market economy or within a liberal market 
economy makes really no difference at all, as its objective will always be to 
maximize profit. 
 
2.3) Objective 
 
As it was presented before, sustainable development is not only about 
environmental and ecologic considerations but rather a whole set of political, 
economic and social processes. 
This research pretends to contribute to the understanding of this concept, 
analyzing it from a critical perspective, therefore focusing in the facts that gave 
way to the development of the concept and how it has been promoted as the 
general global goal of the planet. All of this by inquiring questions such as: who 
are the supporters of this concept? And why are they supporting it? 
To then proceed to analyze the way in which this concept has been 
institutionalized in Europe and how the overarching infrastructure context of the 
European Union may influence the way in which the environmental issues are 
being handled in the two selected National State, all of these trying to highlight 
differences in governmental, political, and economic institutions among them. 
The drive for developing a comparison based in the varieties of capitalism 
approach is to try to find out what are the motivations of Multi National 
Corporations towards environmental concerns (with the objective to differentiate 
‘real’ environmental concerns from ‘rhetoric’ ones) in the two selected Nation-
States (which in turn represent different capitalist schemes; Germany as a case of a 
coordinated market economy and the United Kingdom as a case of liberal market 
economy) towards a better understanding of the relation between the 
environmental discourse and the ways in which it is being considered in each one 
of the two capitalist schemes.  
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2.4) Selection of the Case Study Nation-States 
 
As the objective of this research is to highlight an array of differences in 
governmental, political, and economic institutions among different capitalist 
schemes, the countries contemplated for the research are Germany and the United 
Kingdom, considering them as examples of a market economy in the case of the 
United Kingdom, and as a coordinated market economy in the case of Germany.  
 
 Coordinated (Germany) Liberal (U.K.) 
Logic Collective ordering Market ordering 
Policy Centralized Decentralized 
Implementation, 
administration 
Decentralized, 
standardized 
Decentralized, varied 
Politics Strong, centralized 
parties 
Individualized political 
markets 
Interest groups Corporatist organization Pluralist organization 
Market economy Coordinated Liberal 
Table 1. Infrastructures for Urban Governance. Source: (Sellers 2002) 
 
2.4.1) Germany 
 
In coordinated market economies, firms depend more heavily on non-market 
relationships to coordinate their endeavors with other actors and to construct their 
core competencies. These non-market modes of coordination generally entail more 
extensive relational or incomplete contracting, network monitoring based on the 
exchange of private information inside networks, and more reliance on 
collaborative, as opposed to competitive, relationships to build the competencies of 
the firm. (Hall&Soskice 2001, p8) 
According to Sellers (2002, p6-7) the organized infrastructure generally attributed 
to Germany and northern Europe presents the type of infrastructure most directly 
opposed to the market model. In this system, lawmakers and norms issued at the 
heights of the state set the broad lines of policy. Strong, centralized parties as well 
as highly organized economic interests help enable this pattern. Administration 
operates in a decentralized manner to carry out this policy, but a national system 
of localized, civil service bureaucracy as well as national parties and organized 
interests help assure consistent local approaches to application. Fiscal equalization 
reinforces these tendencies with equal local financial obligations. The 
standardization inherent in this system helps equalize disparities in policy among 
places, and gives potentially mobile firms and workers less incentive to search for 
more favorable local contexts. Just as the state relies on these elements of formal 
organization, the capitalist order of this coordinated market economy relies on 
organization and institutionalized cooperation. The encompassing, hierarchically 
organized business and labor interests of corporatism shape national economic 
decisions. Industrial relations, worker training, corporate organization, and 
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relations among businesses order the operation markets through collective 
institutions and cooperation among them. Throughout state and society, in what 
might following Weber be termed a formally rationalized system of state society 
relations, an infrastructure of formal organizations shape activity. 
 
2.4.2) United Kingdom 
 
In liberal market economies, firms coordinate their activities primarily via 
competitive market arrangements. Market relationships are characterized by the 
arm’s length exchange of goods or services in a context of competition and formal 
contracting. In response to the price signals generated by such markets, the actors 
adjust their willingness to supply and demand goods or services, often on the basis 
of the marginal calculations stressed by neo-classical economics. (Hall&Soskice 
2001, p8) 
Following Sellers (2002, p6) in the United Kingdom a market-centered 
infrastructure builds upon institutions that require and foster private ordering 
through markets. 
In the governmental and administrative sphere, as well as among political parties 
and interest groups, supra-local institutions here present a decentralized pattern of 
fragmentation. Especially since the 1960s, interventions from state and federal 
governments have remained limited. No uniform system of bureaucracy or political 
organization imposes consistent processes in local administration. Fragmented, 
decentralized local governments and political organization predominate. Rules 
discourage organized political parties. Politics as well as policy-making resemble 
the open-structured, flexible and volatile structures of the marketplace. 
Decentralized fiscal infrastructures for local government also make local revenues 
dependent on local tax bases. The broader dependence of the liberal market 
economy on markets to order production and innovation reinforces and builds on 
these tendencies. In the place of coordinated market institutions, shareholder value, 
fluid labor markets, general educational credentials and contractual relations 
among firms predominate.  
 
2.4.3) Overview of the German and the British Sustainable 
Development Strategies 
 
The first version of the German NSDS was published in 2002 under the name 
“Perspectives for Germany/ Our strategy for sustainable development”, it 
considered the economic, social and environmental dimensions within the 
framework of four guidelines and 21 Indicators, organized along the four main 
guidelines, touching social, economic and ecological policies.  
In 2006, the Statistisches Bundesamt, developed an “Indicator Report”, that 
compared the values of the sustainability indicators to the targets set in the strategy 
of 2002. And it added subthemes to the 21 indicators. 
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In the Progress Report on the National Sustainability Strategy published in 
November 2008, Climate and energy, raw materials (the management of raw 
resources) and demographic change are central topics and the Indicator Report 
2008 has slightly changed compared with the previous edition.  
In 2010, the report has remained mainly unchanged compared with its 
predecessor. 
Towards 2012 the Federal Government held in 2010 a two months civil dialogue 
to sustainability, covering basically two main themes: sustainable management and 
water.  
In 1994 the document “Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy”, was 
published as one of the first answers for the commitments signed in Agenda 21. 
Two years later in 1996, the UK government developed a set of sustainable 
development indicators. The government published in 1998 a consultation 
document. 
In 1999 and after deep consulting and reviewing, the government published the 
strategy named “A better quality of life – Strategy for sustainable development for 
the United Kingdom”. 
Later on the same 1999 as the UK devolved the powers to the administrations of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the UK Government published the report 
“Quality of life counts” (DETR 1999),  the document was intended to give baseline 
data for sustainable development indicators supporting the 1999 strategy. 
Northern Ireland published in 2001 its first formal Regional Development Strategy, 
the Scottish Executive published in 2002 its Strategy and the National Assembly for 
Wales published in 2004 their own Strategy for SD. 
In 2002 the UK Government published Achieving a better Quality of life (DEFRA 
2002)which focused on progress towards SD throughout the year 2001. 
In 2004 a consultation paper was developed to review the UK sustainable 
development strategy with the involvement of civil society, and the response for the 
consultation leaded to the development of the 2005 Strategy, called Securing the 
future (H.M.Government 2005). This included a set of 68 strategy indicators that is 
more outcome-oriented. 
Both strategies were developed from the agreements reached in the Agenda 21, it 
is important to mention that this document was presented with a very low degree of 
formal obligation and therefore it let the developers decide policy when to adopt 
environmental strategies (at least until 97, where the Rio +5 meeting established 
that the national sustainable development strategies had to be submitted by all 
countries at the World Summit to be held in Johannesburg in 2002), because of 
this the UK published its first version in 1994 and Germany in 2002. 
German and British strategies, share their approaches to the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development, are guided by 
Governmental Cabinets and have well established SD governance systems with 
institutions dedicated exclusively to Sustainability. 
Both strategies have arranged consultations dialogues in which the people has 
expressed their opinions to the development of the framework that would orientate 
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their way towards SD, though both strategies have received some criticism, it could 
be assumed, by the level of participation and involvement of the people, that they 
had contributed to define the final NSDS. 
Based on an analysis of both strategies, one could assume that the National 
Sustainable Development Strategies that are driven by governmental institutions, as 
in the case of the German and the British strategies have enabled the strengthening 
of links between national and sub-national levels in both countries, which makes 
clear the fact that these governments are very sensitive to the European 
Sustainable Strategy, which in the version published in 2004, defined the 
importance they place on vertical integration. 
 
“Vertical integration is important for the government of SD, since it addresses the 
fact that some issues which cut across the boundaries of different jurisdictions, of 
supranational institutions like the European Commission, through federal and state 
governments to municipalities”. (European Commission 2004, p15) 
 
Therefore, although the strategies were designed in response to the agreements 
contained in Agenda 21, the motor that drives them is now the Sustainable 
Development Strategy of the European Union. 
This cannot be considered a surprise, given the peculiar nature of its institution-
building process that the European Union and particularly the European 
Commission, has proven to be the most powerful actor in expressing both a 
political intentionality and practices to actively delineate policy "in accordance with 
their own domestic policy styles and regulatory traditions in the hope of minimizing 
the cost of subsequent political and administrative adjustment." (Busch & Jörgens & 
Tews 2005, p151) 
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2.5) Comparative Studies Regarding Environmental Governance 
 
“In a given national context, even fundamentally 
  different regimes may pursue similar objectives. 
Faced with different contexts, even similarly composed 
regimes may find themselves in pursuit of different aims.” 
(Sellers 2002, p 1) 
 
That is why it can be logic to assume a comparative study of the environmental 
politics and governance between two developed European countries (considering 
the European continent one of the most progressive regions in the world regarding 
Sustainable Development, in which almost every government, also the European 
Union at the top have established Strategies for Sustainable Development).  
A cross-national comparative study presents a challenge as it does an opportunity. 
In undertaking comparative, cross-national research from the national standpoint, 
the comparative environmental politics have the chance to innovate by elaborating 
forms of comparative analysis at different levels that can more effectively grasp the 
changing character of the nation-state and the influence that the overall framework 
of the European Union may exercise over it. 
 
2.6) Research Methodology 
 
The study work is a comparative research that will be conducted following a 
deductive approach. Spatially, cross-national comparisons are by far the most 
common and are very constructive. In this direction examining the political and 
economic national contexts of both countries, in order to have a national 
background; all of this aiming to exemplify how two national variants of capitalism 
and policy making can provoke differences in the behavior of governmental, 
political, and economic institutions regarding sustainable development. 
 
2.7)  Research Strategy 
 
This research attempts at the interactions, incorporations and interrelations between 
political, economic and social processes that have derived from the emergence of 
the environmental concerns in the planet, but focusing in the institutionalization of 
such concept within the European Union and the way in which it has been 
delineated the environmental governance in the two selected nation states. So, in 
the attempt to outline the differences in governmental, political and economic 
institutions between the different capitalist models, (coordinated market economy 
and liberal market economy, exemplified by the selected countries) in order to 
address the objective of the research and to find an answer to the main questions, 
the study is divided into three investigation phases. 
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The first phase is the theoretical framework, this is the central core of concepts and 
theories that will support the whole research, and therefore it deals with critical 
analysis of the Sustainable Development concept. Going back to when the concept 
did not existed yet, from its ideological basis and how it gave way to the 
emergence of the environmental consciousness, stressing the way in which the 
concept was presented and questioning the original paragraph which defines it, 
while also signaling the way in which the neoliberal ideology has permeated the 
concept of sustainable development.  
Also in this section and as part of the critical perspective from where this research 
is developed, an analysis of the Global Financial Institutions is developed, where it 
is outlined the way in which the planet is being handled since the end of the 
Second World War, and what is the relation between these Institutions and the 
sustainable development. 
Then, the first section focuses in a critical analysis of the green economy concept, 
which was presented as the cornerstone at the Rio+20 summit in 2012. The 
theoretical frame of the research ends with a subsection covering the role of the 
nation state in the institutionalization of globalization. 
The second phase is the analysis phase, here and trying to have a clear idea about 
the environmental governance in Europe, the section discusses issues such as the 
relation between capitalism and democracy, the way in which it is developed the 
institutionalization of environmental policy as well as the political objectives of the 
environmental discourse within the European Union. After this analysis, the 
research deals with the national states, considering them as economic-social spaces 
in a comparative approach from the environmental perspective, in this way the 
research focuses on policy principles, policy styles, political parties, economic 
structure as well as the environmental policy and environmental administration in 
both nation states. 
The third phase of the research is the evaluation phase, so it outlines how the 
different capitalist schemes have influenced the environmental governance in each 
nation state. In this way and trying to contextualize the `varieties of capitalism’ 
approach, it is presented a brief political economic context of the approaches of 
comparative capitalism. Then, the research proceeds to outline similarities and 
differences between liberal and coordinated market economies. 
As concluding section, the questions of the research are answered,  
 
2.8)  Final Considerations 
 
According to Finger (2008) actors—be they individuals or organizations—always 
act under rules,  which are sometimes also called ‘‘institutions.’’ These rules—which 
can be formal or informal—set the incentives for the actors’ behavior. As such, 
institutions (rules) are never neutral. In other words, no matter how well intentioned 
the actors (individuals and organizations), their behavior is always framed by 
more or less institutionalized rules. Changing these rules is generally beyond the 
power of single actors, as it requires both a long-term perspective and coordination 
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with other actors. Actors always aspire to increase their ‘‘degree of freedom,’’ that 
is, to somewhat influence to their advantage the rules (institutions) that constrain 
their behavior. And then continues to outline that nation-states are a quite 
particular form of institution, for three different reasons. First, nation-states have 
managed to attribute to themselves the monopoly of legitimate violence, which 
makes their rules more easily enforceable than any other rules. Second, and 
building on this monopoly of legitimate violence, an entire legal apparatus and 
profession has been built around nation-states, which institutionalizes state-backed 
rules more deeply than any other rules (Weber 1925). Finally, and precisely 
because of this process of institutionalization, nation-states’ rules have not only 
developed a life of their own, but actively contributed to ‘‘disembedding’’ modern 
society from their (bio-physical and cultural) environments, as well as to 
perpetuating such ‘disembeddedness’ (Giddens 1990; Polanyi 1944). 
Indeed, when it comes to modern society’s relationships with its environment, most 
rules shaping the relevant actors’ (unsustainable) behavior are influenced, if not 
directly determined, by the nation-state. Of course, new supra-national institutions 
have been emerging since, but they remain heavily shaped by nation-states to this 
day. Moreover, when focusing on an international level, nation-states can also be 
actors. 
This is the reason why this research is focused in making a comparison between 
two national states leaded by different modes of capitalism, which may be useful to 
highlight an array of differences in governmental, political, and economic 
institutions that exemplify two of the principal national variants of capitalism and 
policy making among developed European countries and the influence each one 
exercises towards defining a national institutional behavior towards the 
environment- namely the environmental governance, in this sense this research 
pretends to contribute to the discussion about global environmental governance 
from a critical stance regarding the organizational and institutional dimensions of 
the aforementioned variants of capitalism with the objective of have a clear idea 
about what could be expected of these nation-states and the institutions which 
compose each one regarding environmental issues. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
3.1) Sustainable Development, what is behind the term? 
 
The objective of this chapter is to place the research problem within a specific 
knowledge framework in order to provide it with a coordinated and coherent set of 
concepts and propositions, which will function as guide and will help to signalize 
the research boundaries. 
In this direction the approach taken in this chapter is to present an analysis about 
the creation of what could be called an environmental consciousness, that later 
would give way to the development of the Sustainable Development. To proceed 
then to provide a brief historical background about the creation of the Brundtland 
Commission to understand, among many other things, the reasons behind the 
creation of the sustainable development concept; the ways in which this concept 
has influenced almost every area of human activities and how even as it was 
presented as a development which is respectful with nature, environment and future 
generations it shows very little relationship with such concepts.  
 
3.1.1.-  The Ideological implications of the Sustainable 
Development 
 
Actually, it is quite common to hear concepts such as green business, eco-
efficiency, eco-modernism, ecological modernization, as well as to hear many 
proposals about becoming green, or at least greener. All of these concepts are 
considered improvements towards the ultimate global goal: the Sustainable 
Development, but what is defined when these two words are mentioned?  
Usually the term is used, (misused and abused) towards representations of a sound 
development, which is respectful and in harmony with nature, all of this while also 
promoting economic prosperity based in very unsustainable ways of consumption. 
The approach taken in this chapter, is to examine the conceptual history of 
sustainable development, since the appearance of what could be called 
environmental consciousness to the development of the concept Sustainable 
Development by the Brundtland Commission and the influence that the concept has 
exercised in many human activities fields, taking into account the various discourses 
created around the Sustainable Development concept, and focusing specially in the 
way in which the aforementioned concept is used as an ideological assemble 
towards promoting ways of subsistence which cannot be considered sustainable at 
all. 
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3.1.1.1.- Historical Framework of the Environmental Consciousness. 
 
In 1904 the German geographer Ernst Friedrich defined the term Raubwirtschaft -
plunder economy, robber economy- in order to refer to the destructive exploitation 
of the resources in colonialized countries. In 1962 the north American biologist 
Rachel Carson published his book ‘Silent Spring’, in which she synthesized a huge 
amount of information about the contamination by organochloride-based 
plaguicides and his effects in living beings, this book fronted a huge counterattack 
which was organized and led by the whole chemical industry but the chemical 
interests had only increased the public awareness- it could be said that this book 
was the cause of the North American DDT ban in 1973-  so with this it started to 
take notoriety the conception of an environmental consciousness in North America, 
in the framework of the Vietnam war and the huge movement against it. 
The upswing of this environmental consciousness had influenced in many 
economists which suggested the possibility of measuring the wellbeing in terms of 
quality of life instead of the gross product per capita, and that this should be 
corrected in order to take in consideration the loss of not renewable natural 
resources. 
A derivation of the movement against the Vietnam War gave birth in 1969 to the 
Union of concerned scientists, which led one of the few actions against nuclear 
energy. That same year it was created the environmentalist organization 
Greenpeace, which headed actions against French nuclear tests and which has 
extended its roots to dozens of countries, and by January 2009 it counted with 2.9 
millions of members. 
The Sierra Club, founded in North America in 1892, was until 1950 a local 
California organization, and for the most of its existence it was in charge of the 
creation of national parks, it was after 1970 that it started to participate in the 
efforts to protect the environment and because of that it reached half a million 
members, a similar process experimented the Audubon Society, created in 1886 
with the objective of preserve the wild life. 
Another environmentalist organization of international scope is Friends of the 
Earth, founded in North America in 1969 and which eventually counted with 2 
million of members in Great Britain.  
From the seventies, many environmentalist parties started to be created in 
European countries as well as in Australia, New Zealand, Brazil and the USA. The 
most notorious (and it could be say that the most important) is the German Green 
Party – Die Grünen - based then in West Germany and which reached 8% of the 
votes in the German Federal Election of 1987 (Partly due to the impact of the 
Chernobyl disaster which happened just a year before in Ukraine, and to the 
growing awareness of the threat of air pollution and acid rain to German forests), 
it has exercised a decisive influence in Germany’s Nuclear power phase-out. The 
North American Citizens Party, created in the USA in 1979 by the scientist and 
environmental activist Barry Commoner, reached high number of votes, more of 
20% in local legislatures and municipalities. In Australia the Australian Democrats 
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a party founded in 1977 and which eventually had the 12% of the votes in 1990, 
gave a central role to the environmental issues without being a ‘declared’ ecologist 
party. 
In 1968 Aurelio Peccei, an Italian industrialist created an informal organization 
called The Club of Rome, aimed to analyze various global issues and to this end, 
commissioned several studies. One of them, focused in the problematic of 
population, natural resources and pollution at global level, it was developed by a 
group headed by Jay Forrester -an MIT scientist who had developed a method for 
analyzing the behavior of complex systems by means of simple simulation model- 
he in turn assembled a team of young experts leaded by Dennis and Donella 
Meadows, they designed a computer simulation called World3, which included 
five variables: world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and 
resource depletion, it must be outlined that this was a Malthusian model. 
The results indicated that if the tendencies such as increase of population, resource 
consumption and pollution continued to exist in the same scale as they were 
happening, a global environmental catastrophe would take place in the middle of 
the 21st century, because as consequence of the increase of population and the 
insufficient production of food, the mortality rate would increase and this in turn 
would cause a population decrease. That is why the authors suggested that a 
stationary state of population and also a stationary state of productive activities 
should be implemented as goal. 
This group played a major role at the instauration of a global environmental 
consciousness and in the comprehension of the core issues that the humanity faces 
in our time, their great merit consists in giving equal consideration to population 
issues and resources - pollution issues, and also because they have showed the 
urgency of this problematic. 
The results were published in 1972 in the book ‘Limits to Growth’ which raised the 
attention to the Club of Rome and which has sold 12 million copies in several 
translations, however at the time of publication the book did not receive positive 
critics but just the opposite, adverse and severe criticism from political and 
corporate leaders who argued that the growth was a necessary step in order to 
abolish the poverty and that the authors from Limits subestimated the future 
technological advances, the most reiterated argument of the retractors was that the 
technology would have an unlimited capacity to resolve any problem of resource 
scarcity and of environmental pollution, with moderated costs and in relatively 
short frameworks of time. 
The cause of these attacks lies in the teleological vision of the society. Albeit the 
modern economists did not affirm that the divine providence was the cause that the 
GDP grew in a determined percentage, there is a teleological vision which 
underlies in the Adam Smith’s  metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ - according to 
which the sum of selfishness leads to social welfare – so, the implicit belief in the 
‘invisible hand’, namely in the harmony between social relations and nature, is 
present in many of the individuals who think (naively) that more of the same – in 
the socioeconomic field- can only lead to more progress. 
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The Club of Rome represents a minority expression within the upper classes, 
although founded by a businessman and included business executives, the answer 
of both governments and business organizations was overwhelmingly contrary, it 
should be outlined that the position of the Club of Rome facing these attacks was 
quite weak. 
It should be emphasized that also in 1972 took place in Stockholm the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which pretension was to 
induce a process of awareness about the need of incorporate preventive and 
corrective ways over the environmental impacts of the productive and consumption 
practices inside the national development policies, so, it could be said that this 
conference was focused in the technical aspects of the pollution provoked by the 
productive and consumption practices (industrialization, population growth and 
urbanization), reasons which signaled a clearly First-World approach. This 
approach provoked a disparity of polarized arguments between northern and 
southern countries, and thus the final declaration included claims of many 
economically underdeveloped countries about racial segregation, colonial 
oppression, the necessary stability in the prices of raw materials and the sovereign 
right to exploit natural resources. 
The conference promoted the creation of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), to offer solutions to the accelerated destruction of natural 
resources and to the degradation of the environmental quality.  
 
3.1.1.2.- Coining the Term: the Brundtland Report 
 
In 1983 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, former General Secretary of the United Nations, 
based in the resolution 8 of the outcome document of the meeting no. 102 of the 
United Nations General Assembly, asked the Norway’s Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, to create and chair an independent commission in charge of the 
environmental and developmental issues, the World Commission on Environment 
and Development. This commission published in 1987 a study, which could be 
considered as an answer to ‘Limits of Growth’ and it is probably the one who 
reached most impact, the report is called Our Common Future and it is widely 
known as the Brundtland Report. 
In this report, the also known as Brundtland Commission found that poor 
distribution of resources, economic dependency on fossil fuels and overcrowding 
were the structural problems of the global ecological deterioration. This commission 
emphasized the need for a change in the political level and that Sustainable 
Development could be reached only with common efforts of different governments 
but it is affected by a fundamental omission, its neglect to discuss the possibility of 
a global environmental catastrophe and its flagrant lack of analysis of the historical 
experience of the technologies promoted by the dominant social forces, namely the 
production of energy based on fossil fuels, the nuclear energy and the private 
transport system, precisely the systems which most affect the relations between 
nature and humanity and the ones which defy the existence of limits and the 
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possibility of a global environmental catastrophe, without mentioning and 
underestimating the agricultural and industrial production issues.  
If well the report suggests the possibility of limits, without defining them and their 
possible hierarchy, it proposes that their existence would be expressed in 
increasing costs and decreasing performance without referring to other much more 
serious possibilities. 
The report contains valid criticism to the way in which the productive forces have 
been developed, but it should be outlined that it presented a very limited character 
in making criticism and proposals. It does not criticize the consumption and splurge 
patterns of a great part of the population living in developed countries, neither the 
relation between use of resources and quality of life. For the conventional 
economic theory a lower use of resources would imply a lower quality of life. But 
the splurge patterns which are implicit in much of the population of developed 
countries does not mean a good quality of life, because it could be easily argued 
that the quality of life doesn’t mainly depends on a great availability of material 
goods but of the available means to satisfy the needs, (i.e. private transport system 
or public transport system), and of a compromise, connection and participation 
within a physical and social environment. 
The report represented an advance regarding the traditional policies in relation 
with environmental pollution, which in the best of the cases limited to control 
measures of the emissions produced in the industrial processes, of production of 
energy, etc. It accepts the negative long-term effects of several technologies 
currently in use, in particular commercial agriculture, mineral extraction and 
deviation of water streams. The report refers to the technologies, which produce 
heat and harmful gas emissions into the atmosphere, but apparently does not 
clarify if it refers to the production of energy based in fossil fuels and to automotive 
transport. It admits that specific products have high environmental costs, such as 
paper, oil and aluminum, and suggests the inclusion of these costs in the prices, a 
solution that cannot resolve the problem because pollution would be produced, 
with higher costs for the consumer but not for the capitalists. It does not mention the 
environmental cost of energy production by traditional means. It suggests measures 
such as taxation for environmental damage, claim for ‘not harmful for the 
environment’ products, the introduction of environment as a factor in the economic 
competence and of environmental audits as a requirement to commercial loans or 
investments. It does not propose the drastic reduction of inputs to determined 
products, (i.e. the quantity of paper used for journals), but it proposes more 
durable goods, less waste, less raw material use, (i.e. through products that need 
less materials, recycling, biodegradable waste, more energetic efficiency, etc.), but 
besides of the issue of the physical limits of the recycling, which is the benefit of 
recycling with less material waste if through this the production would be increased 
in an unlimited way? In this sense it should be noted that not all of the materials are 
recoverable by recycling, and that the percentage of recovery is conditioned by 
thermo dynamical limits, in order to make clear this point I would like to cite the 
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proposed 4th law of thermodynamics by Georgescu-Roegen2, similar to the second 
one but applied to material instead of energy: 
 
‘…in a closed system it is impossible to completely recover the matter involved in 
the production of work’ (as cited in: Asafu-Adjaye 2005, p24) 
 
this means that it is impossible to get back all the dissipated matter (i.e. tires worn 
out by friction). 
The proposal heads to a dematerialized production, namely with a very low 
material consumption and without waste, but the dematerialization, the reduction 
of waste and recycling have their limits and there lies the objection, also recycling 
requires energy, which in turn requires materials. 
The Brundtland Commission did not raise the possibility that some of the objectives 
could be contradictory among themselves, i.e: in the case of an improved energetic 
efficiency in the use of fossil fuels, this could be achieved through a better 
combustion, reducing some pollutants such as carbon monoxide but increasing 
others such as nitrogen oxide, an ozone precursor. 
The report defends the need of high rates of economic growth; the idea of growth 
as progress index, the compatibility between unlimited economic growth and 
environmental conditions and the capitalistic scheme of a liberal market economy, 
it assumes that every environmental issue could be solved between this 
frameworks.  
The idea that growth is essential to reduce and even eliminate poverty, repeated 
ad nauseam by ideologists of the capitalism of the developed countries as well as 
by Latin-American populists and economists and political leaders, reiterated in the 
Brundtland Report, is nothing but an expression of hypocrisy, because the nature 
of capitalism is to reproduce and expand itself without considering consequences, 
and this leads only to an unequal growth which produces wealth only for a 
privileged sector of the society. 
Besides all of these facts, the report defined what, since then, could be considered 
the battle horse of the Brundtland Commission, and thence, the one of many 
governments and organizations around the globe, from Greenpeace to the World 
Bank, ergo, the concept of Sustainable Development, defined as a development 
which does not affect the possibilities of future generations to subsist. 
This definition is objectionable, to say it mildly, because it does not take a moment 
to ask if the present generation can satisfy their needs without compromising the 
resources which would be required by the future generations, and it is also 
objectionable because it doesn’t suggest the issue of the tasks that the present 
generation, in function of a supposed satisfaction of its needs, forces the future 
 
/	#"$
"$! "$
$!!$!
!"""%



0/
generations to do, as it could be the case of confronting the consequences of the 
increase of the sea level due to the greenhouse effect. The Brundtland Report 
neither explain which would be the results of the proposed development, which are 
the needs of the actual generation and which would be the needs of the future 
ones, in this sense it also doesn’t clarify which are the conditions where the 
development would jeopardize the needs of the future generations. Thus, it could 
be not casual, but symptomatic, that governments, which follow or permit 
destructive environmental policies, have not had any problem in accepting the 
notion of sustainable development in the anodyne way that the report presents it. 
It could be considered that the success of the concept of sustainable development 
could derive from the fact that it can be interpreted in a vast array of manners as is 
correctly affirmed by Philip Brey ‘lack of opposition to sustainable development 
may be due to the vagueness of this notion’ (1997), Roberto Guimarães has also 
expressed himself in the same direction ‘it is nearly impossible to find just one 
social actor of importance who declares to be against it’ (1994, p47). 
 
3.1.1.3.- Questioning the Definition 
 
Luke (2005) signals that the emptiness of the sustainable development concept has 
clung to it from the moment of its official articulation by the World Commission of 
Environment and Development on the Brundtland report (1987), here, the WCED 
declares that ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’.  
Under this definition of sustainable development, Luke (2005, p228) outlines some 
questions that were left hanging or were not even considered when defining this 
concept of sustainable development, like, which needs does this concept refers to? 
Are those needs or desires? And also, how development is understood to prevail 
where and for whom? 
In the same line of thought, Michael Redclift (2005, p213) mentioned that “…the 
simplicity of this approach is deceptive, and obscures underlying complexities and 
contradictions” and makes a critic to the Brundtland definition, signaling that 
‘needs’ change, so it is not probable (as the Brundtland definition implies) that the 
needs of the future generations  would be the same as those of the present 
generation,  and asks, if it is development or economic growth, the primary 
determinant of changing needs, and to what extent does our consciousness of 
changes in our needs or ‘wants’ influence how they are met? 
And connected with this last question it could be formulated another one, which 
also was not considered by the Brundtland definition, of how needs are defined by 
different cultures, “…most of the consensus surrounding sustainable development 
has involved a syllogism: sustainable development is necessary for all of us, but it 
may be defined differently in terms of each and every culture.” (Redclift 2005) 
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These unanswered questions have its base at the opening of the Rio Conference 
back in 1992, when governments, NGOs and business had broadly accepted the 
barely recognized notions of sustainability. 
It is important to outline that this void would continue to be responsible for the 
future misunderstandings regarding sustainable development, this is a logic 
affirmation if we consider that until now the concept has been used (and it is still 
being used) within a very wide framework, and therefore it is being associated 
with very different issues depending on the context in which it is employed. In this 
direction, the sustainable developments is commonly associated with ecological 
and environmental considerations, in this sense it should be outlined that the 
political, economical and social processes which constitute it are only considered, 
when it is analyzed in green or academic circles. This behavior has influenced 
directly the perception of sustainable development, because since the term has 
been presented in the Brundtland Report, we have witnessed the evolvement of the 
term in many different directions, different ways to see the Sustainability influenced 
by a lot of external factors, which as result generate a lot of different approaches 
towards Sustainability, to be more precise I would like to cite two examples: 
Meanwhile Ecuador and Bolivia have developed the concept of Buen Vivir (Good 
living) which is based on indigenous traditions and values (although it has also 
received some criticism), and whose objective is the foundation of a new 
development model - which should be respectful with nature - and in order to guide 
their ways towards Buen Vivir, they have presented new constitutions based in this 
concept that considers itself as a new development paradigm which escapes and 
lies away from the Western paradigm of growth. 
We can see at the other side, the Rio +20 Conference and its ‘almighty’ Green 
Economy concept in whose Outcome document (UN 2012) its  mentioned that the 
green economy would help fight the poverty, but it outlines that the transition to a 
green economy ‘may involve additional costs to their  economies’ (referring 
obviously to the dependent countries), and at the end remarks that ‘the support of 
the international community is necessary’ so it could be considered that the green 
economy is an instrument that legitimizes the participation of the international 
financial organizations on sustainable development issues, in this way, the 
aforementioned institutions would try to convince every possible (dependent) 
country to accept its loans towards overcome the structural adjustments which are 
implicit in a transition towards the green economy framework (more on chapter 
3.2.2). 
Both postures ‘Buen vivir’ and ‘Green Economy’ stand at both extremes, and 
though each one has been generated as a solution towards a sustainable 
development, these postures seem to be mutually exclusive, and of course, these 
are not the only two postures towards sustainable development. 
What is the reason that the Sustainable Development concept has derived in so 
many different approaches? 
It could be considered that the globalization processes could provide a right 
framework towards analyzing the evolving social changes in the world.  
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3.1.1.4.-  The Ideology of Capitalism and its Implications on the 
Perception of Sustainable Development 
 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to demonstrate that the sustainable 
development is headed towards nothing different than a sustainable neoliberalism. 
The main objective, however, is to demonstrate that the neoliberalism hasn’t 
succeeded just because it is an economic strategy which better serves the interests 
of the capitalist class (though it must be stressed that this fact has obviously 
contributed) but mainly because it has been promoted as an attractive economic 
strategy by respected, well organized and trans nationalized institutions all around 
the globe. (See also chapter 3.2) 
The question at this point is, how took place the legitimization of such a sectional 
economic strategy? Looking for answers, this chapter deals with issues such as 
ideology and neoliberalism to then try to find the interactions between the 
aforementioned concepts and the concepts of institution-building and sustainable 
development. 
In the first part the terms of Ideology and neoliberalism are analyzed in a brief 
theoretical and historical framework, which serves as a basis to the this chapter 
and the following one, which then deals in connecting the aforementioned terms 
with the concept of sustainable development and the hegemonic-ideological 
backup that the concept has received. All of these trying to contribute to the 
understanding of the ways in which this scheme has been constructed historically, 
which remains somewhat overlooked in the literature of neoliberalism and 
sustainable development.  
 
3.1.1.4.1. Ideology 
 
According to Corominas (2001) the ethimological origin of the word ideology 
comes from the greek εʹ ίδωλον ’image’; which in turn comes from ίδέα ’appearance’ 
(often used to describe the ideal appearance of a determined object), derived from 
ίδείγ which is synonym of the latín videre; the word enjoyed a somewhat semi-polar 
use in the Middle Ages, judging by the fairly frequent use of it to describe rocks 
shaped in the form of familiar objects. 
Ideology, according to Audi (1999) is a term which is usually accompanied by a 
derogatory connotation, it is often used to refer to opposed (or different at some 
degree) political views.  
In the early twentieth century, Leo Strauss, the political philosopher, held the view 
that political philosophy had been replaced in the twentieth century by ideology. 
“political philosophy has been degraded into merely another ideology” 
(Emberley&Cooper 2004, pxiii). The political philosophy was the study of the 
nature and justification of coercive institutions; this mean that such institutions used 
(at least sometimes) the force or threats of force in order to control the behavior of 
its members. The justification for such behavior lays in the fact that the 
aforementioned institutions wanted to demonstrate that the authorities were entitled 
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to obedience; and that the correlative obedience was a duty of its members, in 
other words, that such institutions had legitimate authority over its members. 
The term ideology was used by Marx when referring to the false consciousness 
shared by the members of a particular social class.  
It must be outlined that for Marx, the effects on natural processes (e.g., conversion 
of nature into objects of labor and their products into commodities, as well as the 
generalized exchange among these products in function of its value) are generated 
by the surplus-production process, which is based in the social relations of 
production, thereby causing a confrontation between wage labor and capital. This 
is why Marx did not conceived the functioning of the economy as a relation 
between things, but sought to account for the social structure that transforms the 
nature in objects of labor (in natural use values capable of being incorporated into 
the aforementioned surplus-production process), which is in general terms what 
Marx called commodity fetishism. Then it is clear, that for the capital the nature is 
nothing but a requirement towards the creation of surplus, in this sense, any little 
thing that exists in nature is prone to be turned into surplus. 
Nature in the form of the means of production becomes part of the capitalist 
process, a mean towards surplus value production, and hence becomes alien to 
labor because it is employed as a mean of exploitation and extraction of surplus. 
Hence the human being in capitalism is not only estranged from production 
(because it doesn’t own the products it produces), but is also estranged from 
nature, which serves capitalist interests: Machinery “in itself it is a victory of man 
over the forces of Nature, but in the hands of capital, makes man the slave of those 
forces“ (Marx 1985, p 465) as cited in (Fuchs 2006, p22). 
With commodity fetishism, Marx lays bare the ideological effect produced by the 
capitalist process of production, in which the reality appears as a relation between 
things. That is why Marx, in the Grundrisse (Marx/Engels 1983, p604-605), said: 
 
“The coarse materialism of the economists, which deals with the social relations of 
production of men and the determinations that things receive as soon as they are 
subsumed under these relations, as if there were natural properties of the 
aforementioned things, is also a crude idealism, and even fetishism, because it 
attributes social relations to things as if they were immanent determinations to them, 
thus mystifying such relationships.”  
 
3.1.1.4.2. Neoliberalism 
 
Regarding neoliberalism, it must be outlined that the concept has become one of 
the most used words in politic, social and economic fields, which are trying to 
analyze not just the extents of the actual economic crisis but also the extent in 
which the social life has been submitted to the requirements of the free market. So 
it could be assumed that the concept represents the continuation of an economic 
phenomenon of remarkable historical meaning founded in an ideological construct 
of progress.  

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As ideology it is based on the denial of state interventionism, which advocates the 
free market and competition as the supreme criteria of economic and social 
organization, linked to the "consumerism" as an intrinsic element of the logic of 
capitalist production. (Mardones&Aguirre 1989) 
Some of the main neoliberal authors such as Hayek, Friedman and Popper 
characterized his own position simply as liberalism, even though there are essential 
differences between classical liberalism and contemporary neoliberalism, for 
example in his conception of ethics and politics. (Vergara 1984) 
The current phase of economic globalization has come to be characterized 
increasingly not by free competition as idealized in neoclassical theory, but by 
oligopolistic neoliberalism: oligopoly and protection for the strong and a 
socialization of their risks, market discipline for the weak.” (Gill 1995a, p405) 
Duménil and Levy stated that modern capitalism, or “contemporary capitalism” as 
they denominated it, has different periods and therefore articulates itself differently 
each time, being neoliberalism its latest period, so, it could be said that it is the 
current representation of capitalism.  ‘…neoliberalism is a social order aimed at the 
generation of income for the upper income brackets, not investment in production 
nor, even less, social progress’  (2011, p1, p22) 
According to Brenner, Peck & Theodore (2011) neoliberalism has become the 
dominant process of regulatory restructuring, they stress the strong influence that 
the market exercises over this process and therefore signal that it could be 
denominated as ‘marketization’ or ‘commodification’ , however they opted for the 
neoliberalization term to highlight the  similarities between the prevailing patterns 
of regulatory restructuring after the seventies and earlier classical liberalization 
project , associated with the British imperialism of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, which is where the roots of the neoliberalism came from. 
Therefore they stated that neoliberalism is historically specific. 
Regarding this issue, it could be helpful to cite David Harvey which in an interview 
explained the difference between liberalism and neoliberalism in the following way 
(Boulet 2013): 
 
“…it began to crystallize in the mid-seventies and was much more centralized , to 
the extent that the power had shifted significantly in favor of the financial sector, 
which since then became the main agent (at least at some extent). That was not the 
case with the liberalism. In the era of liberalism it was understood that the financial 
sector should ease the productive activity, so its role was more that of a lubricant 
than an engine of the accumulation process.” 
 
From the ideological perspective it should be stressed that contemporary 
neoliberalism has essential differences with the classical liberalism, in this sense 
neoliberalism could be considered as the negation of classical liberalism because it 
implies a social Darwinism totally opposed to the ideals, motivations and economic 
and social objectives of the authors of the British political economy, such as Adam 
Smith, Thomas Malthus and Stuart Mill, whose liberalism included a competitive 

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humanist ideal consistent with the revolutionary ideals of the rising bourgeoisie and 
with an ethical conception which expressed the concern of the classical economists 
on the social problem generated by the industrial revolution. 
The incomplete, discontinuous or differential character of the projects designed to 
enforce market rules, or its coexistence with other potentially antagonistic projects 
(eg, social democracy) does not provide a sufficient basis to question its 
neoliberalizing dimensions, therefore it could be assumed that the neoliberalism is 
a hybrid process. 
The neoliberalism has been articulated in an irregular way in different spaces, 
territories and scales as result of continuous confrontations between specific 
neoliberalization projects and the always evolving political and institutional 
arrangements, therefore it could be assumed that the uneven development is not a 
temporary condition, product of an incomplete institutionalization of the 
neoliberalism but instead it is one of its constituent features. 
Brenner, Peck & Theodore argue that the neoliberalism process is a tendency 
because its consequences have been quite enduring and affect many political-
institutional levels. 
State Institutions are always mediating the processes of commercialization and 
commodification that take place in capitalism (or the efforts to spread the "market 
discipline") in several policy areas of production (e.g., labor, money, social 
protection, education, housing, land, environment, etc.). For this reason, Brenner, 
Peck & Theodore (2011) conceived neoliberalization as a particular form of 
regulatory reorganization: it involves the rearrangement of institutionalized modes 
of governance which are collectively binding and, more generally, the relationship 
between the state and the economy in order to impose, distribute or consolidate 
commodified and commercialized social ways of life. That is why they denominated 
the neoliberalization process as a regulatory restructuring subjected to market 
discipline.  
Following the analyses done to the constituent elements of neoliberalism, Brenner, 
Peck & Theodore (2011, p21) formulated the following definition: 
 
“…the neoliberalism supposes a historically specific, hybrid and unevenly 
developed tendency of regulatory restructuring subjected to market discipline.”  
 
It must be outlined a David Harvey’s (2005, p3) sentence which denotes the 
ideological construct of the neoliberal strategy when he states that neoliberalism 
has become hegemonic as a mode of dis- course. It has pervasive effects on ways 
of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense 
way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world. 
Furthermore, the advocates of the neoliberal strategy now occupy positions of 
considerable influence in education (universities and many ‘think tanks’), in the 
media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions 
(treasury departments, central banks), and also in those international institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World 
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Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and trade. (See chapter 
3.2) 
  
3.1.1.4.3.- The World After the Collapse of the Berlin Wall  
 
Five decades ago, based on the ideological zone-regimes created by postwar 
treaties, another cultural and spatial order emerged as western capitalism faced 
eastern communism. It must be underscored that, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
communism has crumbled as a system, and our current world is built on those ruins. 
Therefore, since the end of the Cold War, few places in the globe have held to 
traditional formulas of authority. The Cold War opened the door for further-
accelerated industrial development, which has not only contributed to weakening 
the nation-state further, but has also given rise to further liberalization, often 
accompanied by privatization. Moreover, corporate capitalism is now ubiquitous, 
disseminating a message of ridicule of any alternative to the dominant market in 
the name of freedom.  So-called ‘liberal democracy’ is spreading across the planet. 
It involves privatization, either eliminating unprofitable activities or generating 
income; it deregulates in order to foster markets; it restructures its public services in 
order to lower operating costs. It could, therefore, be assumed that the corporate 
capitalist model prioritizes market-disciplinary solutions to regulatory problems. 
These capitalist strategies are hidden behind democratic and technological 
solutions, which are often misread in triumphalist terms as the “coherent and 
directional history of mankind”, as stated by Francis Fukuyama (1992, p89). We 
can observe that this notion is also demonstrated whenever a scientific issue solved 
through human intervention using fossil fuels or manufactured materials is 
conventionally viewed as a success of management and a contribution to economic 
good, when it could otherwise be easily considered as a hazard to sustainability. 
It should also be noted that this interpretation of the world has a direct relationship 
to the ‘ideology of progress’: namely, the assumption that the domination of nature 
through technological resources – developed, in turn, by the sciences – is the key 
to the well-being of humanity. This viewpoint has its roots in the 17th century and 
emerged with Bacon and Descartes. The idea of economic growth as the key to 
contentment forms part of this ideology, and it arose with Adam Smith while the 
accelerated growth of the industrial revolution was taking place in Great Britain. 
A distinctive feature of this ideology is the massive use of fossil fuels. By the 
beginning of the last century, the upswing of the automobile as the dominant 
means of transport had begun in the USA. Although only the bourgeoisie could 
afford them in the beginning, a variety of the changes brought on by the industrial 
revolution made production cheaper. This, of course, influenced the eventual prices 
of the cars and, in turn, made it possible for middle class families to afford this 
mode of transport as well. The stock market crash of 1929 also favored the 
abandonment of public transport, coupled with the bourgeoisie's lack of interest in 
it. Insofar as its use was generalized, cars were favored by the governments that 
invested a considerable amount of money in the construction of road infrastructure. 
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In this way, this process ran parallel to the decline of railways as well as to the 
substitution of coal with oil – both changes which favored an accelerated 
accumulation of capital in both the automotive and oil industries. 
This also brought along with it a deterioration in the quality of life for those middle 
class sectors that were already in a dire situation, whereas the expansion of urban 
areas, particularly accompanied by the boom in single-family housing and which 
represented huge profits for real estate, incrementally increased commuting time to 
work as well as environmental pollution. 
This ideology of growth, which promised an expansion of human well being, 
insofar as the development of productive forces that continued to grow, constituted 
a key element of the existing ideologies at that time. The Soviet Union and other 
countries of ‘really existing capitalism’ accepted the technological development 
model proposed by the governments/private sectors of the advanced capitalist 
countries. The propaganda of the communist parties often criticized capitalism for 
aspects such as racism, imperialism, and the arms race, but it did not give attention 
to such aforementioned issues related to quality of life. 
Fukuyama’s vision of accumulation without end synthesizes the direction towards 
which the whole planet is headed. 
In this sense, much of the mainstream debate over sustainable development has 
ignored the cultural component, which Redclift (2005) signified as how needs are 
defined in different cultures. While conventional thinking considers sustainable 
development to be necessary for all of us, the analysis does not recognize that the 
concept could be defined in different ways with respect to each culture's own value 
system, not only in the social but also in the natural fields of thought.  
Nowadays, we have an almost unified global economic system. Part of society 
lives in the developed world and is concerned with material wealth as its own basic 
need to be satisfied. It is obvious that this notion of need would differ dramatically 
from that of a society in a dependent country, the main goal of which is to subsist, 
and, therefore, its basic needs are fundamental to the needs of any living being: 
food and shelter. 
Therefore, it is clear that societies define their ‘needs’ in ways that could preclude 
others from meeting their own, and, in the process, the long-term risks for the 
sustainability of other people's livelihoods could increase. However, it should be 
noted that the process through which some societies accrue their choices, thereby 
reducing those of others, is largely imperceptible to people in their daily lives. 
However, it is essential to understand it as a core issue for developing behavior 
that could be considered sustainable. 
Nevertheless, by ignoring the social and cultural differences which create a multi-
layered grid of needs and goals specific to each culture, and by promoting 
consumerism as an ideal of progress, it is habitually supposed that the different 
societies around the globe are all pursuing the same goals. In this way, a lot of 
confusion has been generated regarding the question of what is to be sustained. 
This question has many of approaches and, of course, many answers. It should be 
noted that many of these approaches and proposed solutions are mutually 
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exclusive, and this, in turn, makes clear the existence of absolutely contrasting 
subjacent paradigms of conventional behavior – paradigms that are rarely 
questioned. 
One thing is clear at present: the satisfaction of human needs is mostly operated 
and performed by transnational companies concerned only with the production-
consumption cycles required to supply the satiation of global demand and (if 
possible) with expanding the markets. This desire for expansion is a response to 
the continual need for growth as one of the main features of the capitalist system, 
because it is the only way to widen the capital accumulation process towards its 
valorization – the goal of which is to obtain increased levels of profit each time the 
cycle is fulfilled.  
According to Foster (2010), capitalism can be defined as a system of unsustainable 
development. He explains what Marx called ‘simple commodity production’, an 
idealized economic formation—often assumed to describe the society in which we 
live—wherein the structure of exchange is such that a commodity embodying a 
certain use value is exchanged for money (acting as a mere means of exchange), 
which is then, in turn, exchanged for another commodity (use value) in the end. 
Here, the whole exchange process from beginning to end can be designated by 
the shorthand C-M-C. In such a process, exchange is simply a modified form of 
barter, with money merely facilitating the exchange. The goal of exchange is 
concrete use values, embodying qualitative properties. Such use values are 
normally consumed, thereby bringing a given exchange process to an end. Foster 
proceeds to make clear the point that, according to Marx, a capitalist economy, in 
reality, works altogether differently, with exchange taking the form of M-C-M′. 
Here, money capital (M) is used to purchase commodities (labor power and means 
of production) in order to produce a commodity that can be ultimately sold for 
more money, M′ (i.e. M + Δm or surplus value). This process, once set in motion, 
never stops of its own accord, since it has no natural end. Rather, the surplus value 
(profit) is reinvested in the next round, with the objective of generating M′′; in the 
following round, the returns are again reinvested with the goal of obtaining M′′′, 
and so on, ad infinitum. 
The fact that this cycle has a direct relationship to the ‘unsustainability’3 of the 
sustainable development concept must be outlined. 
It is because of this logic of permanent (and apparently unstoppable) expansion 
that we are now witnessing increasing problems of pollution, erosion, 
desertification, global warming, over-exploitation, plundering, predation, and 
suppression of natural and human resources. All these factors are indeed 
considered ‘undesirable consequences’ for the majority of countries on the planet 
and are defined as goals to be eradicated and suppressed in many international 
agreements, though they are simultaneously prerequisites for the proper 
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establishment and reproduction of capitalist relations. Therefore, it could be 
assumed that, in the methodological adjustment of the global production processes, 
the concept of sustainable development has turned out to be an economic, not 
simply an environmental, calculation. 
The above-mentioned could be helpful for understanding the ideological 
conception behind sustainable development, which, in this way, might (not only) 
preserve some fragments of nature, soothe some green consumers, or pay homage 
to the planet, but also enhance corporate profits, national productivity, and state 
power. For transnational corporations, obeying the sustainable development 
strategy is not a sacrifice, because it makes them apt to sustain development. In this 
sense, if being green, or at least greener, sells, then the rhetoric of ‘sustainable 
development’ could be used as a developmental strategy towards promoting a 
green commodification campaign. In so doing, through a green campaign, a 
marketing firm creates green advertisements and propagates them through the 
appropriate media, thereby creating a niche market. Then (once these new 
consumers have been identified), the green consumer goods can be supplied in 
order to fulfill their needs; it must be underscored that the fulfillment of these needs 
will be met by global capital. 
As Baudrillard observes: 
 
“The consumption of individuals mediates the productivity of corporate capital; it 
becomes a productive force required by the functioning of the system itself, by its 
process of reproduction and survival. In other words, there are these kinds of needs 
because the system of corporate production needs them. And the needs invested by 
the individual consumer today are just as essential to the order of production as the 
capital invested by the capitalist entrepreneur and the labor power invested in the 
wage laborer. It is all capital.” (1981, p82) 
 
The transformation of the capitalist system of production accumulation has 
generated a very specific kind of society and discourse, in which consumption is 
one of the main mechanisms of social integration (Ewen 1988). These relations of 
power are strategic and diffuse.  
The consumers are not only a raw material to be colonized and disciplined by the 
social order, but also one of the resources that reaffirm it, express it, and 
reproduce it. “The individual is formed from a series of processes and systems 
which do not respond to a nature… but obey historical, political, and social 
conditions” (Castro 2006, p173). And in today's consumer society, green 
discursive practices are closely linked to the stimulation of being connected to the 
earth by buying some specific type of green product. 
In this sense, we are cultivating the concept of consumer society, wherein needs 
are no longer vital, but they are instead imposed. In this vein, the needs of the 
individual have changed because this individual does not only have the need to 
eat, but (in connection with that) he also has the need to eat organic or green 
products. This is because the action rearranges and readjusts itself in the function of 
the productive system’s exigencies. 
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"If the problem of bad equilibrium established in previous centuries was to produce 
enough to meet needs, the new problem consists of creating the need to consume 
what is produced" (Salvat 1975, p32). Using this logic, consumerism seeks to 
represent the postmodern form of freedom (Rojas 1992), in which the individual 
believes that he acts freely, but his independence often clashes with the 
prohibitions set for coexistence. 
Luke (2005, p238) asserts additionally that the consumer is not docile, (s)he is an 
active, erratic, and capricious supporter of every unsustainably developed circuit of 
corporate globalism’s power and its effects, and must be captured and convinced 
of the merits of each commodification campaign.  In this way when a rhetoric of 
sustainable development takes root, consumers want to believe that buying the 
right stuff gets them ‘reconnected’ to the planet, so one must recognize how 
individual subjects often struggle to reposition by their possessions in the manifold 
agendas of a green transnational globalism. 
It should be emphasized that these kinds of needs are always manipulated to reach 
the condition of being transcendent, showing consumption as the route towards 
achieving perfection, self-esteem, social success, and, lately, a definitive way to re-
connect with the planet, as well as to nurture it. 
Foucault states that the analysis of a discourse is the attempt to reach the network 
of structures that conforms to it in order to see the moment when the elements 
begin to unravel, to see those that are missing and present, their locations and 
meanings, and to seek the relationship between the subject, his/her discourse, and 
the larger social discourse. Thus, the work, production, and consumption put at 
stake a quest for the construction of a kind of subjectivity, which is increasingly 
individualistic. Power operates here, not only to create, monitor, and normalize a 
mass of workers, but also to introduce and discipline consumers. There is a 
‘political anatomy’ that is also a ‘mechanic of power’ [which] defines how to take 
hold of the body of the other, not just for them to do what you want, but to operate 
as is desired and according to the determined speed and efficiency. (Foucault 
1998, p141). 
The sustained capacity to develop in a supposedly green way enters the battlefield 
at this point, when corporate ideologies of individual empowerment are reaffirmed 
with each act of personal-artifact appropriation as signs of, once more, backward 
markets attaining greater economic and social development. In this sense, the 
sustaining of the ability to further advance the prevailing mode of development is 
regarded as ‘the best one can get’ among the world’s neoliberal programs for 
capitalist expansion. (Luke 2005, p234) 
Following this thread, Campbell (Campbell 1996, p312) stresses that “in the battle 
of big public ideas, sustainability has won: the task of the coming years is simply to 
work out the details and to narrow the gap between theory and practice”. Such 
reasoning only underscores how one-dimensional advanced capitalism has 
become. 
Habermas also expressed a critique in this direction when he asked, “Can 
civilization afford to surrender itself entirely to the…. driving force of just one of its 
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subsystems – namely, the pull of a dynamic … recursively closed economic system 
which can only function and remain stable by taking all relevant information, 
translating it into and processing it in the language of economic value?” 
(Habermas 1971)  
Even when sustainable development is seen as the global goal, it is also true that 
many of the approaches to reaching it have reconfigured the perception of reality 
in very intangible ways, and many of these perceptions have one thing in common: 
they consider things such as equality, distribution, and respect for nature simply as 
anachronisms opposed to the market. 
A quote that helps one to understand this kind of behavior in today's global society 
is the following:  
 
“The development of the economic system no longer responds to the question, what 
is good for Humanity? It only responds to the question, what is good for the growth 
of the system?” (Fromm 1976, p20). 
 
At this point and in order to better explain the way in which the world is being 
‘homogenized’, I think it is necessary to quote Ulrich Beck’s distinctions between 
globalism, globality, and globalization (Beck 2000, p9-10). Globalization is a 
process through which sovereign national actors are undermined by transnational 
actors with varying prospects for power, orientation, identities, and networks. 
Globality, by contrast, marks the existential conditions of a world society, which 
are comprised of all the social relationships that are not integrated into, or 
determined (or determinable) by, national-state politics. 
Globalism is unique, actually. It represents a rising professional-technical-
intellectual worldview in which “the global market” eliminates or supplants political 
action. That is the ideology of neoliberalism – rule by the world market. It reduces 
the multidimensionality of globalization to a single economic dimension, which is 
itself conceived in a linear fashion. 
Beck argues that globalism brings a set of beliefs and practices that suggests that 
states, societies, and cultures run like a capitalist enterprise; here, the ceaseless 
crusade for performance and profit appears to be the essence of globalization. 
Therefore, it could be assumed that international argumentation has ignored 
characteristic and particular definitions of what is sustainable in favor of the rather 
exclusive system of knowledge preferred by the dominant scientific paradigm. 
 
3.1.1.5.  Conclusions 
 
The main focus of this critique is to expose a conservative ideology that cloaks 
reality in order to inhibit the desire to change it, and, therefore, like any 
conservative ideology, it selectively calibrates the world according to an 
established power configuration, which is the one that purports to preserve and 
consolidate. It presents a contingent configuration of reality as indispensable and 
inevitable and, therefore, presents all economic, political, and social factors as 
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merely the results of the interrelation of dynamics inherent to technology, justified 
commonly as the way towards progress, veiling, of course, the fact that all these 
factors are actually the products of individual decisions made in terms of objectives 
and interests. It must be stressed that, most of the time, these objectives and 
interests are economic. 
The dynamics of the market and the self-serving pursuit of pecuniary gain above all 
other considerations are exalted as the embodiment of reason and progress, 
considered to comprise a decisive step towards modernity, and even towards 
‘postmodernity’, which, in many ways, signals a return to more perverse and 
predatory forms of capitalism. 
It is clear that sustainable development assumes significance in the same moment 
when the centers of world power declare the shortcomings of the state as the 
engine of development and instead propose the market as its replacement, while 
also declaring shortcomings in governmental planning.  
The thesis of sustainable development focuses on the policy level. It aims to 
regulate capital and make capital internalize social and environmental costs as is 
deemed most beneficial to that capital and the environment as a whole. This means 
sustainable development equals sustainable remuneration (i.e. sustainable 
capitalism). 
The basis of this system is also its downfall, which Marx identified as the inherent 
contradiction of the system, emphasizing that the hardest phase of a crisis has 
always resulted in investment of capital in various ways, which, in turn, transforms 
this phase into a starting point for new investments. He made this statement from 
the point of view of society as a whole in order to signal that this act of alternative 
investing would be the material basis for the next cycle. This statement could be 
very useful for understanding the way in which the concept of sustainable 
development has been used since the nineties as an environmental euphemism to 
allow the unfolding of the neoliberal agenda, at a global scale, towards promoting 
sustainability of development hidden behind a promising green mask. This green 
mask is now deeply embedded in the logic of normalization found in global 
governance regulation and is compatible with the neoliberal method of production 
and distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


12
3.2) Economic Conceptualization of the Sustainable Development 
 
One of the objectives of this section is to show that the neoliberalism has 
succeeded because it has been promoted as an attractive economic strategy by 
respected, well organized and trans nationalized institutions all around the globe, 
as the advocates of the neoliberal strategy now occupy positions of considerable 
influence in education (universities and many ‘think tanks’), in the media, in 
corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions (treasury 
departments, central banks), and also in those international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and trade. 
 The main objective however, is to demonstrate the deep connection between the 
concept of sustainable development and the international financial institutions 
which objective is to promote the global economic growth, analyzing also the 
concept of green economy in order to make clear the fact that its objective rather 
to allow a sustainability of the environment, is to permit a sustainability of the 
economic growth. 
 
3.2.1. -  Economy and Sustainable Development 
 
The past chapter of this research has presented an analysis about the creation of 
what could be called an environmental consciousness, that later would give way to 
the development of the Sustainable Development concept and how this concept has 
been presented and used towards promoting a kind of development which has 
almost nothing to do with sustainability but has a deep relation with economic 
growth. 
One thing is clear, the globalization is a phenomenon which has economic bases - 
one must take a superficial look at the International Institutions which shape the 
global economy, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization to note that these Organizations are dominated by the most 
powerful economy in the World and therefore are permeated with the ideological 
construct which better serves to the interests of the USA- this economic 
globalization is the main responsible of natural resources exhaustion, ecosystem 
annihilation and uneven distribution of wealth and income in many parts of the 
globe. 
So, under this light, a logical question would be, can the economy be seen as a 
tool to improve the wellbeing of the planet, and therefore as a necessary step 
towards sustainability? 
Can the economy change its actual face and what is more important; change its 
behavior in order to improve ecosystems rather than destroy them? 
Because that is what it needs to do if it wants to be related with Sustainable 
Development. 
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This chapter, thence, deals with the functioning of the global economic system and 
will help clarify its deep connection with the greening of the globe under the motto 
of ‘Sustainable Development’. 
  
3.2.1.1. The World after the WWII 
 
It could be said that the origin of this economic phenomenon of globalization lays 
in the postwar agreements reached in ‘The United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference’, held from the 1st to the 22nd of July of 1944 at Bretton-Woods, New 
Hampshire, United States, and therefore commonly known as the Bretton Woods 
Conference. The objective of the aforementioned Conference was to establish the 
rules to regulate the international monetary and financial order after the World 
War II in the understanding that these agreements would promote economic 
growth and would be helpful towards avoid a global economic depression similar 
to that of 1930. 
John Maynard Keynes -representing the United Kingdom and its desire for 
economic stability- and Harry Dexter White -representing the USA and its desire for 
free trade- laid the groundwork for the economic planning in the postwar period, 
one of the immediate objectives was the reconstruction of the war-damaged 
industrial nations. 
Keynes had proposed the creation of a global common unit of currency called 
bancor, argumenting that it was necessary as a global accepted vehicle for 
investment, trade, and payments in the foreseen new global economic system 
along with two new global institutions - a world central bank and an International 
Cleansing Union- which would be in charge of the regulation of the international 
trade with strong incentives for every country in order to avoid substantial trade 
deficits or surpluses. As outlined by Keynes, countries with payment surpluses 
should increase their imports from the deficit countries and thereby create foreign 
trade equilibrium. (ECA 2011, p3) 
Another thing that should be remarked is the fact that the Soviet Union was not 
part of this International Monetary Fund because they were creating an alternative 
economic model and that although 44 nations attended this ‘United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference’, the word  ‘international’ meant Europe, 
When Keynes was asked, “Does this apply to India and the rest of the (British) 
Empire?” he replied, reflecting the colonial view, “That must wait until the 
reconstruction of Europe is much further advanced” (Kapur&Webb&Lewis 1997, 
p61) as cited in (Goldman 2005, p53) 
A similar response surely was received by Victor Urquidi, a Mexican delegate who 
tactfully argued that Europe could not be reconstructed without the raw materials 
and the markets of the South: So wouldn’t capital be best spent in the colonies to 
help reconstruct Europe? (Kapur&Webb&Lewis 1997, p69). 
 No matter what the ‘southern’ delegates argued, the delegates from the United 
Kingdom and the United States did not take their proposals seriously. Keynes in 
fact, had anticipated those kind of arguments and because of that he proposed to 
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Harry White a one on one meeting between the USA and the UK to negotiate 
every issue of the ‘International’ monetary and financial order without discussing 
with “twenty-two countries which clearly have nothing to contribute . . . “ 
(Kapur&Webb&Lewis 1997, p69) but White and the enormous political power of 
the USA backing him, stated “There is nothing that will serve to drive these 
countries into some kind of—ism—communism or something else—faster than having 
inadequate capital” (Kapur&Webb&Lewis 1997, p61). So it could be said that the 
majority of the Third World countries had no choice but to acquiesce in the 
International Economic System established in the Bretton Woods agreements, thus 
they remained politically and economically dependent to the US and its plans, 
being since then hostages of a severe financial austerity regime.  
Another thing that should be outlined is that White also objected the creation of the 
bancor, request that was granted at the conference, mainly due to the fact that the 
devastated Britain had no choice but to ask for aid, making the US dollar the 
global ‘reserve currency’. In the same direction White also influenced the 
management system of the aforementioned organizations proposed by Keynes. So 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, now the World Bank) were created 
according the North American perspective, in fact both institutions have its 
headquarters in Washington. Thus there were no incentives for States to avoid a 
large trade surplus and therefore the burden for correcting a trade imbalance 
would continue to fall only on the deficit countries, precisely what Keynes tried to 
avoid. 
As the US dollar took the role of the ‘global reserve currency’ it took also the role 
that the gold standard has played before in the international financial system. 
(Prestowitz 2003) The US decided to set up a system of fixed exchange rates 
managed by these newly created international institutions to link the dollar to gold -
at the rate of $35 per ounce of gold- so any government and central bank would 
be able to exchange dollars for gold. In this way the dollar was the currency with 
the most purchasing power and the only one that was backed by gold, so it could 
be said that this is how the dollar became effectively the world currency. 
Through that, the ‘Invisible Hand’ of Adam Smith turned out to be a ‘tangible’ 
hand which, since then has had special consideration with the transnational 
corporations, the only beneficiaries of the global economic integration agreements 
signed in Bretton Woods. 
 
As Cox (1994) stated it:  
 
“The characteristics of the globalization trend include the internationalizing of 
production, the new international division of labor, new migratory movements from 
South to North, the new competitive environment that accelerates these processes, 
and the internationalizing of the state…making states into agencies of the 
globalizing world.”  
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In the same line, Daly (1999) expressed:  
 
“Globalization refers to global economic integration of many formerly national 
economies into one global economy, mainly by free trade and free capital mobility, 
but also by easy or uncontrolled migration. It is the effective erasure of national 
boundaries for economic purposes.” 
 
As Cox and Daly remarks, these processes help to erode the national sovereignty 
and therefore it could be considered that these processes also helped to develop a 
global economic interdependence in which the individual nation-states no longer 
have the faculty to regulate capital. In this context it is implicit how the political life 
in many parts of the globe have been configured, at least at some degree by 
neoliberal economic and politic principles. 
“Thus this globalization phenomenon is part of a wide process of restructuration of 
the relation between State and civil society, and of the political economy and 
culture. It is also an Ideology largely consistent with the worldview and political 
priorities of large-scale, internationally mobile forms of capital. Politically is 
consistent with the outlook of affluent minorities in the OECD and in the urban elites 
and new middle classes in the Third World. The current phase of economic 
globalization has come to be characterized increasingly not by free competition as 
idealized in neoclassical theory, but by oligopolistic neoliberalism: oligopoly and 
protection for the strong and a socialization of their risks, market discipline for the 
weak.” (Gill 1995a, p405) 
It is important also to cite Kotz (2002) at this point: 
 
“In much of the Third World and in the transition countries, the United States has 
been successful in dictating neoliberal policies, acting partly through the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank and partly through direct pressure.“ 
 
That could be helpful to understand why the promoters of globalization have held 
the global postulation that an economic growth would reduce poverty and with 
that objective in mind they suggested an instauration of an economic strategy 
which permits a rapid industrialization process of a country, such as an export-
oriented Industrialization model, and towards its implementation they propose 
policies such as reduction of tariff barriers, a floating exchange rate (where a 
devaluation of national currency is often employed to facilitate exports), and 
government support for exporting sectors. In this economic strategy the 
beneficiaries are of course, the neoliberal elite in dependent countries or the 
transnational corporations established in these countries, which in turn only 
increments the economic disparity among the always-disadvantaged population 
and the aforementioned neoliberal elite. 
This kind of industrialization also unleashes a set of processes in which energy is 
consumed and waste is generated, therefore it could be assumed that it is very 
doubtful that this development model could incidentally promote sustainability. 
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I would like to outline the World Bank’s motto ‘Working for a World Free of 
Poverty’ and in this sense I would also remark a paragraph which was found at the 
webpage of the International Monetary Fund (2012) “The IMF promotes 
international monetary cooperation and exchange rate stability, facilitates the 
balanced growth of international trade, and provides resources to help members in 
balance of payments difficulties or to assist with poverty reduction.” 
If poverty reduction is supposedly the main goal of these institutions, why their 
neoliberal adjustment policies usually enrich the aforementioned transnational 
corporations?  
All of these issues bring us back to analyze these institutions founded at Bretton 
Woods. 
 
3.2.1.2.- International Monetary Fund 
 
As it was mentioned before, the International Monetary Fund was established at 
the Bretton Woods Conference in the closing stages of World War II. The 
participants represented the governments soon to win the war. They were 
concerned about the rebuilding of Europe and of the global economic system after 
a devastating war, the International Monetary Fund could be considered the lead 
institution of this Conference, and was imagined by Maynard Keynes as a 
cooperative fund where member states could draw upon to maintain economic 
activity and employment through periodic crisis. In the other hand, the US 
delegation, represented by Dexter White envisaged an International Monetary 
Fund which would be managed as a bank, and in this sense, as a bank, would 
work on the basis that you can borrow money if you demonstrate that you do not 
need it, or if this is not the case, you can borrow money only after accepting the 
conditions imposed by the bank, conditions that seek to ensure that the loan is 
repaid on time, thus, it could be considered that the primary beneficiary is the bank 
and not the customer. The political and military power of the US along with its 
concerns of inflationary pressures in the postwar economy, joined with its desire to 
become the World’s creditor nation can be considered the causes of the 
instauration of this economic approach which has prevailed since the Conference, 
and thus, the loans are the way in which the economic crises have been handled 
since then. As it was signaled, a government has to agree to a set of conditions in 
order to borrow from the IMF. The package of conditions has varied over time, 
and varies to a certain extent with the particular government concerned. Usually 
the conditions include (Crow 2004):  
( Devaluation of the currency – to make imports more expensive (to buyers 
within the country) and exports cheaper (to foreign buyers). 
( Raising interest rates – to make loans within the country more expensive.  
( Elimination of restrictions on financial markets - this opens up the national 
currency to financial speculation and contributes in turn to the bankruptcy of 
national firms. 
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( Reducing government spending to bring it in line with revenues. This usually 
means that health and education spending and employment in government 
must be cut. Most governments protect the other major part of spending on 
the military and the police. Government-funded services are also affected, 
thus subsidies to consumers for food or energy must also be interrupted 
while direct and indirect subsidies to export industries are encouraged and 
promoted. 
( There may also be privatization of government enterprises, including water 
and power utilities, and state purchasing agencies. 
These conditions institutionalize the neo-liberal disposition of the IMF, and are a 
clear example that through its conditionalities, the IMF demonstrates to be the 
antipode of sustainable development.  
 
3.2.1.3.- World Trade Organization 
 
At the Bretton Woods Conference, it was recognized the need of lowering tariffs 
and eliminate barriers which might hinder the international trade, and towards this 
end they had devised an organization to complement the IMF, the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), though at the Conference no agreement was signed 
and even when the US Congress refused to ratify the ITO Charter (which was 
developed on Havana) arguing that such an organization would compromise the 
national sovereignty, it laid the foundations to the creation of an organization in 
charge of the governance of international trade. In this direction the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) originated in 1947 in ‘what was initially conceived as a 
temporary arrangement: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This 
agreement committed members to reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade, and 
to eliminating discriminatory treatment in international commerce - the 
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment - requiring any privilege granted to 
one country to be accorded to all other contracting parties. Given the focus on 
inter-state bargaining and reciprocal trade openness, the GATT system of rule-
making followed a diplomatic model. Agreements were to be concluded in 
negotiations over the reciprocal concessions each Contracting Party would take 
upon itself in return to concessions offered by the other Parties. The agreements, 
which included general obligations as well as particular assignments to specific 
countries, would be approved by consensus. Following the initial signing of the 
GATT in 1947, the Agreement was renegotiated once every few years in “rounds” 
of multilateral negotiations.’ (Chorev&Babb 2009, p466) 
In 1986 it was resumed the round of trade negotiations at Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
which was concluded in Marrakech in 1993, though USA President William Clinton 
signed the Master Agreement in 1994 and finally in 1995 the WTO was 
established. Unlike the GATT, the WTO was a permanent and formal organization 
and that brought a radical change in the governance of global trade, it has 
expanded the scope of its jurisdiction and hardened and enforced its rules of 
applicability. The US administration wanted to make it difficult for governments to 


2.
impose restrictions, such as local content requirements or technology-sharing 
arrangements, on American investors. It sought to create a more favorable climate 
for exporting American services abroad— for example, by making it more difficult 
for foreign governments to regulate or restrict the entry of American firms in areas 
such as banking, telecommunications, health care provision, and utilities. 
(Chorev&Babb 2009,p 470) 
This organization –as it was mentioned before- is the one that seeks to obstruct the 
regulations that certain countries may apply to international trade and in this sense 
it may impose permanent sanctions against offender countries of its trade 
prescriptions.  
 
3.2.1.4.- World Bank  
 
Also at Bretton Woods it was arranged the foundation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Finance (IBRD), it should be outlined that the ‘World Bank’ term 
usually refers to the IBRD along with the International Development Association 
(IDA), its ‘soft lending window’ (Ottenhoff 2010) as both organizations share the 
same staff.  
 The objectives of the Bank were: to encourage the expansion of world trade and 
to finance the reconstruction of the war-devastated European continent (as its 
original name indicates it), but functioning always as a complement of the IMF.  
These ideals however, were reoriented after the implementation of the Marshall 
Plan. Officially known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan 
dispensed over $13 billion between 1948 and 1952 to Western European 
countries constituted as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC). Over 90 percent of this aid was in the form of grants. (Wood 1986, p29-
30) 
So it could be assumed that because of the Marshall Plan, the Bank had to reinvent 
itself as a bank for the non-European world, and therefore the Bank’s mission 
shifted from reconstruction of Europe to development of Europe’s remaining and 
former colonies. 
Summarizing the history of the Bank, according to Goldman (2005, p14-17): 
( The flag of development characterized the fifties and sixties and with that 
objective the Bank kept lending dollars (with high rates of interest) to 
purchase power plants, transmission grids and many other capital-intensive 
goods from Northern firms. 
( By the seventies with the rising surplus of Eurodollars and Petrodollars 
coupled with a mounting US deficit and a North-American economy stuck in 
military expenses, Nixon decided to end the Bretton Woods System, this in 
turn represented the beginning of a US guided mandate to deregulate flows 
of international finance capital in ways that would ultimately benefit the 
North-American economy, Robert McNamara (former president of the Bank) 
took advantage of this overflow of capital and expanded its lending 
capacity, thence turning the institution into a global player. 
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( In the decade of the eighties and as overspending raised the Southern debt 
crisis, the IMF in conjunction with the Bank and the US treasury found 
themselves in need to articulate a completely new program for its lenders. 
The new version of the modernization model emphasized state fiscal 
austerity, market liberalization, and public-sector privatization for the South, 
the three pillars of what came to be called the “Washington Consensus”. 
When this neoliberal development agenda took root, it was highly 
draconian. The countries that followed the Bank/ IMF prescriptions most 
closely, -often with little choice- experienced in the 1980-2000 period a 
sharp reversal of the economic gains of the previous two decades (1960-
1980).  It must be outlined that China, India, and South Korea—the countries 
that had rejected the strict neoliberal prescriptions of currency devaluation; 
elimination of trade barriers and capital regulations; state fiscal austerity; 
and the privatization of public goods, services, and infrastructure didn’t 
suffered the neoliberal whiplash in the same intensity as the ones who 
implemented the neoliberal prescriptions. 
( In the nineties, after a decade of Washington Consensus ideological 
dominance, the Bank hired Joseph Stiglitz as its chief economist in 1997, he 
promoted a post-Washington consensus which concluded that the Bank’s 
and IMF’s neoliberal orthodoxy had created a series of colossal disasters 
around the world, such as the collapse of the Mexican, Russian and East 
Asian economies and that these neoliberal prescriptions were the main 
responsible of the economic crisis in Latin-America and East Asia. Stiglitz 
argued that these particular modernization policies had become “ends in 
themselves, rather than means to more equitable and sustainable growth. In 
doing so, these policies were pushed too far, too fast, and to the exclusion 
of other policies that were needed.” (Stiglitz 2002), as cited in (Goldman 
2005, p16). 
( After the year 2000 the crowd of the Post-Washington consensus has 
diverged in two main groups. One says that the Bank and the IMF need to 
set up many more safety-net and social welfare institutions to blunt the 
impact of neoliberal policies, in other words, that both institutions should 
dispense with their “shock therapy” approach to change and instead 
prepare countries for global integration on a more gradual schedule, with a 
greater sensitivity toward local differences, needs, and capabilities, fearing 
a world full of poverty considering it as prone to set up a revolution. The 
other group states that the Bank should go back to its original mission, they 
assume that by becoming leaner and more discerning, the Bank and IMF 
can return to what they imagine these institutions once were: shrewd 
catalysts for economic development in the third world. 
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3.2.1.5.- Bretton Woods Institutions and Sustainable Development 
 
After this brief resume of the Bretton Woods Conference institutions it is clear that 
they were the main responsible for the crisis in the eighties and the nineties and 
thence of the economic chaos in which the world is sunken nowadays, but 
regarding the title of this chapter little has been said, and towards that end a 
question which emerges is the next. What is the relation (if any) between the 
Bretton Woods Institutions and the Sustainable Development? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to go back and analyze the 
evolution of the aforementioned institutions and the way in which its direction has 
been reoriented as well as the reasons behind these reorientations. 
As it was mentioned in this section, the main tasks of the early World Bank -
established in Washington and run by Wall Street bankers- were, to reconstruct the 
old colonial infrastructure for its main clients, which were, New York and London 
based Banks, so it is clear that in those early times reducing poverty was never on 
the agenda of the Bank. 
How then, the World Bank decided to direct its efforts towards ‘Working for a 
World Free of Poverty’, and what is most important, why? 
In this direction I would like to cite Goldman (2005, p34) which paragraph about 
the Bank’s ways to open up new horizons for intervention could be very helpful. 
“The Bank has never had trouble raising money; its trouble has always been in 
lending it. To drum up continuous business in a circumspect world, the Bank 
depends on its capacity to generate the ideas of new global problems as well as 
on its own global expertise, new mechanisms for intervention as well as new 
reasons for countries to borrow, new development subjects and subjectivities as 
well as new forms of its own legitimation.” 
In this sense, he adds that it could be considered that the idea of fighting poverty 
with massive capital interventions emerged from the historical conjuncture which 
took place at the seventies when the U.S. hegemony besides being in a recession 
(grounded in the accelerated inflation produced by the Vietnam War) was being 
challenged by Europe, Japan, and the oil-producing OPEC nations in one side, and 
by revolutionary insurgent movements throughout the South, on the other side. A 
moment of which Robert McNamara –President of the Bank at the time- took 
advance of, in order to harness the large surpluses of capital in the North and the 
economic calamities of the South into a new development regime that helped to 
turn the World Bank into a global defender of the world’s poor. 
It must be outlined that the Bank has been backed up by the Global hegemony 
since its foundation, and according to Babb and Chorev (2009, p461) hegemony, 
in the classical Gramscian sense, is a form of domination that is maintained not 
simply through coercion or force, as neo-realists would argue, but also through 
consent, achieved by means of moral and intellectual leadership and material 
compromises (Gramsci 1971). For neo- Gramscian international relations scholars, 
a hegemonic world order relies partly on the material capabilities of a dominant 
state—including its military might and its economic power. They continue to explain 
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that hegemony also depends on dominant ideas and collective images, and on 
institutions, which “reflect the power relations prevailing at the point of origin and 
tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power 
relations” (Cox 2006, p363).  
Regarding the dependence of the maintenance of hegemony through institutions, it 
should be noted that in the fifties and sixties, the Bank focused primarily on training 
small group of elites, some of whom became prime ministers, ministry heads, and 
senior Bank and IMF staff. So by the eighties, they had an organized and well-
financed institutional architecture that was already in place, plenty of “trans-
nationalized” people, norms and beliefs, as well as agencies and institutions well 
situated to participate, this could explain why some government agencies and civil 
servants can participate in a potentially lucrative neoliberal agenda even while 
their peers in government and society do not, and thence this fact could be 
considered as the reason of the quick expansion of the neoliberal economic 
ideology all around the world. (Goldman 2005, p32-34) In this sense, the 
institutions were essential for the construction and maintenance of hegemony 
because they help soften domination by diffusing legitimating ideas and granting 
concessions to subordinate forces. 
However, it must be remarked that just a decade after the “McNamara 
revolution,” the contradictions inherent in large-scale development lending and 
policy making became manifest as economies crashed, and therefore the 
institutionalized hegemony of neoliberalism staggered because the Bank was no 
longer considered an expert offering technical advice at a distance, instead it 
became the focus of scorn, anger, and frustration. 
 
3.2.1.6. A New Cornerstone 
 
According to Goldman (2005, p94-98) the Bank, besides being considered 
blameful of reduced public spending; mass unemployment; currency collapse; 
rising prices for food, fuel, and other goods; and falling wages and export prices, 
was also seen as the main responsible for the destruction of huge wetland areas 
and tropical forest in Indonesia, and also the main responsible for the 
deforestation, river contamination and even the death of forest-dwelling indigenous 
people as consequence of the development of highways, dams and the 
implementation of industrial agriculture in regions such as Brazil, Philippines, India 
and Thailand. While this happened some capital-poor states were dealing with 
serious financial issues –which were grounded in the export-oriented 
Industrialization model, imposed by the Bank’s structural adjustments - the Bank 
lent them dollar-based capital towards the development of export quality 
commodities, the expected income would be used to pay back the debt and 
reinvest in the society - as it was presented by the Bank and thence as it was 
considered by the borrowing countries - however, the overabundance of the 
capital lent by the World Bank was focused in the production of determined 
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commodities – oils, grains, cotton, rubber – this in turn caused a dramatic fall in 
the prices of such commodities. (George&Sabelli 1994) 
All of these events provoked the organization of campaigns against the negative 
social and environmental effects that the bank unleashed and thence people 
manifested its discontent in Massive protests in Thailand, Indonesia, India and 
Brazil. It should be outlined that the protest against the Polonoroeste Highway in 
Brazil even reached the US Congress, where speakers representing the indigenous 
groups testified the destructive effects of the project –which was presented by the 
World Bank as a leading example of sustainable development- this in turn 
originated reactions among members of the US Congress, some of them threatened 
with a suspension of the support to the multilateral development banks, some 
others became resolute to discipline the World Bank. 
So, facing criticism and confronted with the social and ecological devastation - 
unleashed from the implementation of its projects and policies - the Bank 
considered the need for a reorientation in order to calm the members of the US 
Congress and at the same time to appease the global society, in this way the 
environment was introduced as the cornerstone of development. 
The respectful attitude that the Bank adopted regarding the environment could be 
seen as a tactical movement because it is grounded in the fact that this kind of 
behavior would help them to gain back the confidence of the northern policy 
makers, in this sense, and citing Goldman (Goldman 2005, p97): 
 
 “the Bank imposed on its borrowers ‘environmental adjustment’ policies throughout 
the 1990s (often in concert with its fiscal structural adjustment policies), which 
pressed governments into creating  cookie-cutter-like environmental protection 
agencies; redrafting forestry, land, and water laws; establishing national 
environmental policy and research institutes; and training a cadre of professionals 
to carry out environmental reforms” 
 
Following the example of the Bank, the concern for the environment is nowadays 
one of the global goals, and in this sense the concept ‘sustainable development’ is 
applied in any imaginable way, it must be outlined that the meaning of such 
concept may reflect marketing or commercialization techniques which demonstrate 
the reasons behind it, the pursuit of an economic development at all costs and 
thence is a clear example of how the ‘sustainable development’ is used as a tool 
towards allowing the expansion  of neoliberal policies sweeping through 
governments, especially those highly indebted to the World Bank, IMF, and private 
Northern banks. 
It should be remarked that satisfying an IMF conditionality is typically a mandate 
for assistance by the World Bank and other international agencies, and as the 
Bank approves loans for infrastructure projects with the precondition that natural 
assets and resources are privatized, the beneficiaries of the Bank’s loans are not 
the native inhabitants but the transnational corporations which are in control of 
such assets and resources. In this way the control over a national economy by 
Bretton Woods is virtually complete.  
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The Bretton Woods institutions have a wholly distorted view of economic progress 
and relationships. Their embrace of unlimited expansion of trade and foreign 
investment as measures of economic progress suggests that they consider the most 
advanced state of development to be one in which all productive assets are owned 
by foreign corporations producing for export; the currency that facilitates day-to-
day transactions is borrowed from foreign banks; education and health services 
are operated by global corporations on a for-profit, fee-for-service basis; and most 
that people consume is imported. When placed in such stark terms, the 
“neoliberal” ideology of the Bretton Woods institutions becomes obvious. It also 
becomes clear who such policies serve. Rather than enhance the life of people and 
planet, they consolidate and secure the wealth and power of a small corporate 
elite, the only evident beneficiaries, at the expense of humanity and nature. 
(Cavanagh&Mander 2002, p8) 
It could be considered that these institutions set in motion what Polanyi defined as 
the double movement. Up to down, the promoters of economic globalization 
prepare everything so transnational corporations can enjoy the privileges which 
are denied to the people, which in turn react against the centralized movement 
which comes from above. The outcomes of this dispute has the potential to become 
the basis towards the set up of a new ‘sustainable’ paradigm, but it could also 
present a great opportunity for another major corporative-change-of-attitude, just 
as the environmental tactical movement implemented at the World Bank and IMF in 
the 1990s and which objective was to allow the development of economic growth 
hidden behind a promising green mask, as it was demonstrated throughout this 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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3.2.2.- Crit ique of the Green Economy 
 
Actually, it is quite common to hear green concepts, as well as to hear many 
proposals about everything becoming green, these green definitions were set up 
considering them as an improvement for the wellbeing of the planet and the 
humanity and in this direction it has been introduced the concept of green 
economy, based in the definition of Sustainable Development presented by the 
Brundtland Commission back in 1987.  
This section focuses on the analysis of the official documents that have included the 
concept of green economy towards its official presentation at the conference Rio 
+20. Through this analysis I want to demonstrate the connection of the concept of 
Sustainable Development with the one of Green Economy in order to demonstrate 
that both concepts have its base in the economical system in which we live and the 
way in which both concepts are used as ideological constructs towards the 
expansion of neoliberal policies. 
In this sense, the main questions that this section addresses are: 
( Does the concept of Sustainable Development interfere in any way with the 
operating system of production? 
( Does the concept of Green Economy represent an alternative way of 
development? Does it consider development away from the western 
paradigm of growth?  Does it represent a step forward in the consolidation 
of a global social equity? 
( Which could be the reason behind the concept of Green Economy? 
The answers will provide valuable info regarding the objective behind these both 
concepts, and by doing that they will be helpful to clarify the aim of the 
organizations that are promoting those concepts. 
The analysis consists in a very brief historical framework of the most relevant 
conferences organized by the United Nations towards promote the Sustainable 
Development since the definition of the concept, to then proceed to make a critical 
analysis of the official documents which include the concept of green economy, 
focusing in the Rio+20 conference, which had one of its main objectives in the 
implementation of the ‘green economy’ as a framework towards sustainability. This 
has implications to understand how the sustainability is discursively formed. The 
article outlines omissions, limitations and contradictions in these official documents, 
but also remarks the way in which these documents proposed and defended issues 
such as economic growth or the instauration of capitalist economic schemes as the 
way towards the instauration of a ‘respectful’ development aiming to examine the 
discourse of sustainability from a critical perspective.  
After the publication of the Brundtland report, the UN General Assembly convened 
in the resolution 44/228 (UN 1989) in the organization of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) -the also known as the Rio 
Conference, or Earth Summit- to elaborate strategies and measures to halt and 
reverse the effects of environmental degradation. This conference was held in 
1992, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and congregated the state chiefs of all around the 
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planet. The commitments for the development of Sustainable Development 
Strategies following the recommendations of the program of action towards an 
economic competitive, social and ecological sustainable development, called 
agenda 21 –named after the 21st century- which was a conjunct goal of the 178 
governments that voted to adopt in this World Summit signaled a key point 
regarding the management of environmental issues. 
Continuing with this tradition the General Assembly convened in its resolution 
44/190 (UN 1993) a special session on the environment (also known as "Earth 
Summit + 5"), which was held in New York in June of 1997, and which objective 
was to review and appraise the implementation of Agenda 21 and following this 
line the General Assembly adopted the resolution 55/199 (UN 2001) in February 
of 2001, convening in the organization of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) –also known as Rio+10- a ten-year review of the progress 
achieved since the implementation of the agenda 21 since 1992, this World 
Summit was held in Johannesburg in 2002. 
The most recent conference organized by the UN which has focused in Sustainable 
Development was convened in the resolution 64/236 (UN 2010) and it is the 
famous United Nations Conference on sustainable Development- better known as 
Rio+20- a conference which was organized with the aim of defining a global 
agreement to indicate that the route to sustainability for each one of the participant 
countries was the aforementioned Green Economy. This concept was outlined in 
the UNEP report titled ‘Towards a green economy’ which defined it as an economy 
that results “in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly 
reduces environmental risks and scarcities” (UNEP 2011,p 16), and at the same 
time promotes sustainable management, it also outlines that in the context of a 
green economy “growth in income and employment are driven by public and 
private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy 
and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services.” (UNEP 2011, p16).  This UNEP report notes that all global problems 
share a common starting point, which is, namely, the gross misallocation of capital: 
“During the last two decades, much capital was poured into property, fossil fuels 
and structured financial assets with embedded derivatives. However, relatively little 
in comparison was invested in renewable energy, energy efficiency, public 
transportation, sustainable agriculture, ecosystem and biodiversity protection, and 
land and water conservation.” (UNEP 2011,p 14) 
Such a promising concept is worth a close look, especially if it was presented as 
the main topic at a UN conference, which brought together the leaders of 140 
National States, and was organized with the aim of defining a global agreement to 
present this concept as the way to go towards sustainability. But after giving an 
overview to the Zero draft of the outcome document (UN 2012b) and to the 
Outcome of the Conference, (UN2012a) it could be assumed that the expected 
outcomes of the conference are at least very contradictory among them. 
The Zero draft of the outcome document mentions as key goals, issues such as: 
poverty eradication, food security, sound water management, universal access to 
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modern energy services, sustainable cities, management of oceans and improving 
resilience and disaster preparedness, as well as public health, human resource 
development and sustained and equitable growth which should generate 
employment even for the young people, issues which could be considered key 
themes within left political agendas and some of them even within  left-radical 
political agendas. 
Then the document signals that a green economy in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication should contribute to meet these key goals in 
order to achieve sustainable development, which must remain as the overarching 
goal.  
The document acknowledges green economy, as a kind of magic wand concept, 
which in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication should 
protect and enhance the natural resource base, increase resource efficiency, 
promote sustainable consumption and production patterns, and move the world 
toward low-carbon development. So this can be considered as a main 
contradiction within the Sustainable Development framework, despite the allusions 
to issues such as poverty eradication, food security and public health contained in 
this Zero draft of the outcome document, such priorities are justified primarily as a 
means to achieve the overarching goal of Sustainable Development, which, 
according to the draft would be reached through an instauration of the 
aforementioned ‘green economy’. 
This document contains no analysis of capitalism and its agents, though it is 
referenced as ‘economic development’ and ‘structure of the economy’. In fact the 
paragraph 11 even remarks that ‘Unsustainable development has increased the 
stress on the earth's limited natural resources and on the carrying capacity of 
ecosystems’, but does not make a reflection to ask which are the drivers of this 
‘Unsustainable Development’, and by omitting these question it is taken for granted 
the economic system and its tangled structure in the same way that the Brundtland 
Report did it, and which could be considered is the cause of the majority of the 
environmental problems that we face today. 
This Zero draft of the outcome document has some very interesting paragraphs, 
which should be examined very carefully by the rulers of the 140 countries 
participating in this international conference - the paragraphs 30 and 31 of the 
document, apart from being very contradictory; express clearly one intention that 
lies far away from the supposed overarching goal of reaching sustainable 
development, the paragraph 30 states: 
 
“We acknowledge, however, that developing countries are facing great challenges 
in eradicating poverty and sustaining growth, and a transition to a green economy 
will require structural adjustments which may involve additional costs to their 
economies. In this regard, the support of the international community is necessary.” 
 
This paragraph supposedly encourages the eradication of poverty while also 
sustaining growth, and something that must be considered reckless, it mentions that 
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the green economy would help fight the poverty but it outlines that the transition to 
a green economy ‘may involve additional costs to their (referring to the dependent 
countries) economies’, and at the end remarks, that ‘the support of the 
international community is necessary’ 
The paragraph 31, should be seen as complementary to the previous one, because 
it mentions: 
 
“We note that the transformation to a green economy should be an opportunity to 
all countries and a threat to none. We therefore resolve that international efforts to 
help countries build a green economy in the context of sustainable development 
and poverty eradication must not: 
a) Create new trade barriers; 
b) Impose new conditionalities on aid and finance; 
c) Widen technology gaps or exacerbate technological dependence of 
developing countries on developed countries; 
d) Restrict the policy space for countries to pursue their own paths to 
sustainable development.” 
 
These both paragraphs are full of good intentions, that could not be neglected, but 
do they have the possibility of being realized? 
At this point I would like to outline that the other main issue of the Rio+20 
conference was ‘Institutional Framework for sustainable development’, where the 
‘Zero draft of the outcome document‘ proposed to reinforce coherence among the 
agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system, including the 
International Financial and Trade Institutions. 
As part of this restructuration of the Institutional Framework for sustainable 
development, the Zero draft of the outcome document is very explicit and shows a 
direct relation and at the same time contradicts the paragraphs 30 and 31, with 
the statement contained in the paragraph 54, which says: 
 
“We recognize that sustainable development must be given due consideration by 
the International Financial Institutions, especially the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, the regional development banks, UNCTAD and the 
World Trade Organization in regulating global trade. In that regard, we request 
the international financial institutions to review their programmatic strategies to 
ensure the provision of better support to developing countries for the 
implementation of sustainable development.” 
 
In this direction and as the Zero draft of the outcome document also reaffirms its 
commitment to the Monterrey Consensus and the subsequent International 
Conferences on Financing for Development. I would like to cite Amartya Sen 
(2002, p9) who signaled ‘The Monterrey Consensus cannot be faulted for not 
being enthusiastic about the positive role that the market mechanism can play in 
removing deprivations in the world. In contrast, many of the critics see Monterrey 
document as being far too pro-market, ignoring the downside of market relations.’ 
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And in the same sense I would like to cite Harrigan et. Al. (1991) as cited in (Kiely 
1998) which stated that ‘Assessing structural adjustment policies in practice is 
extremely difficult. This is because there is considerable dispute over the extent to 
which policies have been implemented. Critical analysis of adjustment programmes 
has often presented them as simple impositions by the World Bank or IMF onto 
supposedly sovereign nation-states, when in fact they are the outcome of complex 
negotiations between international institutions and national governments. 
Going back to the green economy concept, we can look at the Marrakech process4 
as example of actions taken after a UN Conference resolution towards helping 
governments and corporations which through sustainable development plans 
(national or regional) adopted greener policies and business models, in order to 
promote sustainable consumer lifestyles, all of this towards bringing a green global 
economy. (Gresh 2010) 
Gresh describes some critics to the strategies that emerged from the Marrakech 
Process, considering that the Agenda 21 has potential for altering deeper 
meanings of consumer lifestyles and its relationship to the global economy. 
Highlighting that sustainable consumption has been narrowed into an eco-efficiency 
mold that privileges the use of technical fixes to help us consume more efficiently in 
the marketplace and that such improvements do not curb the growth in 
consumption but actually encourage it, which is confirmed by historical evidence 
that shows increases in scale have undermined eco-efficiency efforts. Eco-efficiency 
also hinges upon a neo-classical view of markets and the consumer, which 
approaches all consumption as an activity to increase the utility or well being of 
individual consumers.  
Therefore, it is clear that this document reduces development to a simple process of 
policy making, and therefore it could be assumed that the main political thrust of 
these both documents Zero draft of the outcome document and the Outcome of the 
Conference, and therefore that the objective of the Rio+20 conference was to 
support the restructuration of a neoliberal agenda oriented towards what Joachim 
Hirsch has defined as ‘sustainable neoliberalism’ which main qualitative 
modification, as defined by Brenner (2000), consists in the effort to superimpose 
new politically mediated mechanisms of crisis-displacement upon the traditional 
neoliberal cocktail of unleashed markets, enhanced commodification and 
intensified interspatial competition. 
 
“…can civilization afford to surrender itself entirely to the…. Driving force of just 
one of its subsystems – namely, the pull of a dynamic … recursively closed, 
economic system which can only function and remain stable by taking all relevant 
information, translating it into, and processing it in, the language of economic 
value”. (Habermas 1971) .  
 
1At the WSSD, the Johannesburg Plan  of Implementation (JPOI) called for the creation of a ten-
year framework of  programs to quicken the pace of action around sustainable consumption and  
production patterns; the framework, adopted in 2003 in Marrakech, Morocco,  became known as 
the Marrakech Process
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So, what should be expected as outcome from the Rio+20 Conference regarding 
Green Economy? 
It is clear that the ecological crisis has been triggered by the economic and 
financial crisis, so it could be assumed that the aforementioned crisis has little to do 
with natural issues and instead it shows a deep connection with the capital.  
It is clear that the concept of Sustainable Development has been, since its 
foundation, directly influenced and orientated by the economic system in which we 
live, so therefore it should not be considered as a way towards the preservation of 
the planet and all the life forms inhabiting it, but as a tool towards promoting the 
expansion of neoliberal policies. Because such concept does not threaten or 
challenge in any way the structures of privilege and reproduction of capital 
imposed by neoliberalism, and in this way the interests of the ruling classes remain 
intact, so this could also be considered a reason behind the support of the majority 
of nation states in the world towards the concept of Sustainable Development. 
It might be considered, therefore, that the reason that there is no feasible solution 
to the environmental degradation even after 20 years since the creation of many 
environmental agreements and treaties, is precisely because the concept has been 
used as a tool to establish or expand a market economy, as Leff clearly pointed 
out: 
 
“The discourse of sustainable development seeks to inscribe environmental policies 
in the adjustment paths that bring neoliberal economics to the solution of 
environmental degradation processes and the rational use of environmental 
resources, while responding to the need to legitimize the market economy. These 
strategies of capitalization of nature have entered into the official discourse of 
environmental policies and their legal and regulatory instruments.”  
 
So, after Leff’s statement, this definition can also be seen from an economic 
viewpoint, and therefore it could be defined as the maintenance of a resources 
stock and of the environmental quality in order to ensure the satisfaction of the 
basic needs of contemporary and future generations. Thence, it could be assumed 
that from a pure economic perspective, what is pursued is a sustainability of 
development and not a sustainable development. 
According to Foster (2010) (see chapter 3.1.1.4) capitalism can be defined as a 
system of unsustainable development, where the whole exchange process from 
beginning to end can be designated by the shorthand C-M-C. In such a process, 
exchange is simply a modified form of barter, with money merely facilitating 
exchange. The goal of exchange is concrete use values, embodying qualitative 
properties. Such use values are normally consumed—thereby bringing a given 
exchange process to an end. Foster proceeds to make clear the fact that, 
according to Marx, a capitalist economy, in reality, works altogether differently, 
with exchange taking the form of M-C-M′. Here money capital (M) is used to 
purchase commodities (labor power and means of production) to produce a 


30
commodity that can be sold for more money, M′ (i.e., M + Δm or surplus value) at 
the end. This process once set in motion, never stops of its own accord, since it has 
no natural end. Rather, the surplus value (profit) is reinvested in the next round, 
with the object of generating M′′; and, in the following round, the returns are again 
reinvested with the goal of obtaining M′′′, and so on, ad infinitum. 
It is for this reason that many companies are now seeking to attract potential 
consumers with green proposals, it should be noted that this type of consumption is 
based on investment, and as investment is in turn the engine of capitalism, 
therefore and according to O'Connor (1988) consumption is not regulated in any 
way by consumers but by the rate of profit and accumulation and the limits of the 
credit system. Thus, it obvious that nature is not governed by its own laws, but by 
an amalgam of interrelationships between economic and political factors as 
represented by the form of exchange of the type M-C-M’ exposed here, which has 
no end in sight and which today represents one of the most important forms of 
social and environmental destruction and demonstrates that the ecological crisis is 
in fact a crisis of capital. This crisis is supported in turn by the concept called 
sustainable development, which, hidden behind a promising green mask, aims to 
support the restructuration of a neoliberal agenda.  
In this sense and as Brand & Görg (2003) have signaled, governments are not 
acting as consequence of specific ecological problems but because of the growing 
political pressure to handle international environmental problems, that leads to be 
determined through public symbolism by social actors (the denominated epistemic 
communities). In past years the political need of cooperation has generated an 
innumerable quantity of international environmental agreements, however, this 
agreements (though conceived as a tool for cooperation) does not eliminate the 
competence between national states and between different economic sectors and 
regions. Rather, existing agreements end up decisively permeated by this 
competition, increasing proportionally the competition when some specific of the 
aforementioned agreements deal with complex crosscutting issues. It could be 
assumed that in the national and international policies towards solution of 
environmental issues, totally different and almost opposite interests are integrated. 
 
Conclusion - Critique of the Green Economy 
 
In this globalized world, which is leaded by an economic unilateralism that result 
(among many other issues) in the actual North-South debates not only about trade 
and investment guidelines but also in sovereignty issues, could be considered that 
the main achievement of the Rio +20 conference, -which was the implementation of 
a green economy- is a failure because it shows a lack of commitment to social 
issues and demonstrates at the same time that it lacks in making a commitment 
towards global equity. But it is a clear demonstration that the discourse of 
sustainable development - in the sense that Leff has defined it- is no longer looking 
for, but now through the concept of green economy is achieving the insertion of 
environmental policies in the ways of adjustment which as consequence results in 
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considering a neoliberal economy model as a feasible solution to face the 
environmental degradation processes and the rational use of environmental 
resources, and through this at the same time responds to the need to legitimize the 
market economy. 
Hence, each National State will interpret the green economy concept in the best 
way that it can, and it is clear that the international financial institutions would 
convince them of accepting their loans to overcome the structural adjustment which 
are implicit in a transition towards the green economy, in this sense, it is obvious 
that the northern countries –who nowadays are also receiving the effects of the 
current global financial crisis-, will push hard towards favoring its own 
transnationals. 
Regarding this issue I would like to cite Ribeiro (2012): 
 
“In general, these proposals of green economy, act as an umbrella of many 
technologies and proposals which are based or use biological resources, 
pretending to create the illusion that it would be a transition from an economy 
based on fossil fuels to another environment-friendly economy and that the use 
technologies will help to overcome any problem, without changing the causes and 
patterns of consumption and production. This will never happen, because those are 
the same global companies with the same intentions. Oil companies will not, 
voluntarily, cease the oil exploitation until it runs out the last straw. They will only 
add other energy businesses, which as matter of fact are already underway, and 
will charge extra carbon credits for it.” 
 
Gresh (2010) accurately outlined that, when trying to make sustainable any form 
of consumption, trade relations and global empire will need to be confronted. In 
this sense, are the developed countries interested in financing the structural 
economic adjustments of the dependent countries without imposing conditionalities 
an aid and finance and without create new trade barriers? The Point 58 of the final 
document of the Conference, in its paragraph G, refers to this issue "Effectively 
avoid unwarranted conditionalities on official development assistance (ODA) and 
finance." There is no need to analyze deeply this paragraph to see the intention 
behind, in this way the International Financial Institutions would provide loans, with 
‘fair’ conditions of course, as they have been applied throughout history and that 
only create debt-dependent countries. That is the real objective of the Green 
Economy. 
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3.3) Global Environmental Governance? The Role of the Nation-State 
in the Institutionalization of Globalization 
 
By analyzing the issues covered in each one of the two first sections of this chapter, 
it can be noted that these sections delineated an historical evolution and at the 
same tome indicated some of the key actors inherent to the concept of global 
environmental governance; therefore it could be assumed that these sections 
delineated an articulation of that concept. In this way it was clear that the 
environment is often subdued and even used by the International Institutions 
towards unfolding neoliberal policies which in turn responds to the need to expand 
and legitimize the market economy, which, since the decade of the seventies, 
blurred the boundaries between internal and external economic development and 
therefore connected national economies. This kind of development has 
strengthened growth and competition in the developed world but in the dependent 
countries it was the cause of deep financial crises, which leaded to recessions in the 
directly affected national States and also had negative effects for those countries in 
the world trade and financial markets. See (McMichael 2007) 
These financial crises reveal a “fundamental weakness in the mode of social 
regulation characteristic of the neoliberalism. This weakness concerns the 
inadequacies of financial regulation and also the chronic and now greatly 
exacerbated fiscal crisis of the state in which demands for ever-lower levels of 
taxation by the wealthy persistently undermine governmental capacities for 
supplying vital public goods.” Allen J. Scott in (Soureli&Youn 2009, p48) 
This multilateral, norm-based management of the World economy through 
governmental and private actors towards allowing the implementation of 
neoliberal policies could be defined as ‘Global Economic Governance’ a kind of 
normative-prescriptive proposal for the Political Management of the Capitalist 
expansion, commonly called as ‘the globalization process’, which in turn, affects 
directly the Global Environmental Governance. 
But, if well, the past sections had presented an articulation of this aforementioned 
concept, what does the concept of Global Environmental Governance refers to? 
There is a significant volume of research about the aforementioned concept, and 
therefore there are a lot of interpretations of it, but before trying to find the 
definition of the whole term, it could be useful to first explore the definition of the 
concept of governance. 
 
3.3.1.- Governance 
 
Glasbergen & Driessen (2002) outlined that “The term governance represents the 
notion of steering, and can be seen as a shared responsibility of representatives 
from the state, the market and civil society dealing with societal problems.” 
Another definition that goes in this direction is the one of Lamy & Laidi (2002) that 
says: ‘When talking about governance we generally accept that the state no 
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longer has the necessary authority or means to produce a ‘political’ position that 
adequately represents the general or collective interest’. 
Bulkeley stated that the concept of governance implies a focus on ‘systems of 
governing’, means for “authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control 
and co-ordination”, in which state actors are not necessarily the only or most 
significant participants. (Bulkeley 2005) 
Chris Harrington et al. (2008,  p200) did an interesting exercise by considering 
government, as ‘the formal, centralized and vertical exercise of power and 
authority, such as through regulation or market-based instruments’  to then consider 
governance as the opposite concept, signalizing it as ‘where power and authority 
are horizontally decentralized and devolved to broader members of society’. 
For Jessop (2002b, p1) governance is defined ‘as the reflexive self-organization of 
independent actors involved in complex  relations of reciprocal interdependence, 
with such self-organization being based on continuing dialogue and resource-
sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the  
contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations.’  
He adds that organized in this way, the governance doesn’t necessarily entails a 
perfect symmetry in power relations neither a complete balance in the distribution 
of benefits and remarks that it is highly unlikely to do so almost regardless of the 
object of governance or the 'stakeholders' who actually participate in the 
governance process. All that is involved in this preliminary definition is the 
commitment on the part of those involved to reflexive self-organization in the face 
of complex reciprocal interdependence.  
Even on this minimal definition, governance can be distinguished from the 'invisible 
hand' of uncoordinated market exchange based on the formally rational pursuit of 
self-interest by isolated market agents; and from the 'iron fist' (perhaps in a 'velvet 
glove') of centralized, top-down imperative coordination in pursuit of substantive 
goals established from above.  
According to Jessop (2002b), the concept of governance is mainly integrated by 
three aspects, explained below.  
( An interest in taking the concept of governance as a response to paradigm 
crises in the social sciences. As the ‘given’ nature of national economies, 
national states, and national societies as units of analysis have been 
challenged by the dialectic of globalization-regionalization and when 
conventional conceptual couplets (such as market vs plan, state vs civil 
society, bourgeois vs citoyen) also appear less relevant (Jessop 1998). The 
concept of 'Governance' thus is being implemented to bridge disciplines and 
to provide alternative ways of understanding. 
( For Transnational Corporations, the concept of ‘Governance’ is appealing 
because: 
o It offers an ‘update’ for the legitimacy of old practices, such as 
corporatist concertation. 
o Supplies solutions (although partial and provisional) to issues such as 
the disenchantment with the very unstable neo-liberal market forces. 
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o Suggests solutions to co-ordination issues in the face of an increasing 
complexity, such as market exchange and its increasingly tangled 
patterns of reciprocal interdependence. 
This complexity takes form not only in the market exchange but also in economic, 
politic and social fields, which are influenced by the neoliberal process designated 
as globalization. However, this complexity denotes a sense of delay in the way in 
which the emerging problems are being faced, through top-down state planning or 
market-mediated anarchy. This kind of behavior has encouraged a displacement in 
the institutional ‘balance’ around which policy makers adopt amidst possible 
modes of coordination. 
( Another aspect is that, at a philosophical level, the concept of ‘governance’ 
draws attention as an answer to coordination problems between private and 
public spheres, which is reflected in the increasing interest in modes of 
economic regulation through institutions that might obviate the need for state 
control while also guide the market, this kind of behavior could be funded in 
the fact that even liberal economists admit that the mechanisms of the market 
does not always reveal the true public or private costs and benefits of 
economic activities. In this way ‘governance’ has been presented as a main 
concept towards overcome the division between rule-makers and rule-
followers in representative regimes and that could be the reason that the 
‘governance’ concept has obtained connotations which could be considered 
as positive ones, such as ‘consultation’, ‘negotiation’, ‘reflexivity’ and 
‘dialogue’ in contrast with the ‘lawless’ market and the ‘iron fist’ of a 
centralized state. 
So, governance, could be considered as the interrelation between a wide spectrum 
of institutions, organizations and systems, which are autonomous among them but 
which are also connected through specific ways of mutual and institutionalized 
interdependence, this behavior could be appreciated in the way in which an 
institutional order interacts with the society, and the ‘complexity’ that this 
interaction unleashes, extending in turn the systemic interdependencies all along 
social, spatial and temporal horizons of action. This behavior could be useful also 
to understand how the concept of governance has gained notoriety in theoretical 
debates once that ‘the globalization process’ eroded the basis for a traditional top-
down coordination under the shelter of a central coordinator at the top of any 
given societal formation, as the world economy is being redefined by a complex 
logic of globalization-regionalization under the influence of neoliberal-capitalist 
relations. 
Jessop (1999, p2) signals that this mechanism is supposed to make it more difficult 
for (National) States to control their own domestic economies -- let alone the global 
dynamic of capital accumulation. At the same time capital accumulation is said to 
depend on an increasing range of extra-economic factors generated on various 
spatial-temporal scales through other institutional orders. He continues and outlines 
that major changes are also occurring in the (global) political system with equally 
paradoxical effects. Thus, on the one hand, there is a denationalization of the state 
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system through the movement of state power upwards, downwards, and sideways 
as attempts are made by state managers to regain operational autonomy (if not 
formal sovereignty as such) and thereby enhance the state's own strategic 
capacities. On the other hand, there is a de-statization of politics (a shift from the 
primacy of top-down government towards more de-centered governance 
mechanisms) as political capacities are seen to depend on the effective 
coordination of interdependent forces within and beyond the state. It is in this 
context that governance (or 'partnership') strategies are strongly advocated as 
alternatives to market anarchy and organizational hierarchy in promoting 
economic development. 
As it was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, ‘the globalization process’ is 
nothing else than a process of expansion of capitalism, which is integrated by a 
wide spectrum of forces operating in various scalar levels, it should be noted that 
these forces are complementary and at the same time antagonistic among 
themselves, generally speaking, it could be argued that the economic system is 
internally complex and flexible because of the uncoordinated and decentralized 
forces of the market and the role of the price mechanism as a catalyst towards 
allowing the distribution of capital among different economic activities. Now, being 
a little more specific, as capitalism evolves, different organizations and institutions 
tend to emerge to express different moments of its contradictions, paradoxes and 
dilemmas, and these interact in unstable equilibrium to compensate for market 
failures, so, besides the great complexity and flexibility of the capitalist economy it 
also has a greater capacity for perturbing other subsystems and also makes 
greater demands on their performance as preconditions of its own reproduction. 
(Jessop 2000, p331): 
In this way it is clear that,  
a) Globalization enhances capital’s capacity to defer and displace its internal 
contradictions, if not to resolve them, by increasing the scope of its 
operations on a global scale, by enabling it to deepen spatial and scalar 
divisions of labor, and by creating more opportunities for moving up, down 
and across scales.  
b) Globalization weakens the capacity of national states to confine capital’s 
growth dynamic within a framework of national security (as reflected in the 
‘national-security state’), of national welfare (as reflected in social-
democratic welfare states), or some other national matrix. 
 
However, the preponderance of the capitalist economy at global level doesn’t 
signify that its influence on other systems is unilateral and uniform, because in 
reality it is asymmetrical and variable. 
The political system, which is nowadays materialized above all in the institutional 
structures of National States and linked to the global world through public opinion, 
also has important reciprocal influences on the development of the capitalist 
economy. Why? Because the state is the main responsible for the reproduction of 


36
labor and also has the political responsibility for maintaining social cohesion in a 
socially divided, pluralistic social formation. 
The capitalism as system, according to Jessop (2000, p332), is ‘structurally 
coupled’ to other systems and to the ‘lifeworld’. 
Regarding the structurally coupling it must be remarked that the capitalism is 
composed by systems such as the legal and the political one, which offer 
substantial extra-economic conditions for accumulation even in liberal, competitive 
capitalism but which despite that fact, are operationally autonomous from the 
capitalist market economy and have their own set of instrumental rationalities and 
institutional and organizational dynamics which also are integrated by other self-
organizing systems with their own mutually distinctive logics, rationalities and 
dynamics, such as art, sport, religion, education, science and medicine, systems 
which constitute as well environments for the self-valorization of capital, providing 
markets as well as inputs. 
The ‘lifeworld’ is composed by an interrelation of various social relations, identities, 
interests and values that stand outside and/or cut across specific systems rather 
than being anchored in them, thus, it includes social relations such as national 
identity, generation, gender, ethnicity, new social movements and so forth. These 
influences affect the economy by shaping opportunities for profit as well as 
influencing struggles over commodification, de-commodification and re-
commodification of the wider society. This can be illustrated through such 
phenomena as the gendered division of labor; dual labor markets structured 
around generational and ethnic divisions; the development of markets oriented to 
the ‘pink pound’; concerns about regional, urban and national competitiveness; or 
the impact of green movements on strategies for ecological modernization. 
This implies that the development of the capitalist (market) economy is closely 
bound up with non-economic factors and that it never follows a purely economic 
logic. Its development is always over determined by its coupling to other systems 
and the lifeworld. 
From this perspective, Jessop consideres that the development of the capitalist 
economy is embedded in a wider nexus of social relations and institutions and the 
lifeworld; its evolution is linked to environing, embedding institutions and the 
activities of wider social forces; and these institutions and forces may either help or 
hinder its overall reproduction, regularization and governance. Thus, accumulation 
regimes are usually associated with modes of regulation that regularize the extra-
economic as well as the economic conditions required for their expanded 
reproduction and that require the cooperation of extra-economic forces. 
 
3.3.2.- Institutional Behavior? 
 
It could be considered that the interrelation of various social relations, the 
“lifeworld”, is composed of “actors” – be they individuals or organizations – that 
always act according to rules, sometimes called “institutions’’. These rules, which 
can be formal or informal, set the incentives for the actor´s behavior. As such, 
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institutions (rules) are never neutral. Williamson (1996) categorized such 
institutional rules into four levels, depending on the timeframe it would take to 
change them (i.e. the degree of “institutionalization”). These are, namely, resource 
allocation and employment rules (ongoing), governance rules (1–10 years), basic 
institutional rules (10–100 years), and cultural rules (100–1,000 years). 
 
“In other words, no matter how well-intentioned the actors (individuals and 
organizations), their behavior is always framed by more or less institutionalized 
rules. Changing these rules is generally beyond the power of single actors, as it 
requires both a long-term perspective and coordination with other actors” (Finger 
2008, p35). 
 
In past chapters, some of the conceptual frameworks that underline this approach 
are presented, such as an ideological analysis of sustainable development and an 
analysis of the economic issues behind sustainable development. 
The ideology helps to present reality as indispensable and inevitable. It shows 
economic, social, and political facts as mere results of the interrelation of the 
dynamics inherent to technology, justified as the path to progress, when 
considering progress as the fulfillment of economic objectives and interests. 
Regarding the economic issues supporting the concept of sustainable development, 
it could be assumed that the embrace of the unlimited expansion of trade and 
foreign investment as measurements of economic progress, suggested by the 
Bretton Woods institutions, demonstrate that the aforementioned institutions 
consider the most advanced state of development to be one in which all productive 
assets are owned by foreign corporations producing goods for export. The 
currency that facilitates day-to-day transactions is borrowed from foreign banks, 
education and health services are operated by global corporations on a for-profit, 
fee-for-service basis, and most of what people consume is imported. 
When stated in such stark terms, the “neoliberal” ideology of the Bretton Woods 
institutions becomes obvious, and it also becomes clear whom such policies serve. 
Rather than enhance the lives of people and the planet, they consolidate and 
secure the wealth and power of a small corporate elite, the only evident 
beneficiaries, at the expense of humanity and nature. 
 
3.3.3.- The Role of the Nation-state in the Global System 
 
Nowadays, nation-states are considered relevant mainly because transnational 
corporations, non-governmental institutions, and international organizations are 
dependent upon them. However, at the same time, most nation-states are no longer 
relevant actors (it could be said that, with the exception of US, China, and the 
European Union, nation-states are just one more body among transnational 
corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international 
organizations). This section focuses on the changes that the nation-state 
experiences in this adaptation process and indicates what can be expected from 
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such “adapted” nation-states. As has already been mentioned, a nation-state is 
both an actor and an institution. As an institution, some key features characterize it 
– namely, the fact that it is built on an underlying philosophical assumption of 
“development as permanent military conquest”, an assumption that can also be 
found in international organizations. However, the nation-state is itself composed of 
actors and organizations, which, as such, can and do adapt to change. On a 
purely material level, such adaptation of nation-states takes the form of 
deregulation, privatization, and public sector restructuring (Finger and Allouche 
2002). 
Indeed, a nation-state placed in a global context comes under both financial and 
legitimation pressures (Finger 2002). It must adapt so as to remain perceived as a 
relevant actor by its citizens. Therefore, and according to Finger (2008), it 
privatizes, either to generate income or to get rid of unprofitable activities. It 
deregulates to stimulate markets and satisfy citizen-consumers, it restructures its 
public services to become more service-oriented and to have lower operating costs, 
and it develops regulations that are favorable for and even actively promote 
further industrial development. Most nation-states have undergone such a 
restructuring process since the 1990s, often to a greater extent than in the poorer 
or “developing” countries, because of the pressures of both the World Bank and 
transnational corporations (see Chapter 3.2). 
For Finger (2008, p47), it is clear that the nation-state, like most other 
organizations and institutions, is capable of adapting to globalization, and will 
therefore continue to exist. The question, rather, is a philosophical one: What will 
such adapted nation-states look like, and how will they behave? We can already 
see how nation-states transform from “developmental” states, whose aim is to 
develop in the spirit of permanent military-style conquest, into so-called 
“regulatory” states (Majone 1996), whose aim is basically to control operations 
within their territories.  
Not surprisingly, over the past 15 years, we have seen the rise and growth of 
national regulatory activities of an unprecedented nature. In other words, the 
nation-state subcontracts the lucrative parts of its operational activities to the 
private sector and the non-lucrative parts to the nonprofit sector, while essentially 
outsourcing all of its former developmental activities (including postal services, 
health services, educational services, and others). It limits itself to regulating 
operations executed by others, hoping to maintain control by way of regulation. To 
this end, it is becoming increasingly dependent upon the very actors 
(organizations) it is supposed to regulate – that is, transnational corporations. 
 
3.3.4.- The Institutionalization of Globalization 
 
The international institutions that have emerged since World War II remain state-
like or state-centric institutions and therefore perpetuate (and do not alter) the 
functions formerly performed by the nation-state when it comes to promoting 
industrial development. It is not surprising, then, that they continue to display state-


4/
like approaches to collective problem-solving. It must be emphasized that, in the 
age of globalization, the state adapts by dropping its developmental ambitions 
and focusing primarily on law-and-order regulation that promotes development. 
Quite logically, we can now locate these same approaches on a supra-national 
level. In previous chapters, the three types of institutions that emerged after World 
War II, namely, the UN, the Bretton Woods organizations, and the WTO, were 
highlighted. Indeed, collective problem-solving at the supra-national level has been 
crystallized, since the 1980s, around these three types of institutions. Rather than 
displaying alternative approaches to collective problem-solving at the global level, 
both transnational corporations and global non-governmental organizations are 
clustered around these three institutions. Each one has a different way of 
examining global reality and global problems, and, therefore, each one offers a 
unique approach to them. The approach of each can be explained by a 
combination of the institution's history and original mandate (which evolved over 
time), its own governance structure, and especially its financing mechanisms and 
financial situation as outlined by Finger (2008, p48): 
( The original mandate of the United Nations was: peace, human rights, and 
development. In order to do that, the UN set up a series of specialized 
agencies in different topical areas, some more geared at policy advice, 
others more operational. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has been 
faced with ever more severe financial problems, forcing it to gradually drop 
its developmental function, at least at the operational level. Given the 
context of the Cold War, the UN was never very active on the human rights 
side, and is therefore mainly left today with a peacekeeping mission. 
However, given the UN’s financial problems, peacekeeping is only possible 
in periods of crisis – that is, when money can be leveraged. Thus, the UN’s 
approach to global collective problem-solving more and more clearly 
emerges as one of ad hoc crisis management with humanitarian arguments 
as the core justification of intervention.  
( The original mandate of the Bretton Woods institutions was to assist the 
developmental agenda of the UN by providing and guaranteeing loans to 
countries that engaged in infrastructure projects. It must be underscored 
(again) that the World Bank, probably the most influential of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, is a commercial organization that makes profits by 
making loans. In addition, the Bretton Woods organizations have a different 
governance structure from the rest of the UN, giving power to the donors 
and not to the recipients of the loans. Thus, the Bretton Woods organizations 
can be managed much more efficiently and much more strategically. Not 
surprisingly, then, the Bretton Woods organizations and the World Bank in 
particular, have managed to take considerable advantage of the decline of 
the UN and have subsequently taken over the development discourse, if not 
the development agenda. They have done so by promoting private-sector 
participation in infrastructure development and by advocating public-sector 
reform involving substantial restructuring and privatization and, more 
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recently, a regulatory state serving mainly to protect investors in industrial 
development projects (Kessides 2004). In short, the Bretton Woods 
institutions now focus mainly on infrastructure development led by the 
private sector, with the state as a regulator and guarantor of investments 
and investors. 
( The WTO’s original mandate was to open national markets to trade, with 
the underlying agenda, as suggested above, being that trade leads to 
development and development leads to peace. The WTO has been more or 
less successful in doing so, depending on whose judgment one listens to. The 
result of the WTO’s actions is indeed that markets have been opened, 
significantly boosting global trade and especially the growth of transnational 
corporations. This has proceeded to the point that pressure from the 
transnational corporations for further market opening has substantially 
declined. The WTO is therefore challenged today—by both transnational 
corporations and consumers—to evolve from a “market opener” into a 
global “market regulator”, an activity for which it has no explicit mandate. 
In this context, one must also mention the European Commission, which is 
faced with the same challenge, but at a regional level, and with an explicit 
mandate to perform market regulatory functions. In both cases, the 
institutions are evolving from a policy function to a more judicial function 
and approach, thus assuming ever more, on a regional or global level, the 
law-and-order role that nation-states had formerly played at the national 
level (Abbott&Snidal 2001). 
 
It should be underscored that these institutions emerged as responses to the fact 
that industrial development – which was originally an impulse of and actively 
promoted by the nation-state – has now taken on a supra-national life of its own. 
Each of these types of organization is now trying both to respond to and to take 
advantage of this fact. In so doing, all three institutionalized global governance 
mechanisms actively contribute to cementing and further institutionalizing industrial 
development. In all likelihood, these global institutions will not solve the problems 
caused by industrial development, but will rather channel them in a way that they 
can be approached in terms of (global market) regulation (WTO, EU), crisis 
management (UN), or further industrial development opportunities (Bretton 
Woods).  
 
3.3.5.- Institutional Pollution? Institutionalized Approaches to 
Environmental Problems 
 
In this section, while trying to make clear the way in which the aforementioned 
approaches to global governance play out in environmental issues, this paper will 
show how each type of global institution (given its perspectives and strategic 
interests) approaches environmental issues and problems. It will also outline what 
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can be expected from each approach, based on the analysis of global 
environmental issues and problems developed by Finger (2008). 
As UN organizations are characterized by a lack of funds, it could be assumed 
that they have basically relinquished their developmental function and, therefore, 
that they lack relevance on the ground. UN organizations are capable of moving 
funds just in the case of a major crisis and only for crisis management. It follows 
that the UN’s new focus is increasingly on “security”, generally combining, or 
rather, confusing, human and military security. The environment constitutes another 
such security threat for the UN, offering justification for UN intervention, or an 
opportunity to prove its usefulness. Such environmental security threats may include 
earthquakes, floods, or famines (due to environmental causes). In all of these 
cases, and especially when accompanied by a major human disaster, the UN can 
offer its new humanitarian security approach. It then attempts to coordinate rapid 
intervention among its agencies, thereby involving numerous local and global non-
governmental organizations to assist it on the ground. Needless to say, this ex-post 
crisis management approach to environmental security threats is quite the opposite 
of a precautionary, long-term, and future-oriented way of dealing with 
environmental issues and problems. However, this approach to environmental crisis 
management—as a response to seeing the environment as a threat to human 
security—is increasingly becoming what one can expect from UN institutions when it 
comes to environmental (and all other) matters. 
Finger (2008 p51) signals that there is a second institutionalized approach to 
global problem-solving and that it coalesces around the Bretton Woods 
institutions—in particular, the World Bank—and involves most of today’s relevant 
business actors. This includes not only the major Transnational corporations that 
are in direct contact with the World Bank, but also global business organizations, 
such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the World Business Forum (WBF), 
not to mention the major donor countries: the United States, France, Germany, and 
Japan. Even some UN organizations (e.g. the UN Environmental Programme and 
the UN Development Programme) are trying to integrate this institutional 
arrangement, for example, around what has come to be known as the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). The main characteristic of these organizations is that 
they have money and clearly formulated strategic interests. Not surprisingly, the 
Bretton Woods institutions have assumed the UN’s original development agenda 
and translated it into their own commercial logic. The gradual adoption and 
integration of the Rio process into World-Bank-led “sustainable development” may 
serve as a case in point. As a result, environmental issues and problems have been 
redefined as further opportunities for industrial development, investment, and 
overall economic and financial growth. As part of their new “sustainable 
development” agenda, the Bretton Woods Institutions now actively support 
investments in sustainable development, thus using environmental problem-solving 
as one more argument for further technological and economic development. 
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Here, according to Finger (2008, p51) the environment becomes not only an 
additional investment opportunity, but also an opportunity for transnational 
corporations and governments of the Global North to offset some of their 
environmental wrongdoings by means of investments in the Global South (e.g. 
pollution credits). Finally, entirely new markets and even industries are being 
created as a result of this market approach to solving environmental problems (for 
example, the pollution-rights trading industry and the certification industry). This 
market approach, which basically turns environmental problems into an additional 
opportunity for further and even accelerated industrial development, is being 
accompanied, actively supported, and legitimized by global environment- and 
development-NGOs, such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), or the Nature Conservancy. Finger (2008, p51) 
signals that it could be expected that this type of institutionalized approach to 
environmental issues and problems would further expand both conceptually and in 
practice. It has all of the major actors behind it, including the nation-states whose 
logic this approach matches perfectly, and it actively legitimizes the pursuit of the 
logic of industrial development. Again, it goes without saying that this 
institutionalized approach in no way solves or even addresses the underlying 
environmental problems caused by industrial development. Rather, it probably 
sustains and exacerbates these problems. In institutional terms, this approach is 
probably the most innovative: If the UN-led approach (above) and the WTO-led 
approach (below) are still mainly state-centric – that is, following government 
ordering (hierarchy, integration) – the World Bank-led approach is essentially 
hybrid in nature, combining public, private, and third-sector actors into quite 
innovative governance networks. From a new institutional economics point of view, 
such hybrids, in the age of globalization, are probably much more effective in 
promoting industrial development than government ordering (which was probably 
the more effective way of promoting industrial development immediately after the 
Industrial Revolution). Finger (2008, p52) signals that the question remains, as to 
whether such hybrids would also be effective governance mechanisms to address 
the consequences of industrial development. 
The third institutional approach coalesces around the World Trade Organization 
and related organizations. Grounded in the GATT, the role of the WTO has been 
to open up markets for competition, a process that has accelerated substantially 
because of the end of the Cold War. Increasingly, therefore, there is a call—both 
by critics of further liberalization and by transnational corporations that have 
basically already achieved their goals—to re-regulate such deregulated global 
markets. In this effort, and because it lacks an explicit mandate in this matter, the 
WTO has to turn to other organizations, and thus also evolves, in new institutional 
economics terms, from government ordering (hierarchy, integration) to hybrids 
(networks). Again, the environment appears to be a major opportunity for such re-
regulation, which otherwise is hard to justify on neo-liberal ideological grounds 
(Finger&Tamiotti 1999).  
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The underlying objective of such environmental re-regulation is only accessorily 
environmental protection; the often unacknowledged objective is to cement the 
market power of those transnational corporations that have already been able to 
take advantage of global market opening, so as to prevent other firms, especially 
those of developing countries, from entering these global markets, and of course to 
increase the power of the WTO and related organizations. Many non-
governmental organizations are also able to take advantage of this evolution 
towards (privately led) global regulatory environmentalism, such as the WWF. 
In other words, this third institutionalized approach to the environment fits perfectly 
into the previously identified trend of a regulatory state and new global regulatory 
institutions, as regulation is a means for nation-states and state-like institutions to 
adapt to globalization by keeping some power (e.g. enforcement of regulations). 
Therefore, it is clear that such (environmental and other) regulations do not have 
environmental protection as their main objective, but rather are the expression of 
lobbying efforts by actors who can derive competitive advantages from such 
regulation. 
Obviously, the three approaches obey and proceed from three totally different 
institutional logics—environmental security and corresponding crisis management, 
development opportunities and the corresponding rhetoric of “sustainable 
development”, and market regulation and corresponding environmental 
regulations. Thus, the environment is now simultaneously a security threat, a 
development opportunity, and a case for re-regulation. Following the 
organizational and institutional framework, the environment has now become an 
opportunity for UN organizations to justify their existence, for the World Bank and 
related organizations to further promote industrial development, and for national, 
regional, and global regulators and firms to establish their (market and political) 
power. In other words, today, there is no coherent institutional approach to 
addressing the global environmental problems that stem from the pursuit of 
industrial development. Instead, all three approaches are complementary, in that 
they all create new opportunities for further industrial development. The 
environmental regulation approach is complementary inasmuch as it offers market-
regulatory solutions to those environmental problems that clearly result from an 
over-free market (e.g. CO2 emissions). The environmental security approach is 
complementary to the extent that it helps to give the illusion that, through crisis 
management, the worst effects of global environmental degradation can be 
mitigated. 
Finger identified these three now globally institutionalized approaches to 
environmental issues and problems, and with these it became clear the types of 
action towards which they are likely to lead. Indeed, these institutions are likely to 
promote and fund either purely technical and technocratic approaches to 
environmental issues and problems (e.g. regulatory approach, crisis management 
approach) or financial and economic approaches. For Finger, this also means that 
environmental issues and problems that cannot be addressed by either of these 
approaches will fall in between the cracks and will simply not be addressed. This is 
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the case for global environmental problems of a systemic nature, namely those that 
stem directly from the pursuit of industrial development, such as resource depletion, 
global warming, the destruction of local livelihoods, degradation of biodiversity, 
and more. Similarly, environmental issues and problems that do not have the 
support of the nation-state as the relevant institutional entity will also fall through 
the cracks. These are typically problems that are either not limited to national 
boundaries (e.g. consumption, loss of cultural diversity) or are so-called ‘‘global 
common problems’’ (e.g. ocean fisheries). As a matter of fact, most of today’s 
global environmental problems of systemic proportion fall precisely in between 
these institutional cracks and are therefore likely to not be addressed. 
Finger (2008, p54) also outlines that, in institutional terms, one can clearly observe 
an evolution from (state-centric) integrated and hierarchical approaches to hybrid 
approaches, parallel to globalization. However, at least at the global level, these 
hybrid forms of governance are shaped by the main global actors—namely, nation-
states, transnational corporations, and inter-national organizations—whose strategic 
interests coalesce around the pursuit of further industrial development. This, in turn, 
raises the question of whether and how the global environmental crisis can indeed 
be addressed by such hybrid forms of global governance at all. 
Finger signals that the currently dominant institutional approaches to environmental 
(and all other forms of) global governance are clearly inadequate and 
unsustainable. First, they are inadequate and unsustainable in and of themselves, 
as neither a security-oriented nor a developmental nor a regulatory approach 
alone will contribute to solving environmental problems. Secondly, they are also 
unsustainable in combination, as the regulatory and security approaches merely 
comprise a legitimization of further industrial development, rather than an 
alternative to it. In other words, the currently institutionalized approaches to global 
environmental problem-solving will not contribute to addressing the ever more 
pressing issues of the degradation of life support systems. 
 
3.3.6.- Conclusions 
 
This chapter has been based in the underlying institutional arrangements (identified 
by Finger), that command, among other things, the ways in which global 
environmental problems are, and will continue to be, “addressed”. It shows that 
there are three such co-existing and complementary institutional arrangements, 
each rooted in the militaristic-developmental nature of the nation-state, which aims 
at, above all else, conquest, expansion, and control. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
the examination of all three institutional arrangements is inadequate for 
understanding, let alone addressing, the dynamics of industrial development. 
Worse, they actually contribute to legitimizing and furthering such unsustainable 
industrial development. 
In short, this new global institutional framework builds on the nation-state logic of 
militaristic industrial development, yet now instrumentalizes the nation-state by 
means of more hybrid forms of governance. 
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In other words, in the age of globalization, the nation-state, in combination with the 
still quite state-centric yet more hybrid supra-national institutions, are no alternative 
to this institutionalized logic; they are rather a supporting and accompanying 
factor. In this way, Finger and Finger (2003) have used the concept of “institutional 
pollution” to highlight the fact that institutions can be as destructive and detrimental 
to the planet as industrial development and pollution itself. 
 
3.4)  Final Considerations 
 
The objective of this brief theoretical framework is to define the ideological 
construct behind the concept of sustainable development, to demonstrate the ways 
in which the preservation of the environment is now considered a global goal and 
to expose the mechanisms behind concepts such as “sustainable development” and 
“green economy”, as well as to make evident the fact that so-called “global 
environmental governance” is nothing more than the institutionalization of biased 
approaches whose objective is to foster development opportunities through the 
rhetoric of sustainable development while they seek to regulate markets through 
those very environmental regulations. Also highlighted is the way in which the 
environment is being adapted to the needs of new global institutions, and not the 
other way around – a consequence of which is that environmental problems are 
being redefined either as development problems, problems of crisis management, 
or problems of state-centric regulation. Moreover, outlined is the non-neutrality of 
the currently dominant actors (namely, nation-states and global governance 
institutions) when it comes to addressing the current global environmental crisis. 
It is clear that the interactions between these issues are implicated in the generation 
of an environmental governance framework. 
This theoretical framework was developed trying to establish objective criteria. As 
the research deals with two nation-states that exemplify different capitalist schemes, 
these criteria serve as a basis for the comparison of the possible differences 
between the overarching frameworks of the two aforementioned nation-states. This 
section is meant to act as a preface for what can be expected of nations and 
institutions regarding environmental issues and the way in which both actors 
(nations and institutions) are dealing with the current (and ever accelerating) 
environmental crisis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: A BRIEF 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Issues related to concepts such as ideology, economics, globalization, and 
development are discussed in the previous chapters to understand the way in which 
capital and the desire for its continued growth have given way to the creation of 
concepts that are used to legitimize the perpetuation of certain modes of 
production at the expense of the environment.  
I would like to cite Hobsbawm, who said that things "can only be understood as 
part of a particular historical context”. In this sense, all the analysis completed in 
the first part of this research was done to establish the ideological, economic, and 
political contexts of the research. This research aims to evaluate two countries that 
operate under two different capitalist schemes with the goal of understanding the 
way in which the overall governance structure of each country may represent a 
crucial pressure. This pressure, in turn, can affect and/or alter the objectives of the 
respective national sustainable development strategies, and the way in which these 
strategies (through the aforementioned governmental interference, subsequently 
subjected to the laws of the market) may fail in their pursuit of “pure” 
environmental objectives, serving instead as a strategy for economic development 
disguised as official documents of environmental regulation. 
Before even starting to analyze the selected nation-states, it is necessary to take a 
deeper look into the way in which the environment is being managed nowadays. 
This, of course, leads us to analyze the development of a system that is in charge 
of coping with environmental issues, a system that goes beyond issues of legislation 
and that, through institutionalization, takes for granted the policy principles, rules, 
conventions, norms, and practices that jointly delineate a framework within which 
interested actors may function. In other words, this is an effort to find out what the 
process is that gave way to the development of environmental governance as a 
system. When talking about this system of environmental governance, it is assumed 
that nation-states have ceded, at least to a certain extent, their sovereignty 
concerning issues of vital importance for their citizens, as it institutionalizes not only 
rule-making, but also the rules for making rules. Therefore, this chapter may 
provide a brief introduction to understanding that process by analyzing the 
policies, institutions, objectives, and actors involved, first at a global level and then 
focusing on the European continent. Also necessary to be stressed is the fact that 
the presently dominant socio-economic order of the planet – namely, capitalism – 
had a rather uncertain future after the collapse of liberal Europe in 1914, the 
October Revolution in 1917, and the global financial crisis in 1929. We should 
also include the interwar period, regarding which it must be stressed that 
Hobsbawm (1995, p144) defined World War II as an “international ideological 
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civil war” in which, beyond a confrontation between states and armies, there was 
an affray of ideologies, worldviews, and cultural models. It should also be noted 
that the agreements made at the end of the World War II (see Chapter 3.2) drove 
and ensured the development of capitalism, which, in the long run, led to the 
overthrow of its main opponent in 1991. 
Moreover, in his work “The Age of Extremes”, Hobsbawm mentioned that Soviet 
socialism was awful but believed that there was no other alternative. He made the 
point that the tragedy of the October Revolution lied in the fact that the revolution 
was unable to produce anything other than an authoritarian, relentless, and brutal 
form of socialism. Following Hobsbawm’s line of thought (although the failure of 
socialism is wrapped in his premise), it still served a necessary function because its 
vocation was sacrificial. It forced a transformation of capitalism, since one cannot 
at all be sure, in the absence of the challenge posed by the USSR, that capitalism 
would have ever experienced the New Deal or the welfare state, nor that 
liberalism would have finally accepted universal suffrage and democracy.  
 
4.1.- Capitalism and Democracy 
 
Regarding the concept of democracy, a fact that should be remarked upon is that 
the capitalist system captures strong support in nation-states that are ruled by 
democratic governments. With this form of government, it is assumed that the 
citizens are asked about their preferences concerning how public resources are 
handled.  
At this point, and considering the link between capitalism and democracy, a 
meaningful question would be: 
Is it possible for a government to control a capitalist economy? 
Is it possible to conduct the economy while going against the particular interests of 
those who have the control of the productive wealth?  
According to Przeworsky and Wallerstein, “The capitalist economy (…) generates 
a number of effects that are experienced as profound deprivation by large 
segments of society. The market does not assure the material security of anyone 
who does not own wealth and is not able to earn a living. The market generates 
drastic inequalities, including inequality of opportunity” (2008, p78). 
Significantly, within a capitalist system, a large number of resources are privately 
owned, and, as the word itself signals, those resources are therefore defined as 
private. Hence, questions around the way in which those resources should be 
handled remain a private privilege.  
The central thesis of Marxist political theory is that, under capitalism, all 
governments should respect and protect the fundamental rights of those who own 
the productive wealth of society. Thence, capitalists are endowed with a power 
that no formal institutions can overcome – namely, public power. People may have 
political rights, they may vote, and governments may pursue popular mandates. 
However, the actual capacity of a government to achieve determined goals is 
limited by the public power of capital. It is claimed that the nature of the political 
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forces that come into office does not change these limits, for the limits are 
structural, i.e. a feature of the system, not that of the occupants of governmental 
positions nor of the winners of elections (Przeworski&Wallerstein 2008, p58). 
Some of the theories that explain the reasons why, in a capitalist society, 
governments act in the interest of capital reside in Milliband’s (1969) explanation, 
in which state managers internalize the goals of capitalists and use the state as an 
instrument on their behalf. Offe’s (1975) explanation emphasizes the generic 
structural and functional limitations: Under capitalism, the state cannot organize 
production or command consumption, because these are prerogatives reserved to 
owners of private property. Przeworski's (2008) explanation claims that it does not 
matter who the state managers are, what they want, or whom they represent, nor 
does it matter how the state is organized or what it is legally able or unable to do. 
Capitalists do not even have to organize and act collectively: It suffices that they 
blindly pursue narrow, private self-interest to sharply restrict the options of 
governments. 
At this point, it is essential to emphasize the way in which the development of 
capitalism and, therefore, the organization of the economic system upon it, 
evidences the progressive predominance of the market over other institutions. In 
fact, as capitalist laws permeate broad areas of social life and often supplant the 
norms produced by the state and the community, the market, which is also the 
ruling mechanism for the regulation of economic activity, is often regarded as an 
institution itself (Regini 1995, p1). 
Some notable social scientists have established their discourses around this vision 
of the market. Weber attributed great importance to the principle of rationality, 
which originated from the necessity for estimation and standardization imposed by 
the market, and which also came to dominate social life and the political system by 
embodying itself in the bureaucracy. Durkheim signaled that the collapse of so-
called “mechanical solidarity” and the rise of “organic solidarity” was based on 
the division of labor, and thus on exchange – the predominant criterion for the 
allocation of resources in the market. Marx underscored the fact that capitalism 
reduced relationships between individuals to concise market relationships and 
labor to a commodity, all of which was reduced to a “labor force” that was in 
demand and supplied a market, the labor market (Regini 1995, p12). 
Even when this is an evident phenomenon, it is not often regarded as the growth of 
capitalism, but rather as a penetration of the market, and therefore of the 
principles of competition and exchange on which it is based, wherein the pecuniary 
gain is exalted above all other considerations as the embodiment of reason and 
progress. It should be noted that this kind of behavior represents a decisive step 
towards modernity, and even towards “postmodernity”, which, in many ways, 
signals a return to more perverse and predatory forms of capitalism. 
Hence, it should be no surprise that, based on these principles, environmental 
concerns have been incorporated into the logistics of the market, because they 
have proven to be a great instrument towards market expansion. 
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4.2.- Global Environmental Governance 
 
As was outlined before in this research, the global discourse on the environment 
configures, and is configured by, institutions and policies at every scale. In this 
manner, and with the political economic context of neoliberalism as a framework, 
the privatization of state roles and the financialization of global markets have 
provoked a rearrangement of power relationships among state, market, and civil 
society groups. Therefore, global environmental governance is being shaped not 
only by nation-states (subjected to the power of capital), but also by (biased) 
international institutions, transnational corporations, and civil society.  
This is the reason why it is important to present, at least to some extent, an analysis 
of international institutions and the way in which they exercise influence over the 
“environmental discourse” (see Chapter 3.2), as well as an analysis of the role of 
nation-states in the institutionalization of globalization (see Chapter 3.3). As can be 
seen in the aforementioned chapters, it is clear that institutions have performed a 
significant role in the construction and maintenance of hegemony, because, by 
diffusing legitimating ideas while granting concessions to subordinate forces, they 
have greatly contributed to softening the effects of neoliberal domination. 
 
4.2.1.- The Institutionalization of Environmental Policy 
 
If we take a look at the environmental policy measures legislated by the European 
Union, it can be noted that most of them take the form of directives that member 
states are required to implement (i.e. water pollution directives that specify 
standards for drinking water). However, implementing standards is not the only 
concern of the European Union; it is also implicated in the creation of processes for 
the setting of such standards. One of the functions of the European Union is to 
harmonize the stances of its many members regarding environmental issues. As this 
harmonization involves consensus-building towards the way in which international 
treaties are considered, it could be assumed that the European Union plays an 
essential role in the context of international environmental policy. 
Nonetheless, how did the European Union attain this role? The boom in 
environmental issues that hit the developed world in the late 1960s and early 
1970s led to the founding of organizations such as the WWF and Greenpeace and 
the publication of books such as Rachel Carson´s Silent Spring, Paul Ehrlich’s The 
Population Bomb, Dennis and Donella Meadows’ Limit to Growth, and Ernst 
Friedrich Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered. It can 
be assumed that this boom had its effects on the European Union’s policy – in 
particular, because all the concerns among policy-makers regarding environmental 
protection gave rise to the organization of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (see Chapter 3.1.1).  
It should be stressed that, in the 1970s, the oil prices gave way to a recession, and 
this event caused a decrease in attention towards environmental policy-making, not 
only in the European Union, but also in the member nation-states. However, new 
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environmental issues, such as concerns about global climate change and the 
depletion of the ozone layer, helped to regain this loss of attention in the late 
seventies.  
At this point, now arguably well under the influence of certain member states, the 
European Union began to develop directives to tackle the new problems 
mentioned above. In 1982, Germany, which before had been skeptical about 
acidification issues, started to take measures in order to overcome such problems, 
and it could be therefore assumed that, with regard to environmental issues, 
Germany underwent a “conversion”. From then until 1992, environment-related 
issues were the focus of much deliberation, discussion, and decision-making (Weale 
et. al. 2000, p3). 
Weale also states that, as happened in the 1970s, the recession in the 1990s 
slowed down political interest in environmental issues. Nevertheless, by the end of 
that decade, the European Union was implementing monitoring on issues such as 
water and air pollution while also seeking a central position regarding climate 
change issues in international forums. 
Nowadays, environmental issues spill over into industrial policy, transport policy, 
regional policy, agricultural policy, tax policy, etc. Actors responsible for policy-
making in these areas increasingly have to take environmental considerations into 
account when drafting legislation. Indeed, it has been argued that, with the 
requirement in the Single European Act that environmental protection is to be a 
component of other EU policies, environmental policy has been accorded a unique 
status so that it has come to constitute a front-ranking objective of the European 
Union. Hence, according to Weale, the European Union's environmental policy has 
been developed in substance and institutionalized in process, both in terms of the 
emergence and growth of the structures of environmental governance at the 
European Union level, and in terms of the rules and processes underpinning this 
operation. Furthermore, the evolution of the policy has had an effect on the pattern 
of rule-making authority with the European Union. To understand this point, it 
would be useful to consider Hart’s differentiation between primary and second 
rules. According to Hart (1997, Chapter 5), a primary rule imposes duties, while a 
secondary rule confers public and private powers. Primary rules apply to actions 
that involve movement or change in the physical world. Secondary rules apply to 
operations that apply to both movement and change and the creation and 
variation of duties and obligations. Concerning the way in which rule-making is 
carried out in the European Union, Weale states that a primary rule defines the 
policies that are decided, whether these are rules about air pollution standards, 
water emission limit values, or the designation of sites of biological and ecological 
importance. A secondary rule, by contrast, is a rule about rules; it defines how the 
primary rules are made and how they may be changed, and they concern such 
matters as whether a measure is to be taken by qualified majority voting or 
unanimity in the Council of Ministers, whether a matter falls within the co-decision 
procedures for the European Parliament, or indeed whether a rule can be made at 
all. 


51
Weale also outlined that early policy developments were not based on formal 
secondary rules empowering environmental policies, because environmental 
responsibilities did not find a place within the Treaty of Rome. Therefore, the 
earliest developments took place under a convention that was agreed upon by the 
heads of state as having significance enough for European citizens as to warrant 
action at the European level. Subsequently, secondary rules were generally 
formulated during the process of treaty change. Such treaty changes have been 
crucial to the evolution of environmental policy and to the emergence of the 
existing system of environmental governance in the European Union. It is important 
to highlight that, since 1973 (the year in which the first Environmental Action 
Program of the Community was approved), the European Union has had its own 
environmental policy (in the Treaty of Rome, no environmental concerns were 
considered, hence no environmental measures were proposed). Since then, an 
extensive set of directives has been developed in an attempt to cope with a wide 
spectrum of environmental issues, giving way to occasional confrontations between 
member states (Hildebrand 1992). However, this legal situation was suddenly 
transformed in 1987 when the Single European Act went into force. 
This Single European Act (EU 1987) was a revision of the Treaty of Rome 
(published in 1957). It could be considered the keystone of European Integration 
in the 1980s, as it was based on the assumption that a Europe without barriers to 
trade would be more efficient and more competitive, especially against 
consolidated industries such as those in the US and Japan, as well as the then 
developing industries in the Far East. However, the conjunction of political forces 
that combined a set of global, European, and domestic goals resulted in different 
positions regarding European integration and what this integration would bring 
with it. Great Britain sought after the extension of a free trade area that would 
function to enlarge the country's home-grown government program of liberalization 
abroad. France, led by Miterrand, tried to establish a framework in which policies 
of economic renewal could be pursued without incurring the problems that 
redistributive Keynesianism had produced between 1981 and 1982 (Hall 1986). 
Germany encouraged European integration for security and economic reasons, 
while the southern European countries backed up the idea of integration because it 
would grant them access to the structural funds of the European Union, and so on. 
This Single European Act incorporated an environmental competence into the 
aforementioned treaty, allowing environmental measures to be adopted via 
anonymous agreement. It could be assumed that the act was conceived with the 
objective of establishing the institutional preconditions for the completion of the 
internal market, authorizing qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers on 
environmental matters, and hence granting the European Union the authority to 
carry out environmental policy and thereby empowering the European Parliament. 
As a result of the changes introduced by the Single European Act, it is important to 
stress that Article 100A explicitly names the environment as an area with regard to 
which harmonization legislation could be introduced by adjusting the national 
regulatory systems in preparation for the start of the internal market. 
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Thereafter, the Maastricht Treaty – effective since November 1993 – extended 
qualified majority voting to most environmental matters and introduced the co-
decision procedure, giving the Parliament even greater scope to influence policy 
outcomes. Significantly, this treaty added the notion of “sustainability” to the main 
objectives of the European Community in the form of “sustainable growth”, a 
model for which the demands of the environment and economy are to be kept in 
harmony with one another. This treaty also amended Article 2, which stated that 
one of the key goals of the treaty was the promotion of “continuous and balanced 
expansion”. After Maastricht, it was to refer to the need for “harmonious and 
balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth respecting the environment”. 
The treaty of Amsterdam, in force since May 1999, made the co-decision 
procedure the norm (disregarding the cooperation procedure) and introduced the 
idea of sustainable development as a principle of European Union policy, with the 
requirement that it can be integrated with other policies. 
The Treaty of Lisbon, effective since December 2009, significantly extends the use 
of the co-decision procedure and provides for an extension of qualified majority 
voting in the Council of the European Union. However, this system of voting will 
only enter into force in November 2014.  
In sum, according to Weale et. al. (2000), it could be assumed that not only is 
legislative and policy development extensive in the field of European 
environmental policy, but this development has also been accompanied by the 
institutionalization of environmental protection in the decision-making processes of 
the European Union. Since 1972, the number of primary rules in the field of 
environmental policy has been expanded, and a complete set of secondary rules 
has been transformed. If the objective is to understand the characteristics that 
define European environmental governance, an analysis of the nature of the rules 
could be helpful for understanding the co-evolution of primary and secondary 
rules, as well as provide an overview of the institutional context where this co-
evolution has been taking place. 
It is clear that environmental governance is an ever-evolving system, and, thus, it 
could be assumed that it will never be complete. It is multi-level, because important 
decisions are made at different tiers of authority (the European Union level, the 
national level, the sub-national level), and, in order to understand what happens at 
a specific level, it is necessary to know and understand the interrelationships at 
play between a certain level and the other levels. Regarding this level structure, the 
horizontal complexity found in this governance structure should also be 
underscored, because, at each of the aforementioned levels, there are many actors 
involved in decision-making. Environmental governance is also defined as a system 
because there is a set of rules, conventions, norms, and practices in the making of 
international environmental policy in Europe that goes beyond international 
diplomacy (treaty-making) and cooperation (regime formation). This kind of 
international process of decision-making is therefore institutionalized in a system 
identified by Wallace (1996) as a “government without statehood”. Moreover, 
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precisely this notion of government without statehood is a clear definition of the 
concept of “governance”. In this way, environmental governance is just a form of 
government in the field of environmental policy (Weale et. al. 2000, p6). 
 
4.2.2.-  The Internal Market As the Polit ical Objective of 
Environmental Discourse in the European Union  
 
In Chapter 3.2, it was demonstrated that the objective of international financial 
institutions is to promote global economic growth, and it follows that that could be 
the reason behind the support that these institutions offer to concepts such as “the 
green economy”. Through this, the connection between international financial 
institutions and the concept of sustainable development becomes even more 
evident, as it has been made clear that, in purely economic terms, what is being 
sought is the sustainability of development. 
As was shown in Chapter 3.1.1.4 (“The Ideology of Capitalism and Its Implications 
for the Perception of Sustainable Development), one of the ruling assumptions of 
this ideology is that environmental protection should be seen not as being in 
competition with economic growth and development, but instead as an essential 
precondition for such growth and development. Moreover, according to Weale 
and Williams (1992, p47), “community policy-makers have been among the main 
contributors to the development of the ideology of ecological modernization”. 
As Albert Weale has pointed out, with its re-conceptualization of the relationship 
between the economy and the environment, the ideology of ecological 
modernization marks "a decisive break" with the assumptions of the first wave of 
environmental policy (Weale 1993, p207). Instead of being seen as a burden to 
the economy, environmental protection is now considered to be a potential source 
of future growth. If a country intends to acquire or maintain a secure position in the 
international marketplace, it will require the technical and production capability to 
respond to the increasing demand for environmental quality by producing low-
pollution goods and pollution-control technology. Such a capacity has become 
necessary because, in the emerging global markets, the country with the most 
stringent pollution-control standards will determine standards of product 
acceptability more and more.  
 
"The future development of a post-industrial economy will depend upon [a 
country’s] ability to produce high value, high quality products with stringent 
environmental standards enforced" (Weale 1992, p77). 
 
So, what is the relationship between the economy and the environment in the 
European Union? 
A brief analysis of this relationship would provide a much clearer panorama and, 
therefore, could be seen as a necessary step before making the transnational 
comparison, which is the main objective of this chapter. 
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Following Weale et. al. (2000), it could be argued that the place of environmental 
policy in the process of European integration was simply ensured by the 
emergence throughout the 1980s and 1990s of many of the pollution problems 
that undoubtedly had a clear trans-boundary character. Therefore, it could be 
considered obvious, to some extent, that the European Union had developed the 
capacity to deal with such problems. In fact, it has been argued that the European 
Union had developed as an international resource regime in order to deal with 
such problems. Weale (2000, p29) again, signals that there are certain factors 
that lead to believe that the evolution of environmental policy in the European 
Union has not followed a logic of regime development. He bases this reasoning on 
the following statements: 
( The form and manner in which EU environmental policy evolved was 
conditioned by the use of economic means to achieve political ends. 
Meaning that the European Union was not concerned exclusively with cross-
boundary pollution flows, but also had to deal with the consequences for the 
internal market of environmental regulation. Thence, the involvement of the 
European Union in environmental policy was not a problem or issue-specific 
in the way that is typical of international resource regimes (i.e. the Rhine 
Commission, the International Arctic Committee), but rather, it entailed issues 
of market regulation in a wider sense. 
( An extensive number of the environmental issues which are considered top 
priority in European Union policy do not always have a cross-boundary 
character. Indeed, the European Union has provided a set of political 
institutions in which political actors could pursue issues that are more often 
concerned more with local public goods, like urban air quality or the quality 
of the running water, than international public goods. 
( The European Union has not played as significant a part in some European 
cross-boundary pollution problems as the designation “international 
resource regime” would suggest, since other bodies – significantly, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe – have played at least as 
strong a role. 
So, basing the reasoning on these statements, it is clear that the European Union 
could not be considered an international regime. Therefore, an understanding of 
the ways in which the interdependencies regarding environmental issues have 
come to dominate European environmental policy is a priority. 
As Weale et. al. (2000, p30) point out that, since the liberalization of trade was 
selected as the right tool for European integration, this notion of integration 
borrows much of its logic from issues that are raised by the implications of free 
trade for the environment. However, it is not so simple, because, as outlined by 
Brack (1995), there are certain respects in which free trade can be good for the 
environment and certain respects in which it can be bad. There are some aspects in 
which free trade can represent some environmental advantages: Free trade 
facilitates specialization according to comparative advantage and thus promotes 
the efficient use of resources. It can also provide higher levels of resources for 
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environmental investment, as well as open economies to the use of new 
technologies that can improve the potential for clean production and product 
diversification, taking pressure off of unsustainable extractive industries. On the 
other hand, there are also aspects in which free trade could be seen as a 
hindrance to the environment: Free trade promotes growth, hence increasing 
pollution, while higher income does not always lead to higher expenditure on 
pollution-control technology. In addition, trade liberalization can imply agreements 
that undermine the effects of environmental standards, and countries with strict 
pollution controls can find themselves coming into competition with countries with 
laxer standards. 
Weale continues to outline that the establishment of an internal market has 
demanded that policy-makers pay attention to environmental issues, because 
measures of environmental protection, either in the form of administrative 
regulation or by means of economic instruments, often threatens the functioning of 
the market. However, since any set of markets can give rise to market failures, the 
establishment of the internal market has also had implications for environmental 
protection policies. Thus, just as environmental protection policies have inevitably 
had implications for the internal market, so the creation of the internal market has 
had implications for said policies. 
Since the internal market is a political creation, it deals with questions of identity 
and purpose within the European Union. The relationship between the internal 
market and the environment hence unravels in ways unforeseen and unintended by 
those taking political action. 
Weale et. al. (2000, p37) point out that, from a purely economic point of view, 
environmental pollution is an externality. That is to say, it is a case where parties 
engaged in trade do not bear the full cost of the transaction themselves but 
displace some costs onto third parties. According to Buchanan and Stubblebine 
(1962), an externality is a cost or benefit that results from an activity or transaction 
and that affects an otherwise uninvolved party who did not choose to incur that 
cost or benefit. A classic example of an externality is given by Pigou (2013) in the 
instance of the smoking chimney that pollutes the area in its vicinity: Neither the 
owners of the factory nor those who buy its products need take responsibility for 
paying the costs of the extra cleaning of homes and clothes that the nearby 
residents incur. Hence, externalities are an example of market failure. 
Understanding that term in the strict sense to an average case where the 
competitive equilibrium of the market does not lead to a so-called “pareto-efficient” 
allocation of resources, is itself defined as a state of affairs in which one person 
cannot be made better off without making someone else worse off (Kreps 1990). 
To the extent that there were already externalities within the economies of Europe, 
the creation of the internal market program was built on the assumption that it 
would raise the total volume of goods and services traded in Europe. However, if 
in the production and consumption of those goods and services, externalities are 
created, then it will follow that externalities, too, will increase, unless compensation 
measures are taken. Hence, the internal market could result in a failure of 
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environmental policy. It follows that, as Weale et. al. (2000, p38) outlined it, one 
of the ways in which the environment and the internal market are related is that the 
economic benefits associated with the internal market could be offset by the growth 
in uncompensated externalities, which the increase in the volume of goods and 
services traded would bring. It must be emphasized that, in 1990, a Task Force 
(EU 1990) was established with the objective of analyzing the environmental 
consequences of the internal market. This Task Force identified two main categories 
of impact. One that contained static impacts that were a result of removal of 
barriers, in this sense, included issues such as how trade in animals, plants, and 
wastes could be effectively regulated without border controls. The proposed 
solution to these kinds of issues was trust-building within the European Union, so 
that point-of-origin checks and enforcement procedures were mutually recognized. 
The other category consisted of dynamic impacts, which resulted from the economic 
and industrial growth expected as a result of the barriers falling; this group 
included the more obvious effects, those that were expected as a result of dynamic 
growth derived from the creation of the internal market, perhaps most obviously 
the expected growth in road and air transport, putting more pressure on the 
environment. The Task Force (if it acknowledges that its work on the economic side 
was completed in a very short span of time and with limited resources, outlining 
that its results should be seen as estimates) indicated that these effects would be 
especially critical in southern Europe, where infrastructural development would 
have to be extensive. Also stressed is the fact that the less developed Global South 
would also be more vulnerable to the rise in tourism, which could lead to increased 
economic and social tension in addition to overloaded sewage systems, noise, and 
air pollution, as well as the destruction of habitats – all examples of external 
effects.  
Despite the complexity of the issues analyzed and the uncertainty regarding the 
Task Force´s findings, it was clear that the effects of the internal market could be 
potentially harmful to the environment. Nonetheless, because the internal market 
was a political imperative, it was treated as a high priority issue in the Commission, 
and specifically within the Council. Therefore, no attention was paid to the issue of 
environmental externalities, so the interdependencies between the internal market 
and environmental policy are evident. Therefore, it is clear that there is a relation 
between environmental policy and the implementation of the internal market. It 
should be underscored that the process of institutionalization which has been 
carried out since 1972 has played an important role in this process, because, 
through it, “the environmental measures [have] acquired a range and scope going 
beyond anything that could be conceivably related solely to the single market” 
(Weale et. al. 2000, p53). The notion that institutionalization implies autonomy, at 
least to some extent, must be stressed. Usually, when one refers to an 
“institutionalized policy field”, one assumes that the policy-making decisions are 
arrived at according to the rules, conventions, norms, and practices that define the 
institution in which policy is forged. The integration of the European Union through 
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the internal market has led to a pragmatist development of environmental policy 
measures. 
As was mentioned earlier in this text, environmental concerns were first introduced 
in European countries in 1970, and the attention of policy-makers was almost 
entirely focused on the pursuit of economic and industrial development; the 
creation of a European common market was only one part of a broader strategy. 
In this way, the introduction of environmental concerns did not distract policy-
makers from their objectives. It rather strengthened persistent trade and clearly 
placed the logic of environmental action on a supranational level. Thus, it could be 
assumed that member governments saw the transnational institutionalization of 
environmental governance as a process that did not interfere with their own policy 
preferences. In fact, Commissioner Mansholt (President of the Mansholt 
Commission, the European commission that held office from March 22nd, 1972 to 
January 5th, 1973), after a review of the Club of Rome’s report “The Limits to 
Growth”, made a statement claiming that European economic policy needed a new 
orientation and proposed a “centrally planned recycling economy”. As this radical 
demand insisted on a change in the way in which the European Union was 
operating, it was rejected by the Commission itself as well as by the Council. 
Significantly, despite being too radical for the Commission, the Mansholt demand 
projected a rather different role on the Commission – that of a potential agenda-
setter. Hence, it could be useful to point out the extent to which the environment as 
an issue could pose a challenge to dominant assumptions about the priority given 
to increasing economic growth. 
Weale et. al. (2000, p76) note that, along with the increasing sophistication in the 
development of policy principles, a change in the conceptualization of the 
underlying rationale of environmental policy has been noticeable. This modification 
was intended to change the assumption that there is an automatic trade-off 
between economic growth and environmental protection, and it was important at 
the strategic and intellectual level because the principal reason for the slow-down 
in environmental policy developments in the 1970s was the high priority given to 
improving economic growth in the wake of the oil price hikes of 1973. Therefore, if 
the tension between economic development and environmental protection were to 
remain dominant in policy thinking, those arguing for a higher priority for 
environmental protection would always face an uphill struggle. It is important to 
stress the fact that, during the 1980s, it became common for policy-makers – not 
only in the European Union – to argue for the role of environmental policy in 
promoting a new sort of economic competitiveness. The argument made the case 
that, with the advent of global markets, the standard of product acceptability for 
international consumers would be determined by the country with the most stringent 
pollution control standards, so that the future of the post-industrial economy would 
depend upon its ability to produce high-value, high-quality products meeting high 
environmental standards. Hence, based on this argument, Europe would be able to 
take full advantage of the economies of scale in globally competitive markets only 
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if it legislates for high environmental standards on par with those to be found in 
Japan and the US. 
This argument turned the most familiar objection to stringent environmental policy 
on its head: There was always a trade-off between the imposition of environmental 
standards and the protection of economic interests, most notably the protection of 
employment. As Hirschmann (1991) points out, one of the most important 
rhetorical devices in the armory of those arguing for progressive causes is the claim 
that what appear to be conflicting goals (equality and freedom, or economic 
prosperity and social protection) are really consistent with and may even reinforce 
one another, just as it is a feature of a “reactionary” discourse to stress the conflicts 
that are involved. 
In the case of environmental policy, it became almost an article of faith that 
environmental protection was a precondition of the economic success that was 
associated with the European project. 
It is clear that these arguments were developed extensively within the Commission 
and that they surfaced in relation to the Commission’s “White Paper” on growth 
competitiveness and employment, the background of which is well known. 
According to Weale et. al. (2000, p77), amid the growing public and political 
anxiety about the recession and rising unemployment in Europe, in June 1993, the 
Copenhagen European Council invited the Commission to prepare a document on 
the subject, outlining a diagnosis and discussing possible policy solutions. Given the 
origins and context of the document, positive mention of environmental protection 
shows the extent to which the fundamental argument of ecological modernization 
had entered the policy arena. In terms of environmental policy, there is a clear 
formal recognition within the “White Paper” of the role of environmental projects 
and concerns in promoting enhanced growth and competitiveness. Chapter 10 of 
the Commission’s report is titled “Towards a New Development Model”. It 
promotes fiscal and other policy instruments as devices for moving costs away from 
the employment of labor and towards the use of resources. According to the 
paper, the existing policy instruments will have to be reoriented to encourage the 
more efficient use of resources (thus leaving the possibility of eco-taxes), and 
priority should be given to environmentally friendly innovation both by means of 
subsidies for technical improvement and by funds for research and development. It 
should be stressed that the aforementioned chapter is the conclusion to a series of 
related points made throughout the document. Hence, in the context of the need to 
develop new forms of work and new employment opportunities, environmental 
protection is one of the sectors where expansion is said to be possible (EC 1979). 
In this way, the Commission used the strategy of ecological modernization as a 
legitimating discourse in its attempt to reconcile the goals of the internal market 
and the imposition of high environmental standards. Weale et. al. (2000, p78) 
point out that environmental policy-makers within the Commission were successful in 
articulating a legitimating discourse in terms of which the institutional expansion of 
European environmental policy could be justified, but they warn that this conclusion 
needs to be considered very carefully, because, within the new discourse, there 
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are divergent elements that contain politically important ambiguities which have 
blunted the effectiveness of the argument that is being advanced. The elements of 
this ecological modernization discourse are complex; it could be assumed that this 
complexity has permitted that it always be possible for policy-makers to downplay 
some elements and stress others depending on their own interests or perspectives. 
At this point, it is important to note the inherent tension in simply justifying 
environmental policy in terms of a “market failure” rationale, which implies a more 
interventionist line. This issue could be considered a local example of the wider 
1980s conflict between the ideological proponents of “Rhineland capitalism”, (who 
favored a partnership between economic enterprises and political authorities) and 
proponents of neo-liberalism (who favored a less interventionist role for the 
political authorities) (Albert 1993). This issue is critical because it outlines the 
ambiguity of the internal market project. In this sense, it was seen as a liberal 
project by some and as a tool for a more interventionist regime at the European 
level by others. At this point, it must be highlighted that, among those who 
considered this strategy to be a liberal project, there were also two general 
positions: one that stressed the importance of reducing non-tariff barriers to trade 
created by national regulations, and another that stressed the dangers of “market 
failure”, especially in the environmental area. 
From another perspective, those who held a different view of the relationship 
between environmental protection and economic cost could always question this 
strategy of ecological modernization. In this sense, for highly developed industrial 
countries like Germany or the Netherlands, which need to search for new markets, 
the strategy of ecological modernization was an obvious step forward. On the 
other hand, it did not make much sense from the perspective of a country like 
Spain.  
However, the strategy of ecological modernization was presented as a progressive 
way of approaching environmental challenges, justifying economic growth and 
technological advances as an essential part of a conscious and respectful 
environmental program. In this sense, the strategy has been presented as a 
significant path towards development in almost all of parts of the globe, 
exemplified by the well-being of the powerful industrial countries that have been 
carrying out the strategy. 
In any case, as Weale et. al. (2000, p79) signal, even in developed northern 
states, that environmental standards have never been allowed to completely 
override cost calculations. They cite an example of a German approach to 
pollution control that relied upon setting standards according to the “state of 
available technology”; the Germans implicitly reckoned the economic 
consequences of their decisions, outlining that no standard is ever set solely with 
reference to environmental considerations and without considering its economic 
effects. 
So, what is the relationship between the approach of ecological modernization to 
the justification of environmental policy principles and the concept of sustainable 
development? This, of course, depends on how narrowly or broadly the concept of 
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sustainable development is defined. Nevertheless, even according to relatively 
narrow definitions, the principles of ecological modernization capture only a part 
of what advocates of sustainable development are seeking. Ecological 
modernization rests crucially on the claim that economic growth can take new, 
more environmentally friendly forms. Sustainable development seeks to set the 
pursuit of economic development within the context of principles of 
intergenerational equity, social justice, and democratic participation. That this is the 
discourse of ecological modernization, rather than of sustainable development, 
that could most easily be attached to the justification of the European Union's 
environmental policy measure, probably reflects the continuing importance of the 
origins of European integration in the method of economic interdependence. 
 
4.3.-  European Environmental Governance: The Main Institutional   
Actors. 
 
The last section outlined the way in which policy principles influenced policy-making 
in the European Union. These principles exist as such because institutions employed 
them in the task of formulating policy and devising solutions to environmental 
problems. Before choices can be made and strategies formulated, institutions have 
to be established. It is clear that European institutions and institutional actors 
occupy a pivotal position in the European environmental policy narrative, and 
therefore in the environmental governance of Europe. As has been demonstrated, 
the involvement of European institutions in the creation of environmental rules has 
been a gradual and slow process; this process has been accompanied by 
institutional proliferation, and, through this, environmental concerns have become 
a feature of a wide range of European Union institutions. 
In turn, the European system of environmental governance has involved an 
extension of the range and character of various institutional actors and not just the 
development of policies. Moreover, by delineating the institutionalization of 
environmental regulation at the European level, the aim is to explain how the role 
of European institutions has been altered and adapted as European environmental 
governance has evolved. Before describing each institution, it should be 
underscored that these are mainly considered organizational actors, and it should 
be recognized that they derive their powers and place in the European Union’s 
system of environmental governance from the complex of rules and practices within 
which they are embedded. 
 
4.3.1.- The European Commission 
 
The European Commission performs a wide range of functions and is involved in 
environmental governance in many ways. As an agenda-setter, a consensus-
builder, a manager, and the formal initiator of legislation, its presence is largely 
taken as a given at all stages of the European environmental policy process. The 
European Commission has often been characterized as a hybrid of European civil 
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service, international secretariat, and embryonic government. Its functions have 
been defined as both political and administrative, but this definition still falls short 
of describing the full uniqueness of the institution. 
Regarding the structure of the Commission, it is important to note that it is headed 
by an executive and collegiate decision-making organ, the College of 
Commissioners, which is comprised of 20 commissioners who collectively decide on 
Commission policy. Each of them is responsible for one or more portfolios, and 
voting is performed on the basis of consensus or simple majority and is 
confidential. The division of tasks among the commissioners has as much to do with 
the political experience of individual commissioners. As with any ministerial-type 
post, commissioners are expected to operate on a fast learning curve and to pick 
up the fine details of the portfolios in the job. However, it is true that commissioners 
do not work alone, and, to at least some extent, commissioners are only as 
effective as their supporting staffs. The informal working groups of the cabinets of 
various commissioners can be very important, because not only do such advisers to 
the commissioner have their master’s ear, but they also frequently have excellent 
contacts beyond Brussels, in Whitehall, Paris, and so on. More generally speaking, 
they provide a form of policy leadership and agenda setting. Their interaction with 
the various personnel on committees is vital for transmitting and intercepting 
information flow. It is the cabinets that keep commissioners informed on general 
policy developments and that are responsible for specific briefs. 
The cabinets also liaise between the commissioners and commission services. The 
Commission is comprised of 24 directorates-general (DG), which, like mini-
ministries, are responsible for specific sectoral and horizontal policies, reflecting 
the policy competences of the EU. Director-generals head these DG, as senior 
commission officials who can themselves have a significant effect on policy 
priorities. Within this general structure, horizontal services provide across-the-board 
facilities for all DGs. For environmental matters, the Legal Service is one of the 
most important Directorate-Generals since it is responsible for ensuring that the 
legislation being developed within the DGs is compatible with the treaty and is 
legally sound. The Legal Service examines all draft environment texts, though it 
rarely interferes with the substantive aspects of draft legislation. 
There are many DGs that deal with energy, research, development, and industry 
that may have an interest and even some involvement in environmental matters. 
DG XI (environment, nuclear safety, and civil protection) is the one that is 
ultimately responsible for the drafting of environmental legislation and the 
implementation of policy. DG XI is divided into directorates that deal with general 
and international affairs, environment, industrial nuclear safety, civil protection, 
and environmental quality and natural resources. Though it has grown a lot since 
the mid-1980s, it still remains a relatively small DG. It is considered a “fringe” or 
“science” DG by the Commission itself, and, therefore, it is important to take into 
account that this DG is not one of the Commission's political heavyweights. In other 
words, this DG can achieve little on its own, so it is necessary for the DG XI to 
build coalitions of support for its proposals. From the outside, environmental 
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groups see DG XI as an integral and implicit part of the Commission and not as a 
defender of their interests. 
One particular domain of the Commission’s activities that is frequently forgotten 
about is its duty to produce detailed, delegated, secondary legislation as 
mandated under parent directives and regulations that have been approved by the 
Council of Ministers. To assist the Commission in this function, a host of specialized 
committees with distinctive rules has been set up; indeed, at present, some several 
hundred such committees meet on and off to assist the Commission in a system that 
is known as “comitology”. These committees are composed of experts, typically 
nationally approved scientists from each member-state, who provide detailed 
advice to the Commission regarding the rules and regulations associated with a 
major directive. Since many of the precise costs of an environmental measure are 
contingent upon such details, the work of such committees is by no means trivial, 
even if it is often obscure. There are many sources that signal that the reliance of 
DG XI on these committees is extensive and detailed (see Bainbridge&Teasdale 
2012; Buitendjik&vanSchendelen 1995; Demmke 1997). Regarding environmental 
policy, “comitology” can be vital, particularly because, under a variety of complex 
rules, the so-called “regulatory committees” may actually refuse to approve 
Commission plans and thus leave policy in limbo. They can also send issues back to 
the Council, thus reopening the terms of the original agreement. Therefore, it is 
mainly for these reasons that the European Parliament has been keen to be given a 
greater say on comitology, while environmental groups have been prone to 
vocalize worry about the scope of opaque and secretive deals made between 
national representatives and Commission officials – a point that further illustrates 
the possibility of the permeation of the supposedly supranational Commission by 
member-states’ representatives. Politically speaking, therefore, comitology is 
interesting, as it illustrates the extent to which intergovernmental actors have 
become close working partners with supranational actors in the evolving system of 
European environmental governance. 
 
4.3.2.- The European Parliament  
 
The European Parliament is often seen as the defender of environmental interests; it 
is where environmental groups turn to as the first port of call when seeking to 
lobby European institutions (as the Parliament’s capacity to influence the European 
policy is known). The Parliament’s ability to alter environmental legislation has 
been enhanced since the Single European Act and the extension of qualified 
majority voting in environmental matters, after Maastricht. Moreover, with the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure in some areas of the policy-making, this 
influence has further increased in a trend that has been confirmed by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Most of the Parliament’s formal work takes place in committee 
sessions. The 20 parliamentary committees debate and investigate proposals, 
produce reports on the Commission’s legislative proposals, and propose 
amendments that are ultimately voted on in the Parliament’s plenary sessions. 
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Directly elected officials, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are the 
most obvious link between European institutions and the citizens of Europe. This is 
in part because the European Union has become increasingly aware of the 
urgency of increasing its legitimacy in order to reduce the democratic deficit while 
seeking to become an even more pivotal actor within the European Union polity. 
 
4.3.3.- The Council of the European Union (The Council of Ministers) 
 
This is, to a large degree, the legislating body of the European Union. Significantly, 
the Council of Environmental Ministers was created in 1973 as a response to the 
general rise in public concern about environmental issues. During the 1990s, it was 
holding at least four official Council meetings each year. Because the councils are 
not standing bodies, national officials that hold ambassadorial or deputy 
ambassadorial positions assist them, and they collectively form the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which has the capacity to play a pivotal 
role in the development of environmental policy. The importance of the Council 
derives from the fact that it is the last port of call for European legislation, which, 
unless appealed against, must subsequently be implemented and enforced. The 
Council is made up of national ministers, one from each member state, and is 
chaired by the country holding the EU presidency. Depending on the issue and 
consequently the treaty base, votes on legislation are taken either by unanimity, 
with every state effectively holding a veto over new legislation, or by a system of 
qualified majority voting (QMV), which is a weighted voting system that gives the 
larger states more votes than the smaller ones (though not in a strict, proportionate 
sense). 
The significance of the decision-making procedures in the Council of the European 
Union stems from the fact that it is in this forum that the differences of national 
policy preferences are expressed. Given the institutional centrality of the Council, 
and its significance as the archetypical intergovernmentalist institution of the EU, its 
pattern of decision-making is dominated by the pattern of preferences that member-
states bring to Council discussions. In this context, the hypothesis that has 
dominated both journalistic and academic accounts of the Environment Council is 
that its divisions take a “leader-laggard” form. In this sense, member-states could 
be categorized into “leaders”, who press for high environmental standards, and 
“laggards”, who, for a variety of reasons, oppose the raising of standards. 
 
4.3.4.- The European Council 
  
However, the supreme decision-taking body of the European Union is the European 
Council, an institution with an identity distinct from that of the Council of Ministers, 
since the heads of the governments of the member states composes it. It sets 
agendas, filters information, and demands policy from the domestic political arena 
through to the European level. It should be stressed that only the most controversial 
and politically sensitive issues will come to the attention of the European Council. It 
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holds meetings twice a year, so there is time to discuss and deal with issues that 
have been considered unresolvable at the Council of the European Union. The 
European Council prioritizes issues of high politics – foreign policy matters, 
constitutional and institutional questions, and economic affairs. Therefore, it is rare 
that environmental issues emerge as the focus of the European Council; unless 
some environmental issues manage to attract the European Council agenda as a 
result of intense public or media attention. 
 
4.3.5.- The European Environmental Agency  
 
The European Environmental Agency is governed by a management board 
composed of representatives of the governments of the 33 member states that 
compose it. It became operational in 1994 and is headquartered in Copenhagen, 
Denmark. In the course of its establishment, some voices called for it to be given 
powers of supervision over national environmental inspectorates, to ensure that 
they were correctly implementing and enforcing environmental legislation. 
However, this function was eliminated from the final directive. Although its current 
role of disseminating and regularizing the production of environmental statistics is 
far from insignificant, the mere production of such information can have unintended 
regulatory effects by indicating implementation gaps and deficits, thus creating 
pressure for action (Majone 1994). 
 
4.4.- Final Remarks 
 
The European Commission, through its capacity to make use of symbolic and 
informal policy instruments, demonstrated its capacity to shape the norms and 
principles that would thereafter underpin a distinctly European system of 
government. From the mid-1980s, the Commission, Parliament, and Court 
demonstrated how, whether together or at odds with one another, they could 
influence the environmental agendas and play a leadership role in environmental 
governance. Rather than claiming this to be evidence of a move from passive to 
purposive institutionalism, we might see it more as recognition of the adaptability 
and malleability of European institutions. Although they have the capacity to act 
purposively, they do not always do so. They have at their disposal a range of 
strategies and roles that they're able to adopt in order to achieve their desired 
ends. While it could be wrong to see national governments as anything other than 
the most important actors in the environmental policy game, which establish the 
limits within which the European institutions can act, the European institutions could 
be considered purposive, and this purposiveness could be considered subjected to 
nationally-imposed constraints. In this way, saying that an institution may be able to 
act purposively is not the same as saying that said institution is able to act 
independently. 
The inter-institutional relationships and the interactions among a wide range of 
policy actors shape patterns of environmental governance at the European level, 
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but European institutions are not the only actors involved in environmental 
governance in Europe, even if they play some of the main roles. In this sense, 
national and subnational governments and interest groups are also sources of 
considerable influence. 
It is clear that the European institutions play an important role and help to 
delineate, to some extent, the environmental governance in Europe. Nevertheless, 
it should be emphasized that Environmental governance is defined by a 
combination of factors, such as structural and procedural contexts, which, in turn, 
are based in the principles and values that permeate the overarching political 
framework of each of the nation-states integrated into the European Union. In this 
regard, by analyzing the way in which policy is made, it becomes clear how 
technical and scientific input merge into policy and are blurred within the political 
discourse, the character of which is established institutionally. Therefore, this could 
be considered a confirmation (and perhaps an extension) of the conclusions of 
Chapter 3, because this analysis has exposed the way in which the hegemony is 
maintained through the neoliberal institutions signaled in the aforementioned 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
NATION-STATES AS ECONOMIC-SOCIAL SPACES: 
ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNANCE OF GERMANY AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
According to Lipietz (1985), accumulation regimes and regulation modes are 
conformed basically in the spaces of “nation-states”. It could therefore be assumed 
that this is because these centralized contexts of power provide the ideal 
sociocultural conditions towards the emergence of ideas, values, and common 
orderings, which, in turn, serve as a basis for the development of social 
concessions. It follows that this is where such regimes and modes – through 
framework conditions – could better exercise their influence. As regulation 
emerges from the harmony between institutions and a variety of processes that are 
relatively independent of each other, even without a guide, but have the state as 
an institutional center, because the physical coercive power is fundamental to the 
maintenance of class relations, its social forms and the modes of institutional 
expression, and because it is only there where it could be inscribed, in a binding 
way, in social concessions (Hirsch 1995, p51). It would be wrong to assume that 
the state manages society; rather, it guarantees the regulation process through its 
coercive means and is itself an object of regulation (Jessop 1990, p367). 
Alterations in the accumulation conditions and in the social coercive correlations 
always lead to modifications in the network of the political system—that is, in the 
relations between administrative apparatuses, informs of representation, the 
modalities of the mediation of party interests, or forms of associations (Jessop 
1984, p238). The concrete configuration of the state, the specific relation between 
the state and society, the way in which state intervention, and the 
institutionalization of social relations have not been previously fixed, but rather 
modified according to the conditions of regulation. By these means, it is possible to 
more accurately determine the bond between politics and economics, state and 
economy. There is not any economic area that is independent from the state and 
regulation. The process of accumulation of capital is always considered within the 
regulation framework, in which the state is seen as the institutional center, even if 
its function and importance may vary according to their respective accumulation 
regimes and modes of regulation. At the same time, regulation maintains the 
dependence of the development of the accumulation process. The ideas that 
consider the economy to be managed by politics or vice versa are therefore 
wrong, as accumulation and regulation form a contradictory unit – contradictory 
because it is determined by the respective social practices and their own dynamics 
(Hirsch 1995, p52). 
Understanding the regulation process and the role that the state plays in the 
process implies, then, the observation of not only the state apparatus in a reduced 
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way, but also the so-called political-administrative process. Next to this 
determination of the reduced state stands what Gramsci describes as an extended 
state, which includes the whole spectrum of civil society. This is the branched 
network of organizations that, in a formal sense, at least to some extent, are 
independent from the state, and are the voluntary associations at the service of the 
representation of society interests, the formation of political will, the expression of 
opinions, and public discussion: parties, federations, sectoral interests groups, 
churches, universities, the media, associations, clubs, citizen initiatives, and many 
more. Next to the state, in the aforementioned reduced sense, civil society is an 
essential component of the regulatory system, because it is there where interests 
are organized and social processes are regulated. For example, through collective 
agreements, general ideas regarding value patterns and orderings are conformed 
to and therefore serve as mediators between the state and society (Hirsch 1995, 
p53).Hence, it is clear that the usual assumption that state and civil society are in 
opposition to each other – that is, considering them as a coercive apparatus (the 
state) and a field of freedom and democracy (civil society) – is unfounded, 
because both are structural components of the institutional system of regulation, 
determined by the structure of a capitalist society through which domination is 
stabilized and the process of accumulation of capital guaranteed. The institutions of 
civil society are developed through relations of economic power and political 
domination, and, despite all opposition and friction, both are narrowly 
interrelated: the state guarantees the structures of civil society (such as the freedom 
of union association or private property of the media) and, without them (that is to 
say, without the processes of legitimation and canalization of the interests they 
produce), political domination could not last. 
Individual states and their external delimitation offer favorable conditions for the 
configuration of modes of regulation based on consensus and coercion in the 
institutionalized unit, and confer consistency and relative stability to the process of 
capitalist accumulation (Hirsch 1995, p65). As Lipietz (1985) indicates, societies 
organized as individual states represent a fundamental departure point for 
analyzing capitalism. The nation-state systems of accumulation and regulation are 
developed from the beginning within the global capitalist market, and, across 
borders, they are embedded in complex entanglements, exchange processes, and 
economic, political, and military dependencies. International economic and 
political processes are not simply consequences of the joint action of isolated 
national societies, but represent their own structures and dynamics that react to 
each other. The capital, in its dynamic of valorization, lies in a certain opposition to 
the forms of political organization that are spatially fixed. Hence, the 
implementation of a national mode of accumulation and regulation is linked to the 
generation of favorable conditions for positioning. 
As the global capitalist model is characterized by different socio-economic spaces 
(which have also experienced different development), as well as by the existence 
of states that rival each other, a coherent system of regulation such as that which 
can be found in a national framework could not be formed. However, at a global 
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scale, the process of accumulation of capital requires its own regulatory 
mechanisms between states, in order to guarantee a relatively stable exchange of 
commodities, work force, and money. That is why, at the global scale, the process 
of accumulation of capital must also be politically and institutionally regulated, 
which brings about particular difficulties, especially since capitalism is politically 
constituted in the form of individual states. The international regulatory system 
consists of a multiplicity of institutions and organizations that are vastly different 
and linked to each other in an inconsistent way, e.g. governments, central banks, 
and international institutions such as those created at the Bretton Woods 
Conference (see Chapter 3.2.1), which were imposed according to the 
internationally dominant mode of accumulation and regulation. Such a dominant 
mode was, in turn, imposed by world potencies, which support and promote it with 
their own material possibilities and institutional means. However, it should be 
highlighted that, the more an accumulation and regulation mode is imposed at a 
global scale, the more comprehensive and enveloping its inherent crisis tendencies 
will become, such as the environmental one that is covered in this research. At the 
same time, the international regulatory system shows its own, very diverse moments 
of instability, as the position of the potency that guarantees consistence and 
coherence can be undermined through strong competitors. This has generally been 
successful for not simply having copied the dominant development model, but 
because, through competitors' political and social internal structures, they have 
developed their own, more effective alternatives. Regarding the dominant 
economic system, and precisely because there are more alternatives developed by 
the means mentioned earlier, this research focuses on analyzing how 
environmental governance has been developed in two different contexts. These are 
namely two different different varieties of capitalism, and this is an attempt to 
contribute to the understanding of the ways in which capitalism, under two different 
structures of organization, copes with environmental problems. This is done by 
trying to answer some of the research questions presented at the beginning of this 
study. Particularly, there are the following: 
( In which ways do the overarching political and economic contexts of the 
European Union exercise their influence over national governments and the 
way in which environmental governance is handled?Is there a significant 
difference between the two national variants of capitalism regarding their 
approach to sustainable development? If so, what is the cause of such a 
difference? 
( What is the significance of the environmental discourse in the two nation-
states? 
 
 
 
 
 

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5.1.- National Policies on the Environment: A Comparative Approach 
 
In the last chapter, it was clear that environmental governance in Europe is 
influenced by an entangled combination of factors that permeate the overarching 
political framework of the European Union. This chapter, in turn, focuses on 
comparing the environmental policies of two nation-states, with the following 
objectives:  
a) Delineate the background in which the development of environmental policy 
was carried out. 
b) Find out what policy principles (the way in which environmental policy is 
conceptualized and how it is encoded in legislation and in practice) are in 
each nation-state. 
c) Find out what the policy styles (the process of policy-making within which 
these principles are worked out) are characteristic of each nation-state. 
By examining policy styles and principles, this research seeks dependent variables, 
in other words, to outline the characteristics of what makes for differences between 
the two nation-states considered for this research, on the assumption that these 
characteristics reflect underlying institutional influences. From there, the different 
policy regimes characteristic of each nation-state are defined with reference to their 
policy principles and policy styles; these can also be regarded as independent 
variables, because, through the adoption of policy principles or the simultaneous 
processing of issues, a historical legacy is likely to be left that will shape how issues 
are dealt with in subsequent periods. 
This chapter will then deal with the description of the policy principles and styles, 
understanding them as essentially dependent variables, but taking into account the 
way in which and the extents to which established patterns may influence 
contemporary developments in each country. 
 
5.1.1.- Policy Principles  
 
5.1.1.1.- Germany 
 
The German way of dealing with environmental policy and legislation needs to be 
viewed in the context of the German legal tradition, which, commonly with many 
continental systems, places a great emphasis on the formulation of general 
principles. In 1992, in the submission made to the Rio Conference, Germany 
picked three principles that had already been formulated in 1971 for the 
“Environment Programme” in order to define its approach to policy. These 
principles are: the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle, and the 
collaboration principle (Bundesumweltministerium 1992). These last two principles 
are common across many economically developed countries. Thus, it must be 
underscored that much of the distinctiveness of German environmental policy is 
granted by the importance placed on the Vorsorgeprinzip (principle of 
precaution). However, this principle cannot be understood without comprehending 
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the long-standing principle of control in German environmental policy, regulating in 
accordance with the so-called Stand der Technik, (State of the Art). In the 1974 air 
pollution legislation, the Principle of Stand der Technik was defined as follows: 
 
“Stand der Technik im Sinne dieses Gesetzes ist der Entwicklungsstand 
fortschrittlicher Verfahren, Einrichtungen oder Betriebsweisen, der die praktische 
Eignung einer Maßnahme zur Begrenzung von Emissionen in Luft, Wasser und 
Boden, zur Gewährleistung der Anlagensicherheit, zur Gewährleistung einer 
umweltverträglichen Abfallentsorgung oder sonst zur Vermeidung oder 
Verminderung von Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt zur Erreichung eines allgemein 
hohen Schutzniveaus für die Umwelt insgesamt gesichert erscheinen lässt. (The 
state-of-the-art, in terms of this act, is the development of advanced processes, 
facilities, or modes of operation that result in practical measures for limiting 
emissions to air, water, and soil, to ensure environmentally sound management, or 
to at least reduce the impacts on the environment by reaching a high level of 
environmental protection, which appears secured in general.)” (Umweltbundesamt 
1974, p6). 
 
This principle has come to mean, in practice, that regulators ask what is technically 
feasible in engineering terms, leaving operators free to determine how to achieve 
those standards. Afterwards, the regulators consider whether controls that are 
technically feasible can be applied to an emission, making some judgements about 
the economic costs of such control. Therefore, there is always an economic, as well 
as an engineering, assessment involved. Hence, the relationship between Stand 
der Technik and Vorsorgeprinzip is clear, because, in the German context, a 
precautionary environmental policy is one that always takes advantage of the 
available state-of-the-art in dealing with an environmental problem. This is a key 
element that permits the better understanding of the way in which Germany relates 
environmental protection and economic development, and how, in this sense, it 
does not consider the aforementioned issues as opposed but rather as 
complementary. Therefore, it could be assumed that this is one of the reasons why 
Germany was one of the first promoters of the discourse on ecological 
modernization. 
 
5.1.1.1.- The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the concept that guides the environmental policy style, in somewhat the 
same way as the Stand der Technik does in Germany, is the principle of “best 
practicable means”, a principle based in the historical development of British 
pollution control legislation, in which the central idea is that pollution control policy 
should not, in principle, seek to minimize the state of pollution, but should instead 
aim to optimize it. This principle thus derived from the principle of Integrated 
Pollution Control (IPC), an approach which, in general terms, is that the pollution 
standards set and enforced in one medium, i.e. air, should be consistent with the 
standards set for another medium, i.e. water. In this way, the basic requirement for 
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integrated pollution control is that the totality of emissions from a given process be 
considered by the regulatory authorities. This IPC approach has given way to the 
development of two other principles: the BATNEEC (Best Available Technology Not 
Entailing Excessive Costs) and the BPEO (Best Practicable Environmental Option). 
In this sense, it may be the case for emissions that one medium meets the BATNEEC 
standards, but does not represent the best environmental option. In this sense, the 
BPEO could be considered the counterpart of the German Vorsorgeprinzip to 
impose more rigid emission requirements. 
 
5.1.2.- Policy Styles  
 
5.1.2.1.- Germany 
 
The style of German environmental policy is highly formalized. It seeks to reduce 
administrative discretion to a minimum and to incorporate explicit statements of 
principle into its legislation and policy approaches. This regulatory formalism 
becomes obvious when examining the tendency to ensure that standards, along 
with the procedures that accompany them, are explicitly stated in legislative and 
administrative documents. The main legislation documents in Germany related to 
environmental protection take the form of framework legislation, within which 
specific standards have to be set by regulators in the Umweltbundesamt (Federal 
Environmental Agency) and the Umweltministerium (Environmental Ministry) and 
are propagated through Verordnungen (ordinances). This could be considered one 
of the reasons why those setting standards favor uniform emission limits despite 
criticism from the economic perspective that such standards could incite. The policy-
making in Germany is also characterized by the high level of expertise of its 
members, which may sometimes hinder the horizontal coordination of ministries. 
 
5.1.2.2.- The United Kingdom 
 
In many ways, the style of environmental policy of the United Kingdom could be 
regarded as the polar opposite to that of Germany, which could be characterized 
as cooperative in the sense that it rests on a willingness to treat the process of 
regulation as the sharing of information. It should be stressed that the British policy 
style features a considerable amount of administrative discretion regarding setting 
and applying standards. Moreover, although the UK's policy style has changed 
since the impact of EU legislation, there are elements of its traditional approach 
that are still very influential. Such elements become evident in the tendency to 
displace questions about policy onto questions about the structure of the policy 
process. In this sense, the UK’s sustainable development strategy has, at its core, 
the establishment of various advisory bodies: a Panel of Sustainable Development, 
consisting of five experts who report to the Prime Minister, a Round Table on 
Sustainable Development, consisting of 30 representatives from business, local 
government, environmental groups, and other organizations. In other words, the 
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UK approach has been to focus on changes in policy process and machinery rather 
than to concentrate on the development of an elaborately calculated set of 
planning targets. 
 
5.1.3.- Polit ical Parties 
 
It should be stressed that, as soon as international concerns about environmental 
issues started to gain momentum back in the 1970s, political parties in western 
European countries began to respond to those concerns, though their reaction was 
obviously conditioned by ideological affinity. In Germany's case, through political 
competition at least to some extent, the rise of Green Party corresponded with 
public opinion beginning to display higher levels of interest in environmental issues. 
Nevertheless, for political parties, it has been complicated to maintain 
environmentalist positions, whether because of issues of political tradition or simply 
because they have more pressing political issues to resolve. A genuine 
consideration for the environment has largely arisen from issues of immediate 
concern, and mainly due to pollution crises. However, as the environment has 
become a standard requirement in the commitments of every political party, such 
parties do not represent the necessary support that would help to increase the 
priority given to environmental measures. As was stated before, some statements 
adopted by political parties are based more in political competition than in 
substantial policy, so an analysis of party programs could delineate the way in 
which environmental issues have been developed within the process of party 
competition. Such analysis could be done by making a cross-national comparison 
between the two selected nation-states. 
 
5.1.3.1.- Germany 
 
Legal and institutional frameworks have delineated the German party system, as 
well as the political parties. The scope of this party system was intentionally limited 
by constitutional stipulations, which allowed the prohibition of anti-democratic 
parties, and by the 1953 and 1956 electoral laws, which raised the nation-wide 
electoral threshold. (Under Germany's mixed-member electoral system, parties that 
win at least three direct seats receive a share of seats proportional to their list vote, 
even if this is below five percent). 
These laws helped reduce the number of Bundestag parties from eleven, after the 
1949 election, to four, after the 1961 election, and the party system retained this 
configuration for the next two decades. German parties' internal politics and 
structures have also been marked by the country's federal structures. The federal 
decentralization of political decision-making encourages politicians to build 
national careers by nurturing their own organizational and electoral bases at the 
state (Land) level. Finally, the 1949 constitution gave democratic parties the status 
of semi-constitutional organs, giving them some legal privileges as a result of their 
mandated role of participating “in the forming of the political will of the people” 
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(Bundestag 1949, p27, Article 21.1). The Bundestag parties did not get around to 
adopting legislation that spelled out the details of this constitutional status until 
1967, when the parties joined to secure public funds for their work (Bundestag 
1967, p9, part IV, section 18.1). The resulting Parties Law provided a legal 
definition of political parties that affected the parties' organizational operations by 
specifying standards of intra-party democracy, which were to be followed by all 
recognized parties. In return, the Parties Law established what was to become a 
very extensive system of public subsidies for legally qualified parties. 
Since the country's establishment in 1949, the Federal Republic's party competition 
has been dominated by struggles between left and right. Despite some initial 
concerns that Germany's proportional representation electoral system would 
promote the party-system fragmentation that had characterized the Weimar 
Republic, from the 1950s through the 1970s, only three parties played leading 
roles in this left-right dynamic: on the left, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and, 
on the right, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian partner, the 
Christian Social Union (CSU). The political center was occupied by the much 
smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP), which alternately governed with both the left 
and the right in state as well as federal legislatures.  
The effects of environmental issues on the party system in Germany have been 
clear since the 1970s, when the Social-Liberal coalition, under the leadership of 
Interior Minister Genscher and the Secretary of State responsible for environmental 
protection, Günther Hartkopf, passed several important environmental laws 
(Schreurs 2003, p58), including the “Act Against Noise from Air Traffic” (1971), 
the ‘Leaded Petrol Act’ (1972), the ‘DDT Act’ (1972), the ‘Waste Removal Act’ 
(1972), and the “Federal Emissions Control Act” (1974). The last is considered 
one of the first major pieces of legislation concerning air pollution control, as it 
provided the legal basis for setting air quality standards. Also essential to stress is 
the fact that the importance given to the environment is reflected in the manifesto 
position of the Free-Democrats in the early 1970s, which shifts from a middling to a 
more pro-environment position between 1969 and 1972. Between 1953 and 
1972, the Social Democrats did not show themselves as too environmentalist, in 
part because they had committed themselves to making promises that somewhat 
involved economic growth. Regarding environmental commitment, it should be 
highlighted that, in order to cope with the recession induced by the oil price hike of 
1973, Chancellor Schmidt organized the “Gymnicher-Gespräche” (Discussions of 
Gymnich), where he invited representatives from the unions, environmental 
organizations, the economy, and politics in order to discuss environmental 
objectives. Therefore, it was in Gymnich that it was decided that environmental 
issues be given a lower priority than economic development. After this reunion, 
and according to the agreements reached during it, all parties gave a lower status 
to environmental issues, prioritizing economic ones.Then, in the 1980s, the German 
party system slowly started to demonstrate a commitment to environmental 
concerns, mainly through the 1982 transition from the left-center Social-Liberal 
(SPD-FDP) coalition to the right-center Christian-Liberal (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition. 
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This defined the change of orientation of the German government regarding 
environmental issues, moving from an almost spectator role to that of a conscious 
actor. It could be said that this change was induced by a number of factors. 
Among them, the most remarkable was that the Bavarian Christian Social Union 
used, at least to some extent, the environmental issue of the “Waldsterben” (Schütt 
1980, p545-546; Ulrich 1980) as a means of attacking the social democratic core 
in North Rhine Westphalia. Another event that could be considered of importance 
regarding the environmental transition in Germany is that the Green Party started 
to emerge as a political force (attributed to the failure of the prevalent parties to 
cope with environmental issues). Significantly, it took them a decade of both 
successful and unsuccessful coalition experiments at the state and local levels to be 
considered a credible, pragmatic party with the will to govern. Furthermore, it was 
after this decade that they gained support as a plausible partner in coalition 
formation. Although it took until 1998 for an election to give the SPD and the 
Green Party the necessary votes to form their first federal-level coalition, it could be 
posited that the 1980s represent a reorientation in the German Party System 
towards the environment, although often only as part of their rhetorical 
commitments.  
 
5.1.3.2.- The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the main discourse of party competition has been concerned mainly with 
the paramount problem of reversing the country’s comparative economic decline, 
which, in fact, hindered attention to environmental issues. Between the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the United Kingdom experienced a general emergence of 
interest regarding environmental issues. Nonetheless, no major party underwent 
the transition towards environmentalism by implementing measures to cope with the 
demands concerning environmental policy issues, as was the case of the Labour 
Party in the 1970s, which was too concerned with the issues of economic policy to 
also be concerned with the adoption of environmental measures. In the 1980s, the 
Conservatives in charge, and their characteristic neoliberal ideology, resulted in 
deregulation manifesting their main objective of disregarding environmental 
concerns. It should be stressed that, at the end of the decade, there were some 
voices within the Conservative Party who started to bring up the point that the 
privatization of public utilities, such as water and electricity, would provide an 
appropriate institutional, contextual framework in which externalities could be 
accurately regulated (Ridley 1989). Other voices discussed fiscal advantages that 
could be found in “green taxation”; in other words, domestic fuel taxation was 
sometimes defended in terms of its environmental advantages. Nevertheless, this 
“green conservatism” failed to materialize due to the lack of a pro-environmental 
opinion within the party. 
In addition, in the 1980s, the Labour Party was concerned with finding a solution 
to their internal organizational affairs, thus having difficulties giving the required 
attention to policy issues. It should be said that, inside the Labour Party, there were 
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people who mentioned the continuity between the Green agenda and the 
traditional social democratic concern with matters of public health and housing. 
Nevertheless, a tendency to consider environmental and economic issues as 
opposed to one other has prevailed, whether this takes the form of employment 
losses resulting from environmental restrictions on economic activity, or adverse 
effects on the distribution of income from increasing green taxation. One major 
issue of the Labour Party’s attack opposing to the Conservative government was its 
fierce critique of the imposition to applying VAT to domestic fuel. 
Regarding the smaller political parties in the United Kingdom, there are two in 
particular that deserve to be mentioned. One is the Liberal Democrats, which 
emerged as a party in a fusion between the Liberals and the Social Democrats 
after the 1987 general election. The Liberal Democrats have regularly argued for 
an increase in priority for environmental matters, in part following the lead given 
by the Liberals in the 1970s when they were still a different party. 
The other “small” political party that merits attention is the Green Party, which has 
been committed to an environmental agenda. Important to stress is the fact that this 
party enjoyed an increase in popularity at the end of the 1980s, in part because of 
the general upsurge of general interest in environmental questions at the time. 
However, it should be underscored that this result was bolstered by the fact that the 
Liberal Democrats were unpopular just after they merged. In this way, in 1989, the 
Green Party secured 15% of the popular vote in the European elections – a fact 
that undoubtedly influenced the thinking of other parties. Nevertheless, internal 
disputes of the familiar realist/fundamentalist kind divided the party. On top of 
that, the United Kingdom electoral system severely punishes any party that recruits 
only a small percentage of the vote without geographical concentration.  
5.1.4.- Economic Structure 
 
5.1.4.1.- Germany 
 
The German economy is characterized by a number of large, world-class, and 
highly productive firms in sectors such as engineering, chemicals, and vehicles. In 
addition, it has a large number of smaller firms often involved in complex supply 
arrangements with large firms. Its public utilities have strong elements of both 
public and private control, and it also has a large, dispersed agricultural sector 
involving, in many instances, small-scale, part-time farmers. This economic structure 
is housed within a corporatist framework of policy-making in which much wage-
bargaining is centrally conducted by large organizations representing employers 
and employees within different sectors. There is heavy dependence on the banks as 
sources of capital investment. Post-war government policy has been strongly 
committed to continuity and economic growth through policies involving the 
concentration of economic activities. It should also be highlighted that international 
competition plays a main role in large sectors of the economy, and, therefore, the 
implications of policy measures for the relative costs of German products compared 
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with those produced in other countries should not be ignored. Implicitly, and 
considering that European Union membership has been a fundamental pillar of 
German foreign policy since 1957, the opportunities that the European Union 
offers for the regulation and stabilization of international economic context are not 
likely to be ignored by policy-makers.Economic interests have exercised their 
influence on the developments of policy in Germany. Throughout the 1970s, the 
German government and its citizens participated actively in what could be 
considered the emergence of the modern phase of environmental-politics 
development. Nonetheless, the increase in the price of oil in 1973 resulted in 
critical pressures on the German economy. In this way, according to Voss (2013, 
p170), the discussion about the economic impact of environmental policies reached 
a political climax in June 1975 at the “Gymnicher-Gespräche” (Discussions of 
Gymnich). There, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt invited representatives from the 
unions, environmental organizations, the economy, and politics in order to discuss 
the environmental objectives that had been formulated in the early 1970s in the 
context of the reform program of the social-liberal coalition, with the objective of 
scaling down those objectives to a level acceptable for business. In other words, it 
was a call for deregulation in favor of economic growth. Hence, it was a 
demonstration of the way in which a corporatist economic arrangement exercises 
its influence to interfere in a productivist regulatory program. 
Nonetheless, in the 1980s, with the new policy measures, the German corporatist 
arrangement took a new form. In this sense, Germany became one of the first 
countries that attempted to amend the traditional opposition between reasonable 
economics and rigorous environmental protection. 
An essential feature that emerged from the aforementioned change in the German 
corporatist style of policy-making was the way in which Germany, having accepted 
the need to legislate domestically, then sought international measures, especially 
within the European Union, to ensure that the competitive disadvantage was not 
too great for German firms. Another considerable difference brought in by the 
“change” in the German style of policy-making was the expansion of funds 
invested by the government into environmental research and development. This 
reorientation from the corporatist system to topics such as efficient use of resources, 
renewable energy, and sustainable development, which are often considered 
within the framework of “ecological modernization”, was the attempt to 
reconceptualize the environmental responsibilities of business management. 
 
5.1.4.2.- The United Kingdom 
 
The industrial structure typical of the United Kingdom is typified for being less 
technically strong and more dependent upon equity capital, and consequently 
differs totally from the German economic structure. Hence, the fact that there is no 
corporative infrastructure coordinating the economic activities could be considered 
one of the reasons that the United Kingdom has become less receptive to the 
discourse of ecological modernization. The economic program that was followed 
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by the Thatcher government consisted of creating the institutional and legal climate 
in which business managers would have great freedom to pursue profitable 
activities. However, it should be noted that, this fact notwithstanding, in the recent 
years, there have been important institutional and policy developments focused on 
rearranging the relationship between business and environment. To this end, the 
British Standards Institute established the standard BSI 5750 in 1979, trying to set 
a benchmark by which companies can level their environmental performance. After 
that, The Royal Society promoted public discussion of risk perception, and the 
Royal Society of Arts sought to promote the importance of environmental 
awareness in industrial design and manufacturing. Moreover, in 1993, a special 
“Queen’s Award” was established to promote environmental achievement. 
Regarding business organizations, it should be noted that the Confederation for 
British Industry, which is the main employers’ organization in the UK, tried to 
develop awareness of the commercial importance of environmental quality among 
its members by putting a department in charge of environmental issues. However, 
this department, aside from dealing with environmental awareness, also deals with 
concerns about costs (particularly those arising from regulation). In addition, retail 
organizations have tried to cope with environmental concerns, though it is seen as 
a way to gain a competitive advantage, as the retail sector remains strong at least 
to some extent in the United Kingdom's economy. 
In general terms, it could be said that, in the United Kingdom, there has been a 
shift in the traditional perception of the built-in opposition between environmental 
protection and economic performance. Nevertheless, there are still considerable 
reservations within the world of business about the costs of environmental 
protection. 
 
5.2.- Comparison 
 
Regarding economic interests, it is clear that there have been major adaptations to 
increasing environmental requirements – changes that have been brought about 
through policy and regulation and, to some extent, from autonomous actions within 
key industries. This situation is more visible in Germany, where there are large 
industries exposed to international markets and hence have the organizational 
capacity to introduce procedures for environmental auditing and management.  
As environmental policies have been implemented, they have provided economic 
opportunities for the development of eco-industries. The perception that such 
opportunities are important has become more prevalent in Germany than in the 
United Kingdom, but it nevertheless plays a main role in the structure of 
environmental politics in both nation-states. It should be noted that the pattern of 
state-industry relations varies across both cases: In Germany, there has been a 
long-standing corporatist pattern of economic policy-making, and, in the United 
Kingdom, many corporatist experiments have been attempted that have failed to 
compete with alternative approaches. Organizational structures of labor and 
industry have also made corporatist styles of negotiation difficult. 
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It is clear that there has been a greening of economic actors. In an attempt to 
recognize corporatism as a significant condition of environmental policy change, it 
could be assumed that, in Germany, this corporatist pattern has provided a 
framework that has resulted a beneficial, at least to some extent, to ecological 
modernization. Moreover, in the case of the United Kingdom, it must be stressed 
that the framework that apparently created the ideal conditions under which 
environmental investments have been made possible was introduced by 
liberalization.  
5.3.- Final Remarks 
 
Regarding policy principles and styles, it is clear that these tend to relate to 
general national approaches to policy-making. Nonetheless, Germany has 
developed and transformed its principles and styles in ways that have responded 
to key elements of new demands for environmental protection, and, although the 
Vorsorgeprinzip often remains operative only on a rhetorical level, it is true that 
there are cases where the principle has at least strengthened the case for higher 
standards of performance.  
The UK, in which the notion of best practicable environmental option derives from 
the consensual style of regulation – the UK's traditional approach – it prioritizes 
economic growth over environmental protection. Therefore, when a proposal for 
environmental protection is made, the argument that issues of economic cost should 
always be considered is put into question. 
It is clear that the European Union has influenced the ways in which environmental 
affairs are handled. In general terms, the changes in policy styles in both nation-
states have developed through the European Union’s pressures to adopt the 
program of ecological modernization, a dynamic for which the objective continues 
to be the establishment of the single market. 
Cross-national differences between the two nation-states are well-defined when 
analyzing the most relevant elements of the domestic political systems. In this way, 
the specific and differing economic structures influence attitudes of economic 
interests and the respective governments’ abilities to implement changes in 
production practices. Thus, the roles and pressures of these elements may vary. 
Moreover, there are often identifiable reasons for cross-national differences. How 
can one better understand this pattern of similarities and differences? One simple 
assumption that is often used in cases like this is that the perceived differences are 
to be accounted for largely in terms of the differences in levels and forms of 
economic development. 
All of these findings have been established while trying to provide a political and 
economic context for the two nation-states in the interest of a better understanding 
of the process that each nation-state has followed, and that has resulted in the way 
in which the environment is being handled in each one of them. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLICY: A TWO-
COUNTRY COMPARISON 
 
 
In Chapter 5, a brief look at the development of policy styles and principles in the 
two countries considered in this research was presented. Nonetheless, policies are 
developed through organizational processes, so, in this chapter, we will look at the 
organization of environmental policy. However, in order to have a clear look at 
the aforementioned “organization” of environmental policy, it is necessary to 
consider some questions regarding administrative organization. 
How has environmental policy been institutionalized in the two countries? What 
forms of administration have they adopted, and how does their environmental 
administration relate to other facets of the machinery of government?  
It is evident that alterations in the governmental machinery generally take place 
under the influence of many factors, within which the desire of policy-makers to 
give special attention to a particular policy area and to symbolize new priorities is 
often an important consideration. In this sense, when environmental considerations 
began to arrive more seriously in the agenda of liberal democracies in the late 
1960s, the most common response of governments was to establish a separate part 
of the bureaucratic machinery to deal with such issues. This gave way to the 
restructuring of a central ministry to provide focus for environmental policy in the 
case of the United Kingdom. Germany, in the other hand, did not immediately 
established environmental ministries, but nonetheless concentrated environmental 
functions in a pre-existing ministry. 
As was shown in Chapter 5, this organizational response to environmental issues 
was also a feature of the way in which the European Union first sought to develop 
its own policy capacity. Nonetheless, it could be considered that this story 
highlighted another feature of the administrative politics of the environment. Over 
time, within the European Union, the pattern of organization became more 
complex, and organizations with an interest in environmental issues began to 
proliferate. As the issue of external integration – the coordination of environmental 
issues across several sectors of policy – came to be appreciated, a wider range of 
administrative bodies within the European Union came to acquire some 
environmental interest and/or responsibility, and the institutional space became 
more crowded. 
When talking in comparative terms, it could be assumed that issues of 
administrative organization provide some measures of policy salience; there are 
two ways of seeing this proxy of salience. On the one hand, some centralization of 
environmental policy-making functions, within an identifiable ministry or its 
equivalent, provides a measure of the initial importance of the governmental 
response to environmental issues. On the other hand, the more extensive the range 
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of institutions with some environmental responsibility, the more it is suggested that 
environmental policy is not only established as a policy field in its own right, but is 
also expanding in ways that are demanded by the problems that environmental 
issues pose. Patterns of institutionalization thus provide some measures – even if 
they are indirect ones – of the extent to which environmental concerns are taken 
seriously by governments. 
Within this context, looking at policy organizational structures also permits one to 
empirically compare the relative importance of issue-based explanations of the 
developments of environmental policy with the importance of explanations based 
on national institutional patterns and policy styles – a comparison that could be 
considered one of the core purposes of this research. As was articulated in the first 
part of this chapter, the general drift of arguments about issue characteristics is that 
the nature of an issue brings about certain common patterns of response, implying 
a convergence among policy systems. Some arguments may be raised against this 
approach that identify the importance of national styles and institutions of policy-
making, and that stress how historically conditioned institutional arrangements limit 
or determine what political actors are able to do. Such national policy-making 
styles are likely to preserve a divergence between different national systems 
dealing with the same problem. Hence, proponents of the theory of national styles 
of regulation hold that it is contingent on the historical events that are distinctive to 
each country and that, subsequently, are generally important in shaping policy 
responses to problems. In so far as administrative arrangements provide a measure 
of policy salience, the patterns to which they give rise may (hopefully) provide 
some evidence for testing the predictions of these two approaches. 
The assessment of the evidence relies upon an analysis of how environmental 
protection is organized within the two nation-states in two main respects, the 
national and the subnational. In the first part, it is considered the pattern of 
organization in the central government and, in particular, the extent to which 
functions are concentrated in an environmental ministry. Is one ministry given 
responsibility for most environmental functions, or are functions assigned to a 
number of ministries? In general, types of environmental administrations vary 
considerably, with models ranging from the concentration of competences in one 
environmental ministry (through partial concentration with the ministry playing a 
coordinating role) to the dispersal of competences (alleviated by some inter-
ministerial bodies), and, finally, to what is called “hyper-sectoralization” (López-
Bustos 1992), where policy competence is widely dispersed.  
What models are followed in the two nation-states that integrate this research? And 
how far, if at all, have central administrative structures changed in the last 30 years 
in the light of public concern about environmental issues and other pressures, 
especially from the European Union, making for administrative change? 
Within this context, it is also considered the organization of technical advice. 
Although many environmental issues have a great deal of salience and emotional 
resonance in the public’s collective mind, it is equally true that, in virtually all 
pollution control issues, technical questions concerned with the setting of emission 


..1
limits or quality standards, the restructuring of production processes, or the 
diagnosis of cause and effect relationships come to be prominent factors in making 
policy choices. In this context, it is necessary to consider how expert bodies are 
constituted and what their relationship is to policy-makers.  
Furthermore, attention is given to the way in which central structures relate to 
subnational structures. It is evident that policy-making takes place at more than one 
level of government, and when we turn to issues of implementation, subnational 
structures often result in being of crucial importance. How far has administrative 
responsibility for environmental issues devolved into subnational bodies, and how 
far is it concentrated at the national level? 
In this chapter, these questions are considered by looking at comparative trends in 
relatively easily measured comparative indices. It is argued that it is very difficult to 
discern strong common trends across the two nation-states, which could be said to 
reflect issue-based phenomena within the field of environmental policy. Instead, the 
legacy of specific institutional arrangements within each country is observed, 
particularly the ways in which both the shadows of the past and the specific 
problem-characteristics that each nation-state faces shape the structure of the 
administration. 
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6.1. Administrative Concentration and Environmental Policy 
 
6.1.1. Central Government 
 
How is environmental policy-making organized within the central government, and, 
in particular, what is the extent to which there has developed a centralization of 
functions across the two nation-states? Some analysts take this to be an important 
measure of the institutionalization of environmental policy, arguing that the 
creation of an environmental ministry is an important measure of 
institutionalization. The presence or absence of a ministry alone is an inadequate 
measure, since it ignores the extent to which environmental functions are actually 
assigned to such a ministry. Hypothetically, a ministry might be called a ministry 
and yet have relatively few relevant functions, such as those assigned to, say, an 
agricultural or a public works ministry. Until 1986, Germany did not have an 
environmental ministry, though a significant concentration of environment functions 
were the responsibility of a pre-existing ministry (the Interior Ministry). It should be 
highlighted that, after the creation of the environmental ministry, it has possessed a 
high degree of concentration of environmental functions, and is therefore one of 
the main reasons that Germany is seen as a leader in environmental issues. The 
UK, though they had an early start in environmental policy back in 1970, is not 
consistent with this perception, mainly because it faced a stalling process as the 
politics of economic decline sharpened in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
6.1.2. Subnational Administration 
 
As was mentioned previously, the institutionalization of environmental policy took 
place in the 1970s and 1980s, and this could be seen as a nationalization of the 
activities that had taken place before at the local level.  Therefore, it could be said 
that the institutionalization of environmental policy led to a reorganization of 
central government. Aside from that, new laws for pollution control gave 
administrative powers to national bodies that were previously exclusive of 
subnational authorities. In this sense, the nationalization of pollution policy 
became, at least to some extent, the root of the issues of central-local relations. This 
is why it is important to have a look at the subnational administration and its 
relationship to the machinery of central government. 
The emerging public administration of pollution also transformed the character of 
the subnational bodies that remained. New responsibilities – for example, in the 
areas of monitoring or solid waste control – were often assigned to sub-national 
authorities, and old responsibilities shifted from being merely optional to being 
mandatory. Moreover, one important responsibility typically handled by 
subnational bodies is the inspection of licensed plants and permits to ensure that 
standards are being maintained in accordance with the license. Given the need for 
local knowledge, it is not surprising that subnational bodies are assigned to take on 
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this task, even when the standards have been set at the national or even at the 
international level. 
Broadly speaking, there are two patterns of subnational and national relations that 
may exist in the administration of environmental policy in the two nation-states 
analyzed here. The first pattern rests on the principle of splitting the policy 
functions that are related to any specific area of activity, by making policy-making 
and standard-setting a national responsibility. However, policy implementation and 
compliance-monitoring is a subnational responsibility. The second pattern is to split 
responsibility according to criteria that relate substantive issues. Thus, responsibility 
for hazardous chemicals may be made the responsibility of the central government, 
but some forms of waste disposal may be made the responsibility of a local or 
subnational government. It is important to emphasize that this two-fold 
categorization of ways in which policy responsibility might be assigned is clearer in 
analytical terms than it is in practice. Within the German system, for example, to 
approximate the pattern in which responsibility is assigned on the basis of policy 
functions, with the federal government making policy and setting standards and the 
subnational governments implementing policy, there is still some assignment of 
responsibility on the basis of substantive issues. That is because, in Germany, there 
is a functional division wherein the federal government sets standards in areas 
where it has responsibility, while subnational authorities are responsible for 
implementation. These subnational authorities are also responsible for areas where 
the federal government only has framework powers. All of this has been 
historically determined, as Germany has made the decentralization of power 
hierarchical since the postwar. This has been achieved principally through a form 
of federalism that has divided policy competences functionally rather than by issue 
area. It could be said that the same constitutional anxieties that led to Germany’s 
vertical federalism also make it difficult to establish independent agencies that 
might escape adequate parliamentary scrutiny. In this sense, it is hardly likely that 
the structure of the environmental administration would be an exception to these 
constitutional norms. 
 Conversely, in the UK, where, on some substantive issues, there has historically 
been a centralization of responsibility (e.g. air pollution from major sources), the 
central authorities have always tried to make due allowance for the assimilative 
capacity of the local environment based on the exact standards that were being 
enforced. This is grounded on the fact that the central government takes 
responsibility for setting standards and for implementation in those areas of 
pollution control where it has powers, while local authorities control less serious 
pollution. All of this is grounded, in turn, on the UK’s historical tendency to conform 
to a principle for the assignment of responsibility that stresses substantive issues 
rather than policy functions. This can be traced back to the 19th century, when Sir 
John Simon, former head of the Local Government Board, lost the battle to gain 
responsibility for the major air pollution control lodged with the local authorities 
instead of with a national body, the Alkali Inspectorate (Ashby&Anderson 1981). 
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Therefore, it is clear that each country possesses a national distinctiveness, and, in 
an attempt to better understand the specific role that the institutions play, the next 
section will focus on institutional arrangements in terms of the organization of 
central government, the provision of technical advice, and the central-subnational 
relations in each nation-state. 
 
6.2.  Environmental Administration 
 
6.2.1. Germany 
 
6.2.1.1. Central Government 
  
Germany stands out as having a high degree of concentration of functions. This 
was reflected with the creation of the Environmental Ministry (Bundesministerium 
für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) in June 1986, which brought 
together the main pollution control functions in one organization. There are, of 
course, a number of functions apart from pollution control that are relevant to the 
environment – most notably, those concerned with land-use planning and nature 
protection – that are still outside jurisdiction of the Environmental Ministry. Even so, 
the creation of the Environmental Ministry was a major break from the prior 
arrangements under which the Interior Ministry had carried out most environmental 
functions since 1969. 
The reconfiguration of functions in 1969 was part of the response to the upsurge of 
political interest in environmental questions that occurred in the late 1960s. The 
FDP politician Hans Dietrich Genscher had been made Interior Minister in October 
1969, and he took special interest in the development of environmental policy. On 
November 11th of that year, departments concerned with the control of water, air, 
and noise pollution were moved from the Health Ministry to the Interior Ministry. 
(Müller 1986, p56) Other ministries, however, still held on to environmentally 
relevant functions. The Agriculture Ministry retained responsibility for human and 
veterinary medicine and control of chemical substances, the Housing Ministry 
retained responsibilities for planning, the Transport Ministry kept control of 
transport policy, and the Ministry of Research and Technology kept control of 
environmentally relevant research. 
It should be stated that, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Interior 
Minister Dr. Zimmermann was held responsible for the mishandling of public 
information about radiation exposure. In the absence of federal radiation limits for 
milk, the Interior Ministry failed to step in quickly, prompting the states to issue 
contradictory standards, thus causing public anxiety. To quell the disquiet about the 
incident, Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor of West Germany, issued a decree creating 
the Environmental Ministry. Water and waste management, clean air policy, noise 
abatement, reactor safety, and radiation protection were moved from the Interior 
Ministry. Nature protection was moved from the Agriculture Ministry, and sections 
dealing with the medical aspects of environmental protection, radiation hygiene, 
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and chemical substances were moved from the Ministry of Health 
(Weale/O'Riordan/Kramme 1991). 
There seems to be general agreement among the policy experts interviewed by 
Louise Kramme, shortly after the creation of the ministry, that the move was largely 
driven by the political need to symbolize a change of priorities. However, there 
was a widespread expectation that a ministry would be created after the federal 
elections of 1987, and the main effect of Chernobyl was to bring push date 
forward. Nonetheless, given the symbolic need to demonstrate a commitment to a 
strong policy of environmental protection in the wake of the perceived crisis of 
Chernobyl, it is not surprising that it was possible in 1986 to overcome the long 
and deeply entrenched bureaucratic resistance, particularly from the Interior 
Ministry, to the loss of environmental functions.  
Although bureaucratic turf disputes obviously play a role in the decision about the 
location of environmental functions, it is also worth noting that there has been a 
long-standing intellectual debate in Germany over the most appropriate 
organizational form of environmental policy since the creation of the first 
environmental ministry at the state level in Bavaria in 1970. Roughly speaking, the 
debate has been between those who favor the concentration of environmental 
functions in a single ministry and those who favor making environmental functions 
part of a larger and more powerful ministry with some influences across the wide 
range of policy sectors that bear upon environmental quality. In favor of 
concentration, proponents have pointed to the incentives that an environmental 
minister has to improve policy, and to the fact that a separate ministry is less prone 
to compromise in the specification of environmental goals. In favor of lodging 
environmental functions in a larger ministry, there have been those who are aware 
that the environmental ministry has little power compared with those ministries with 
whom it would have to negotiate and that it is inhibited by sensitivity to the 
difficulties of always having to demand compliance from others. Analyses after the 
event suggest that these tensions have continued (Pehle/Jansen 1998). 
Even without these intellectual disputes, however, the creation of an environmental 
ministry was made difficult in late 1970s and early 1980s by the dynamics of 
coalition politics in Germany. During the last years of the Social-Liberal coalition, 
which ended in 1982, the Social Democratic Party came to favor the creation of a 
separate environmental ministry after a party inquiry chaired by Volker Hauff 
recommended its establishment. Nonetheless, it was not possible to act on this 
recommendation without upsetting the delicate balance of party portfolios in the 
coalition cabinet. 
The first holder of the environment portfolio was Walter Wallmann, who was 
largely seen as both a safe pair of hands and a caretaker on his way to prime 
ministerial office in Hessen, a post he moved to in 1987. He was succeeded by 
Klaus Töpfer, who had an academic background in the economics of land-use 
planning and who was a former environmental minister in Rhineland-Palatinate. He 
brought to the post an understanding of the complex dynamics of environmental 
policy, which were reflected in early organizational changes within the ministry. 
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These strengthened waste control functions by upgrading two administrative 
sections to one a sub-department, boosting central planning functions, and 
adopting a matrix approach in which sectional responsibilities were related to 
cross-cutting themes. 
The difficulty of adapting the traditional bureaucratic structure of German ministries 
to the crosscutting demands of environmental management, in which solutions to 
problems have to be seen holistically, has been a long-standing feature of 
academic and policy discussion. It is hardly accidental that Max Weber developed 
his account of the technical superiority of bureaucratic organization through 
specialization in the context of the German culture of administration. The 
organization of German ministries follows a pattern of departments, sub-
departments, and sections (Referate), the last often being relatively small, involving 
about six people, and highly specialized. At various times, experiments have been 
tried with working groups that cut across the sections, but their influence has been 
low, and some of the difficulties that the German government had in implementing 
the EU’s environmental impact assessment directive sprang from the fact that its 
scope affected some 16 sections. 
Another aspect of the attempt to secure greater integration of environmental 
measures in the broad range of public policy is the creation of the so-called “mirror 
sections” in relevant ministries and in the Environmental Ministry, which are 
supposed to liaise with one another and coordinate each other's activities. 
However, their effectiveness is weakened by their being understaffed in the 
Environmental Ministry, where one section is responsible for liaising with more than 
one ministry, as well as by divided loyalties on the part of those in the mirror 
section of the corresponding ministry. 
The main work of the Environmental Ministry involves drafting the legislative 
measures that are necessary in order to implement policy. Legislative measures are 
not taken in the isolation of the considerations involved in their implementation; for 
example, working groups of state officials are set up to look at the feasibility of 
proposed measures. However, the administrative component of policy-making is 
important, since the broad framework of legislation in each of the main areas 
means that significant policy developments occur as a result of administratively 
drafted measures. Moreover, since there is a strong emphasis on constitutionality in 
the drafting of German legislative measures, there is a need to ensure drafting that 
is highly competent in technical terms, and this reinforces the pressure towards 
specialization.  
That brings us to the role of technical advice in the drawing up of legislation and 
technical standards. The ministry is aided in the formulation of environmental 
regulations by the independent Federal Environment Office (Umweltbundesamt, 
UBA), which takes responsibility for the technical tasks of researching standards 
and drafting potential regulations, while the ministry has the legal and the technical 
task of formulating the regulations in a way that is legally and constitutionally 
sound. Founded in 1974, the function of the Federal Environmental Office is to 
provide technical advice to the ministry in the setting of standards and the drafting 
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of legislation. Strong technical support is particularly important for a system of 
environmental policy in which the principle of Stand der Technik plays a central 
role. The Federal Environmental Office has also played a role in monitoring 
environmental pollution, particularly on issues of inter-calibration. For example, 
during the 1995 smog alerts in Germany, the Federal Environmental Office 
discovered that the state authorities were not all using EU-approved measuring 
methods, and the UBA sought to give advice about standardizing the procedure. 
Moreover, since issues of expertise go beyond the setting of standards, attending 
to wider questions of environmental policy, the Federal Environmental Office has 
also sought to explore these. For example, in the middle of the 1990s, it conducted 
research projects on the role that international trade agreements might have in 
securing environmental protection and on what the appropriate rules of 
international trade might be. The Federal Environmental Office also funds out-of-
house research, for example, on the introduction of improved techniques of 
production in industry. 
The Federal Environmental Office is relatively large – even larger than the 
Environmental Ministry – in terms of the number of staff members it employs, with 
over 600 employees. Until September 1994, it was organized primarily with a 
focus on regulation, but, by then, as a result of an organizational change, a new 
cross-media approach was instigated. A good example of this is the section 
organized to look at issues of soil protection, where pollutants can come from a 
variety of sources. Reunification put the issue of contaminated land on the policy 
agenda, and Klaus Töpfer’s successor and current Chancellor of Germany, Angela 
Merkel, took a particular interest in the issue of soil clean-up. The reorganization of 
the Federal Environmental Office was therefore occasioned by the need to deal 
with such problems. 
Although the Federal Environmental Office is clearly important for providing expert 
advice from within government, it is also clear that the German Environmental 
Ministry uses other sources of specialist advice, often located in federally funded 
research institutes. For example, in the field of water regulation, the ministry would 
expect to consult, among others, the Federal Institute of Hydrology in Koblenz, the 
Federal Institute for Navigation and Hydrography in Hamburg, the Federal Institute 
for Hydraulic Engineering in Karlsruhe, and the German weather service in 
Offenbach. Similarly, when the Environmental Ministry was drawing up technical 
instructions for waste disposal in urban areas, it asked the German Medical 
Research Council to undertake a study of the risks associated with waste 
incineration.  
The Environmental Ministry has also set up joint working parties with the Federation 
of German Industry, e.g. on the technical options for various soil clean-up methods. 
The importance of such joint working parties also has to be seen in the context of 
the principle of Stand der Technik. Some observers have held the view that, in the 
1970s, industry operated a “cartel of silence” on the possibilities of flue-gas 
desulphurization for large combustion plants, as a way of frustrating the attempts 
by the government to require higher standards of air pollution control. The use of a 
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joint ministry-industry working party in the mid-1990s is some indication of how far 
the assumptions of policy and, in particular, the assumptions about the relationship 
between economy and ecology, have altered. 
Another important component of the advice network is the Council of 
Environmental Experts (Sachverständingenrat für Umweltfragen), established in 
1972 on the model of the US Council of Environmental Quality. It is an 
independent advisory body made up of experts from the natural and social 
sciences, as well as engineering. It produces both general and specific reports and 
has been responsible for raising a number of issues on the policy agenda, 
including the problems of implementation failure in its 1978 report on the subject, 
the protection of the North Sea, and the case for increased use of economic 
instruments in the control of pollution. 
A distinctive German advisory institution is that of the Enquiry Commission, a 
mixture of parliamentarians and experts set up to investigate and report on a 
particular topic. Looking at the “big” questions – for example, global climate 
change or the management of product cycles – reports of such inquiry commissions 
are less important for their strict technical content than for keeping the discussion of 
certain issues on the policy agenda. One striking example of the influence of an 
inquiry commission arises from the one established by the Bundestag in 1987 on 
climate change, consisting of 11 members of the Bundestag and 11 scientists. The 
commission played an important role in prompting action and filled a political 
vacuum left by the government. Its activity appears to have been decisive in 
establishing the urgency of the problem and the need to set stringent targets for 
carbon dioxide reductions.  
  
6.2.1.2. Subnational Administration 
 
Germany is a federal state; this simple statement of constitutional fact opens up a 
complex world of subnational environmental policy and politics – a world that has 
become more complex since reunification in 1990 and the incorporation of five 
states into the Federal Republic. Moreover, even in formal terms, and without the 
complication of moving from 11 to 16 states, the administrative situation is 
complex. The states are responsible for the implementation of environmental 
measures; they have their own forms of administrative organization and, in some 
sub-sectors of environmental policy, can set their own environmental standards 
independently of the federal government. Indeed, it was only with a constitutional 
change in 1972 that the federal government came to have significant powers in the 
environmental policy sector. Since that constitutional change, the federal 
government can override the standards of the states where it has “concurrent” 
powers, as in air pollution control, but not where it has only “framework” powers, 
as with much water pollution control. Therefore, although in formal terms of 
Germany’s federalism rest largely upon the distinction of policy functions, it also 
relates to substantive issues of policy. 
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The importance of the Federal Constitution is also shown in the way in which it has 
allowed the German Green Party to have an influence on the making of public 
policy. In a number of states, the German Green Party has been in coalition with 
either the Social Democrats alone (the Red-Green coalition) or with both the Social 
Democrats and the Free Democrats (the “traffic-light” coalition, Ampelkoalition). 
These coalitions began with a tentative period of political cooperation between the 
Green Party and the Social Democrats in Hamburg after 1982, through the Hesse 
coalition of 1985-1987 to others in Brandenburg, Bremen and North-Rhine 
Westphalia (Lees 1998, p98). 
Although, in this section, the focus should be on the relationship between the 
federal government and the state governments, the significance of local 
environmental administration, particularly for such issues as traffic management, 
can be extremely important. 
For the period of this study, the formal constitutional division of responsibility 
between the federal government and the states has been reflected in the legislative 
and standard-setting procedures in which the states are represented both formally, 
in particular in the Bundesrat, and informally, in such institutions as working parties 
convened by the ministry. There is an important distinction in Germany between the 
passing of legislation that bestows standard-setting powers and the setting of 
standards under such legislation. The ministry, in consultation with the Federal 
Environmental Office, drafts legislative measures. They first go to the Federal 
Cabinet and are then passed to the Bundesrat, the parliamentary body of the state 
governments, for an opinion. The cabinet then forms an opinion and puts the 
proposal to the Bundestag. The legislative committee in the Bundestag then consults 
the state governments before the matter is decided. Standard setting, by contrast, 
does not involve the Bundestag, but is undertaken through processes in which only 
the government and the Bundesrat participate. 
In this context, various non-legally mandated processes of consultation and 
decision-making become important, involving various bodies representing the state 
governments. The Conference of Environmental Ministries 
(Umweltministerkonferenz, UMK) includes representatives of state ministers with 
environmental responsibilities as well as the Federal Environmental Minister. After 
its first meeting on October 6th, 1972 (Müller 1986, p73), the UMK has 
subsequently met about twice a year. It is complemented by a parallel meeting of 
civil servants, the Permanent Committee of Departmental Heads of the Federation 
and Federal States (Ständige Abteilungsleiterausschuß-Bund, STALA), which plays 
a role in preparing the business for the meetings of the ministers. 
At the state level itself, various forms of organization are to be found. The earliest 
experiment with the creation of a unified environmental ministry took place in 
Bavaria in the 1970s, when a new ministry was formed by bringing together the 
sections responsible for nature protection from the Economics Ministry, waste 
disposal from the Interior Ministry, and noise control from the Labor Ministry. In 
North Rhine Westphalia, by contrast, the creation of an integrated environmental 
ministry had to wait until 1985, and there has been some suspicion that the 
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unwillingness to form such a ministry was due to a fear from local politicians that 
the ministry would be too strong in the face of the local coal industry, which was 
such a large supplier of jobs at the time. In the end, public pressure was such that it 
was necessary to have a ministry that featured the word “environment” in the title. 
Below the level of the state authorities, there are the municipal authorities, which 
are also important in and of themselves, partly because they have essential 
pollution control functions such as waste disposal, and partly because they have 
licensing functions with respect to plants that are sources of pollution. Moreover, in 
terms of preventing or offsetting environmental problems, the municipal authorities 
can be very important. For example, the city of Freiburg was able, for some time, 
to cross-subsidize its public transport from the profits it made on its ownership of 
the electric plant, and other authorities have experimented with economic 
instruments in fields where the federal government has not dared to tread. 
It is therefore apparent that the institutionalization of environmental policy-making 
in Germany takes many varied forms. In part, this is a consequence of the country’s 
constitutional structure. However, in some part, the institutionalization reflects the 
emphasis given to the search for technical solutions to environmental problems 
under the principle of Stand der Technik, the logic of which requires the creation of 
forums for discussion, interest articulation, and policy deliberation among a wide 
range of parties. 
 
6.2.2. The United Kingdom 
 
6.2.2.1. Central Government 
 
For the period concerning this research, the main ministry responsible for 
environmental protection and pollution control was the Department of the 
Environment. This was the successor to a number of bodies concerned with 
environmental issues, going back to the Local Government Board of the 19th 
century. Established in 1871, the Local Government Board had the task of 
overseeing the local authorities with the responsibility for sanitation and slum 
clearance in English cities (Ensor 1936, p23). These health-related functions were 
consolidated in 1919 with the transformation of the Local Government Board into 
the Ministry of Health – the association of health and housing in the same ministry 
being “a hangover from Victorian sanitarianism” (Webster 1988, p166). With the 
establishment of the National Health Service in 1948, the administration of health 
care ceased to be a matter of liaising with primarily local organizations and 
instead became a matter of administering a nationally controlled and funded 
system of health care. The gap between the local government wing of the 
department’s work and the health wing became increasingly wide, and, in January 
1951, the ministry was split into two components, with the local government 
functions, including responsibility for pollution control, going to the newly created 
Ministry of Local Government and Planning, which was renamed the Ministry of 
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Housing and Local Government in the Conservative’s accession to power later the 
same year (Weale/O'Riordan/Kramme 1991, p52). 
The situation remained stable until Edward Heath came to power as prime minister 
in 1970. Keenly interested in questions concerning the machinery of government, 
and responding to the wave of public concern about environmental issues at the 
time, he transformed the Ministry of Housing and Local Government into the 
Department of the Environment (DoE). In 1974, with the accession of a Labour 
government, this mega-ministry was broken up, and the transport functions were 
returned to their own ministry again. The incoming Labour government of 1997 
completed the circle by once more linking transport and environment in a new 
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, headed by the deputy 
prime minister. 
Despite its name, the department created by Edward Heath was never a ministry 
whose sole, or even primary, purpose was the protection of the environment. With 
its continuing responsibilities for local government, much of its work was connected 
with local government finance, a function that became particularly important in the 
late 1980s with the politically mismanaged reform of local government finance 
introduced under Margaret Thatcher (Butler/Adonis/Travers 1994). Indeed, 
between 1974 and 1987, the Department of the Environment did not even have 
departmental responsibility either for pollution control or for nature and 
countryside protection, and some of the junior ministers, i.e. below the level of the 
secretary of state, have always been assigned special responsibility for the 
functions of environmental protection. 
Successive secretaries of state did not challenge the low concentration of 
environmental functions in the Department of the Environment. The government 
under Thatcher, throughout most of its long period of office, was hostile to, or at 
best uninterested in, what may be regarded as the modern constellation of 
environmental problems: acid precipitation, ozone depletion, pollution of the 
oceans, river quality, and waste management (Hajer 1995, Chapter 4; Weale 
1992, Chapter 3). Secretaries of state like Michael Heseltine, Kenneth Baker, and 
Nicholas Ridley either displayed an interest in other aspects of the department’s 
work – for example, urban renewal in the case of Heseltine – or demonstrated 
hostility towards the growing consciousness of environmental problems, as in the 
case of Ridley. As a junior minister, William Waldegrave was able to make some 
progress on key environmental issues such as acid precipitation, but his secondary 
position obviously precluded him from being able to take the lead on questions of 
ministerial organization. Christopher Patten showed a genuine interest in issues of 
environmental protection and pollution, but, during his brief term in office, his 
attention was absorbed by the controversy surrounding community charge, leaving 
him little opportunity to focus consistently on environmental questions. 
The Department of the Environment shared its responsibilities for environmental 
functions with four other departments of state: the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, the Department of Transport, the Scottish Office, and the Northern 
Ireland Office. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had responsibilities 
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for pollution control with respect to some marine pollution, and the Department of 
Transport was responsible for vehicle emission control. The two territorial ministries 
were responsible for environmental matters. Despite this rather untidy set of 
relationships, the political focus of pollution control policy was centered within the 
Department of the Environment. 
It is important to highlight that, in 1997, John Prescott (the then Secretary of State 
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions) merged the positions and 
responsibilities of Department of the Environment with the ones of the Secretary of 
State for Environment, the Secretary of State for Transport, thence creating the 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. In 2001, this 
department was renamed the Department for Transport, Local Government and the 
Regions (DTLR) at the same time that the Environment Portfolio was merged with 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food under the guidance of Margaret 
Becker (the then Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural affairs). This 
gave way for the creation of the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). All departments were given their own secretaries of state and, in 
May 2002, the Local Government and the Regions Portfolios were separated from 
Transport and given to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, which, in turn, 
became the Department for Communities and Local Government in May 2006. It is 
also worth mentioning that, in October 2008, the climate team from the DEFRA 
was merged with the energy team from the Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) to create the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change. 
Returning to environmental policy, it should be stressed that a major change in the 
administration of environmental policy took place with the creation of the 
Environment Agency, formally established in April 1996. Since that date, primarily 
operational responsibility for environmental protection, distinct from policy, has 
rested with the Environment Agency (in Scotland, the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency). This comprises a board appointed by the government to 
implement policy. In England and Wales, the new agency brings together two 
bodies: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) and the National Rivers 
Authority (NRA), as well as some inspectors from local authorities concerned with 
waste management. 
HMIP was created on April 1st, 1987 and brought together specialized 
inspectorates within the Department of the Environment who were responsible for 
air pollution (which, by a quirk of administrative history, had previously been the 
responsibility of the Department of Employment since 1974), radio-active 
chemicals, hazardous waste, and water quality. HMIP had administrative 
responsibility for the setting of standards in the fields for which it was responsible. 
Traditionally, HMIP and its precursor, the Alkali Inspectorate, has been small; 
around the time of its creation, it had some 230-250 inspectors. In 1993 and 
1994, it had about 450, but it was due to reduce these numbers, under public-
sector so-called “efficiency savings”, to some 434 inspectors. The consequence of 
these small numbers is that site visits were – and still are – relatively infrequent, 
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even to complex plants. The single largest category of visitation in recent years has 
entailed pre-licensing discussions with operators. 
By contrast with HMIP, the National Rivers Authority (NRA) was a non-
departmental public body, meaning that it operated at arm's length from the 
ministry. It was created in 1989 in the wake of the privatization of the previously 
public Regional Water Authorities. The NRA had its own board, made up of part-
time members, as well as a full-time director-general. At its inception, it had some 
7,000 staff members, and so was significantly larger than HMIP. In bringing HMIP 
and the NRA together into one body, the intention was to create the 
organizational structure needed to operate integrated pollution control, also aided 
by the transfer of some functions from local waste regulatory authorities (Weale 
1996). 
Another non-departmental public body with some environmental responsibilities is 
the Health and Safety Commission, the prime responsibility of which is worker 
health and safety. It also has obligations regarding residual emissions affecting the 
public. The commission works through an executive and has responsibility for such 
matters as the control of pesticides and the labeling of hazardous chemicals. It 
merged with the Health and Safety Executive on April 1st, 2008. 
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) was a long-standing part 
of the environmental policy advice system. The original decision to set it up was 
made under the Labour government in 1969. The late Anthony Crosland was made 
Secretary of State for local government and regional planning, with an urgent 
remit to improve the machinery for dealing with problems of pollution. Along with 
a new unit within the department, the Central Scientific Unit on Pollution, it was 
decided to establish the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution as a 
standing body capable of giving independent scientific and policy advice to the 
government. 
In formal terms, its responsibilities were defined as follows: To advise on matters 
both national and international, concerning the pollution of the environment, on the 
adequacy of research in this field, and on the future possibilities of danger to the 
environment (RCEP 1971). 
In practice, it always took a broad view of its responsibilities, as captured in the 
opening of its first report: “We are authorized to enquire into any matters on which 
we think advice is needed” (RCEP 1971). 
Until its polemic closure due to the spending cuts of the coalition government in 
2011, the RCEP published 29 reports, which covered not only problems of 
pollution, but also questions of administrative organization and policy principles 
and approaches. 
In addition to the RCEP, governments have brought in scientific experts in a variety 
of ways to provide advice on specific issues. Examples of such bodies include the 
Expert Panel on Air Quality Standards and the Quality of Urban Air Review 
Group. These bodies had the function of identifying problems and advising on 
appropriate responses. One particularly important advisory body was the 
Government Panel on Sustainable Development, which was replaced by the 
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Sustainable Development Commission in 2010 and was also discontinued due to 
the coalition government’s spending cuts. This advisory body had wide-ranging 
remits to advise on the development of policies for sustainable development, and, 
in its first report, for example, it advocated a substantial shift in taxation away from 
labor and towards taxes on pollution and resource use. 
Parliamentary committees provide other parts of the discursive space for the 
discussion of environmental policy. Although such committees do not have 
legislative power, their reports can be influential and can lead to changes in 
policy. Three committees in particular have been important: the House of Lords 
Committee on Science and Technology, the Environment Sub-Committee of the 
House of Lords Committee on the European Committee, and the House of 
Commons Select Committee on the Environment. 
 
6.2.2.2. Subnational Administration 
 
Local authorities, too, have important pollution control functions. In Britain, there 
are two broad types of local authority: those responsible for large urban areas 
and those responsible for the rest of the country. In the large urban areas, 
metropolitan districts have a full range of local authority functions, although no one 
authority covers more than a fraction of the conurbation in which it is located – for 
example, London has 32 districts, with no government for London as a whole. In 
non-metropolitan areas, there are typically two layers of government (although the 
structure is currently under review): County councils are responsible for waste 
disposal policy, and district councils for some aspects of air pollution policy, with 
both operating within the framework of national legislation and standards. 
Local authorities are creatures of statute in the UK and therefore do not enjoy 
constitutional autonomy. During the 1980s, conservative governments under 
Margaret Thatcher sought both to limit their powers and to control their spending. 
A particularly important theme during these years was the attempt to turn local 
authorities from service providers into service regulators. This distinction was 
especially important in the field of waste disposal, where the functions of managing 
waste disposal were separated from those of regulating the standards of waste 
disposal. 
Despite their lack of power, a number of UK local authorities have sought to 
promote environmental protection, even though their resources are limited. Local 
Agenda 21, which emerged from the Rio conference in 1992, has been a 
particularly important galvanizing influence, and many local authorities have 
sought to set high standards in the fields of recycling, alternatives to car use, and 
energy efficiency. 
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6.3. Final Remarks 
 
Based on the detailed description of forms of policy organization, and as sought to 
be established in the earlier comparative discussion, a clear pattern of institutional 
development does not emerge from the two cases. The manner in which 
environmental policy is institutionalized cannot be detached from the general and 
overarching institutional arrangements of each nation-state. 
The most obvious institutional variables in this respect are constitutional ones. Thus, 
the pattern of institutionalization in Germany is conditional upon the constitutional 
framework, which, in general, secures a decentralization of power and 
considerable autonomy for subnational authorities. The constitutional framework is 
certainly not immutable, as the example of federal power in air pollution legislation 
goes to show in Germany. However, it does impose constraints on the speed and 
form of organizational development. The rapid experiments that comprised such a 
marked feature of the United Kingdom’s experience depended upon the British 
government having the comparative freedom to ordain administrative changes very 
easily, which is owed to the country’s flexible constitution and the absence of a 
need to appease party sensibilities within a government resting on coalitions. 
The variety of ways in which environmental policy is institutionalized also has to be 
placed in the context of the recognition that similar problems of institutional design 
are present in all systems, the most conspicuous of which is how to ensure that 
environmental concerns are diffused throughout all organizations whose policies 
have environmental implications and not just those parts of the machinery of 
government that have the primary responsibility for environmental policy. The 
discussion of this problem, conceived as an issue in the organization of 
government, has been most intense in Germany. 
The national differences in administrative evolution appear to be fairly stable over 
time. The most obvious explanation for this is bureaucratic inertia, combined with 
an interest among ministers in maintaining their turf. It might have been reasonable 
to suppose that the coalition governments of Germany would have revealed more 
stable patterns than that of the UK, since complex negotiations over portfolio 
allocations between hard-bargaining coalition partners might have the effect of 
stabilizing ministerial responsibilities. However, the coalition factor cannot explain 
the stability of the British case, where ministerial reshuffles are commonplace and 
the Prime Minister has the freedom to reorganize the machinery of government, 
often for purposes unrelated to functional requirements. This two-country 
comparison thus suggests that bureaucratic inertia is the primary cause of 
resistance to change, given that domestic or party politics have failed to push for 
change. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DIFFERENT CAPITALIST SCHEMES AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
As was stressed in the previous chapters, when discussing environmental 
governance, it is clear that this concept is delineated and configured by institutions 
and policies in every scale, under the (almost global) neoliberal framework, within 
which the privatization of state roles and the financialization of global markets 
have provoked a rearrangement of power relationships among state, market, and 
civil society groups. Hence, it could be assumed that global environmental 
governance is shaped, not only by nation-states, but also by international 
institutions, multi-national corporations, civil society, and their entangled 
interrelationships. 
Additionally, in the previous chapters, it has been demonstrated that corporations 
are increasingly keen to represent themselves as “green”. It has been underscored 
that – at least to some extent – this environmental concern forms part of a 
rhetorical discourse, because, when trying to distinguish “real” environmental 
commitments from “rhetorical” ones, understanding the key motivators of the 
economic actors is fundamental. 
This section considers that nation-states are subjected to the normative factors that 
constitute capitalist relations and that become domestically institutionalized over 
time, because it is within these relations that firms remain embedded in their home 
markets. 
Moreover, because of this, this section is grounded in the “Varieties of Capitalism” 
approach, i.e. an institutionalist theoretical development focused on how the 
interactions between the state, the market, and civil society are organized 
differently across capitalist systems (Hall&Soskice 2001). Therefore, its objective is 
to uncover what is behind the motivations of multi-national corporations’ interest in 
environmental concerns within the two different capitalist frameworks. By 
answering this question, the expectation is to better understand the relation 
between environmental discourse and the ways in which it is considered in each of 
the two capitalist schemes examined in this research. 
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7.1.- Historical Antecedents – The Polit ical-Economic Context of 
Comparative Capitalism’s Approaches 
 
It should be stressed that the varieties of capitalist approaches emerged as a 
“synthesis” that consolidated more than five decades of work. Hence, in the first 
part of this chapter, the most influential discussions of and/or approaches to 
different types of capitalism are presented in a very brief manner as a way to 
provide context for the varieties of capitalism approach. These discussions and 
approaches can be broadly classified as: state-centered in the decade of the 
1960s, society-centered from the 1970s to the early 1990s, and firm-centered from 
the late 1980s to the 1990s. 
An important precursor to the comparative study of capitalism was the 
modernization approach, of which Andrew Shonfield’s seminal 1965 treatise, 
“Modern Capitalism”, (a comparative study between France and Britain) is one of 
the best examples. In this work, Shonfield elucidated the diverse national 
institutional configurations that existed then and how these configurations 
represented distinct approaches to economic modernization. (Deeg 2006, p59) 
The main concern of this work was the capacity that each state (though often 
supported by a state apparatus, such as the elite bureaucracy) had to devise and 
implement economic policies aimed at the modernization of industries (Kang 2006, 
p4). 
The way each state did this was subjected to the particular institutional 
configuration of both the state and the economy. This emphasis on the state 
reflected the general fact that historically high levels of state economic intervention 
in advanced capitalist economies characterized the postwar era. According to 
Jackson and Deeg (2006, p8), Shonfield’s work represents the connection between 
prewar theories, which were dominated by the notion of stages of development, 
and the later comparative capitalism approaches, and which eschewed stages in 
favor of nationally distinctive models and trajectories. 
The 1970s saw the emergence of pluralist and corporatist studies, which, according 
to Kang (2006, p4), emerged as a response to the lack of attention paid to the 
role of non-state actors in explaining national variations in institutional 
arrangements. These studies gave way to so-called “society-centered” approaches, 
as both approaches considered the political system – and the societal interests that 
could constrain government actions – to be a better explanatory concept than “the 
state”. 
Both pluralist and corporatist approaches are systematic studies of interest 
representation, which differ in their perception of the institutional form of said 
interest representation. As described by Schmitter and Lehmbruch (1979, p16), the 
pluralist approach stresses a “spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, 
horizontal extension, and competitive interaction”. According to Kang (2006, p5), 
the pluralist approach is heavily grounded on the theory of interest groups and has 
served its purpose well in the mainstream of the American political science, as it 
well reflects the characteristics of private interest representation and group 
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associationalism that are so comprise the predominant and accepted pattern of 
societal organization in the United States (Schmidt 1996, p20). In contrast, 
Schmitter and Lehmbruch (1979, p16) defined the corporatist approach as 
“controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification, and 
complementary interdependence”, which came to be considered the “European” 
response to the “American” pluralist approach and has been effective in 
examining the small European democracies, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, Germany. 
It should also be noted that the corporatist approach considers trade unions and 
collective wage-bargaining institutions at the center of the analysis. The corporatist 
emphasis on the structure and nature of a nation’s labor movement and collective 
bargaining system provided an initial understanding of how the industrial relations 
system interacts with other institutional features of a national political economy 
(Jackson&Deeg 2006, p10). 
Kang (2006, p5) also outlines that some political economists and economic 
sociologists have attempted to address the capitalist system as an organization of 
economic activity and have therefore given way to the emergence of theories such 
as the French regulation theory and its American variant, “the social systems of 
production”, the theory of flexible specialization and the business-system 
approach. Significantly, the core of these theories lies in the firms and the support 
that they may receive from external institutions at many levels of the political 
economy; hence, these theories can be classified as firm-centered approaches. 
Regulation theory was pioneered by French Marxist political economists, such as 
Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer, but shifted away from a conception of 
capitalist development as a progression of stages to a conception of “varieties” of 
capitalism. The theory ambitiously aimed to replace a theory of general equilibrium 
with a theory of social regulation over capitalism (Aglietta 1979). While capitalism 
is defined by the accumulation of capital, the social relations of capitalism may 
take many institutional forms. 
The theory considered that mass-production regimes (modes of accumulation and 
regulation) such as Taylorism or Fordism, which became dominant in the 20th 
century, gave rise to different cyclical or structural crises. Therefore, it has become 
a major theorization for explaining postwar economic patterns, and it is important 
to remark upon the fact that excellent contributions to the study of macroeconomic 
performance and forms of labor organization based in regulation theory have 
been developed. Moreover, that Robert Boyer is perhaps the most influential 
economist when it comes to transforming regulation theory into a tool of 
comparative analysis (Boyer 1988; 1997). 
Kang (2006, p6) outlines another firm-centered approach: the theory of flexible 
specialization, which was first formulated by American sociologists Piore and Sabel 
(1984) and further developed by Hirst and Zeitlin (1989). Its use of abstract theory 
is less pronounced than in the Regulation Theory and focuses primarily on the area 
of production in the manufacturing sector as it attempts to describe and explain a 
new form of manufacturing organization that emerged with the decline of Fordism. 
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According to Kang (2006, p6), flexible specialization refers to the production of a 
wide and changing variety of products in small volumes (including single items) for 
specialized markets, using general-purpose machinery and skilled and adaptable 
labor. Therefore, it can be viewed as a modern form of craft production, where 
“flexibility” refers to the nature of a production system, i.e. new technology that 
permits general-purpose machines to be programmed to produce many different 
commodities. It follows that multi-skilled workers, often with an understanding of 
computer applications, are needed in order to get the best out of flexible 
machinery. “Specialization”, on the other hand, refers to the nature of product 
markets, i.e. mass markets that have fragmented into a multiplicity of specialized 
markets, as customers’ tastes and preferences have evolved and sought more 
variety, individuality, and innovation. 
Jackson&Deeg (2006, p10) outlined another firm-centered approach, which also 
involves, at least to some extent, some characteristics of the society-centered 
approach. This is the so-called “societal-effect” approach, which has served as a 
basis for comparing micro-aspects of work organization, primarily in France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom (Maurice/Sellier/Silvestre 1986; 
Sorge&Warner 1986). Firms were compared in relation with their social contexts, 
conceived and compared in terms of several interrelated sets of institutions: 
organization, skill formation, industry structure, industrial relations, and innovation 
(Sorge 1999). According to Jackson and Deeg (2006, p10), the methodological 
sophistication of these studies has been under-appreciated, but they actually set the 
stage for truly “holistic” comparisons that understood institutional settings as 
systemic configurations rather than isolated attributes – a cornerstone of 
comparative capitalism literature. These differences in the societal contexts of work 
organization have been also related to distinct business strategies and competitive 
strengths (Sorge 1991). Another approach that focuses on the firm is the business 
system approach, which was formulated by Richard Whitley while studying the 
nature of capitalism and the different ways in which it could evolve through 
systematic analyses of the development of firms and markets, both in East Asia and 
Western Europe (Whitley 1992; 1999). Jackson and Deeg (2006, p9) outlined the 
work of Alfred Chandler (1993) as an important empirical basis for the study of 
comparative capitalism, because he chronicled the rise of major American 
corporations and their business organization models – most notably, the rise of 
integrated managerial hierarchy, what he called “managerial capitalism”. The 
emergence of stable and autarkic hierarchies in the United States was connected to 
the competitive nature of markets and extensive utilization of Fordist mass 
production. When comparing the US to other nations, Chandler found a similar 
context of corporate hierarchy, but it was distinct in form and coupled with 
different approaches to production: In Germany, firms tended to cooperate more 
extensively with each other (e.g. via cartels), hence he termed this “cooperative 
managerial capitalism”. In Britain, “personal capitalism” prevailed, reflecting the 
prominent role still played by owner-industrialists.  
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This business-system approach could be considered as an early version of the 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) approaches. Therefore, the aforementioned approach 
could be easily classified into this category, along with Michael Gerlach’s work 
(1992), wherein he outlines the distinction between the liberal capitalism of 
western capitalist economies and the “alliance” capitalism of Japan. More 
recently, Ronald Dore’s work (2000), which distinguishes between the so-called 
“stock market” capitalism of the US and the UK and the “welfare capitalism” of 
smaller European economies. 
7.2.- The Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The work of Soskice (1999) and the later collaboration he made with Peter Hall 
(2001) argued that a capitalist economy does not assume a single, universal form, 
but instead presents a different form across different nation-states. This assumption 
gave way to the emergence and development of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach, which remains the state-of-the-art of the institutional analysis of 
capitalism. 
According to Mikler (2006, p49), the Varieties of Capitalism approach deals with 
two arguments. One argues that all capitalist economies have been influenced to a 
great extent by the neoliberal model, which, in turn, is the cause of privatization, 
deregulation, and free markets, resulting in the transfer of powers from the state to 
the markets (at least to some extent, because each state has transferred powers 
according to their very specific institutional capacities). 
The second argument deals with the power that multi-national corporations (MNCs) 
possess. One point of view within this argument considers that MNCs have 
incentives to standardize their products to reap economies of scale from their 
global investment, production, and distribution networks. The second point of view 
within this argument considers that MNCs use their international reach and 
information networks to tailor products for local markets.  
For Mikler, the VoC approach walks a line between these two arguments by saying 
that, while MNCs may operate both globally and tailor their products to satisfy 
local market conditions, there is another factor to be considered. This is that the 
products they offer in the first place are very much determined by the institutional 
framework of their home territories. 
For the VoC approach, capitalist states have institutionalized patterns of behavior 
that persist over time. It also considers that firms are institutionally ingrained in their 
native states for historical, political, social, economic, and cultural reasons. Hence, 
it assumes that, rather than homogenizing through globalization, the different 
institutional contexts of the nation-states have given way to the development of very 
specific forms of institutional interactions in a given nation-state. This specific form 
produces different results in terms of competitiveness, the types of goods and 
services produced, and the ways in which these are produced. 
This comparison follows the reasoning of Mikler, who proposes that the 
aforementioned variations are directly related to the institutional framework and 


.01
that this institutional framework has implications for non-economic outcomes, such 
as effects on the environment. 
According to Fritz Scharpf (see Dicken 2010; Held/McGrew/Goldblatt/Perraton 
1999), it could be assumed that the political economy is “populated by multiple 
actors, each of whom seeks to advance his interests in a rational way in strategic 
interaction with others”. Although relevant actors may also be individuals, 
producer groups, or governments, the VoC framework is focused on companies, 
considering them actors that seek to achieve and exploit capacities for developing, 
producing and distributing goods in a profitable manner. To this end, the 
companies need to establish relationships with other companies and relevant actors 
(e.g. suppliers, consumers, stakeholders, trade unions, business associations, and 
governments), all in the interest of finding an institutional explanation for cross-
national differences. 
The VoC framework deems that essentially four institutional domains define the 
incentives and constraints of firms: financial systems and corporate governance, 
industrial relations, education and training systems, and the inter-company system 
(the governance of relations between companies).   
That is why the VoC approach holds that nations can be compared with reference 
to the way in which firms resolve the coordination problems they face in these 
institutional domains. 
This approach articulates a theory of comparative institutional advantage, wherein 
“the institutional structure of a particular political economy provides firms with 
advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there” (Hall&Soskice 2001, 
p37). 
 
7.3.- Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies 
According to this approach and following the reasoning of Meyer (2012, p95), 
market economies can be situated at the poles of a spectrum along which 
developed nations can be arrayed: Liberal Market Economies (LME) and 
Coordinated Market Economies (CME). These types of economies are distinguished 
by their ways of solving problems of coordination between interests groups.  
Therefore, in liberal market economies, firms coordinate their activities largely via 
competitive market arrangements. Their supply of and demand for goods or 
services is conditions by price signals generated by markets and their decisions are 
driven by marginal calculations as stressed in the neoclassical economic literature. 
‘Free markets’ are the prevailing coordinating mechanism and the state-industry-
society relations can be characterized as rather adversarial. (Meyer 2012, p95-
96) 
 “Market relationships are characterized by the arm’s-length exchange of goods 
and services in a context of competition and formal contracting. In response to 
price signals generated by such markets, the actors adjust their willingness to 
supply and demand goods or services, often on the basis of the marginal 
calculations stressed by neoclassical economics” (Hall&Soskice 2001, p8) 
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In coordinated-market economies, firms depend more heavily on non-market 
relationships to coordinate their endeavors with other actors. These non-market 
modes of coordination generally entail relational or incomplete contracting and 
more reliance on collaborative, as opposed to competitive relationships. With the 
state playing a facilitative role, state-business relations tend to be more cordial and 
constructive. Besides markets, firms have the possibility to rely on a range of 
additional organizations and institutions for support in constructing their core 
relationships. (Meyer 2012, p96-97) 
 
 “These non-market modes of coordination generally entail more extensive 
relational or incomplete contracting, network monitoring based on the exchange of 
private information inside networks, and more reliance on collaborative, as 
opposed to competitive, relationships to build the competencies of the firm” 
(Hall&Soskice 2001, p8). 
 
Spekkink&Boons (2010, p4) emphasized the importance of history and culture, 
they stated that the institutions of nation’s political economies are intextricably 
bound to their history and in this regards they cited Hall&Soskice (2001, p13) 
“Many actors have learned to follow a set of informal rules by virtue of experience 
with a familiar set of actors and exposure to a common culture”.  
This has implications for the success or otherwise of policies aimed at addressing 
environmental problems because of the underlying idea that “in any national 
economy, firms will gravitate towards the mode of coordination for which there is 
institutional support” (Hall&Soskice 2001, p9) as cited in (Mikler 2006, p32). 
Operating in these dissimilar political environments, firms develop corporate 
strategies to take advantage of the institutional support available in a given 
economy for particular modes of coordination, deriving from this a new 
perspective on issues in strategic management (Hall&Soskice 2001, pvi). 
In general and according to Meyer (2012, p99-100), political leaders in LMEs 
prefer non-intervention in the economic realm and are only likely to take action in 
the event of perceived large-scale market failure. They compensate for the lack of 
governmental involvement and perceived failures of the market in order to gain 
individual moral legitimacy, legitimize the liberal market system in general, and 
avoid governmental intervention.  
Meyer (2012, p100) outlines that, in contrast, policy makers and corporate actors 
in CMEs rely more on coordination, cooperation, and long-term relationships 
based on trust to develop sustainability strategies. The presence of institutions that 
entrench the power of economic actors incentivizes the latter to cooperate. 
Corporations are likely to be members of powerful business associations that are 
independent of the government yet encompassing enough to monitor and sanction 
their members. Developing unified positions on environmental issues, these 
associations provide business with leverage in negotiations with governmental 
actors and significantly reduce transaction costs.  
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7.4.- Institutional Similarit ies and Differences Between Liberal Market 
Economies and Coordinated Market Economies 
It is clear that there is an abundance of concepts underlying the LME/CME divide. 
For the objectives of this study, this research is based in the line of thought of 
Mikler (2006, p51), who have developed a categorization of an incremental 
number of studies developed by authors who have identified themselves as writing 
specifically on the VoC approach (Berger/Dore 1996; Coates 2005; Hall&Soskice 
2001), as well as authors who believe that institutions matter in describing 
similarities and differences between industrialized capitalist states, and thus may be 
said to precede or be writing in the VoC tradition in a related capacity (Hall 1997; 
Hollingsworth 1997; Weiss 1998; Weiss&Hobson 1995; Whitley 1999). The 
reason for doing this, according to Mikler (2006, p51), is that they analyze the 
institutional aspects of states’ economic performances based on the idea that 
“institutions are embedded in a culture in which their logic is symbolically 
grounded, organizationally structured, technically and materially constrained, 
politically defended, and historically shaped by specific rules and norms” 
(Hollingsworth 1997, p266). Hence, in the avenue of appropriately describing 
institutional relations, the selected concepts are: relations between firms and the 
state, market force priorities, financial market priorities, the organizing principles of 
firms, the role of technology,  
the relationship between exogenous versus endogenous factors impacting firms, 
and the centrality of historical context.  
Mikler (2006, p51) states that the major difference between LMEs and CMEs 
regarding the relations between firms and the state is the extent to which the state 
and businesses cooperate to achieve mutual objectives. Firms in LMEs tend to 
pressure their governments for deregulation (Hall&Soskice 2001, p57). They are 
confident in free markets that operate on laissez faire principles, unless there is a 
clear case for state intervention due to market failure. By contrast, firms in CMEs 
expect the state to play an activist role and be a partner in the market with them. 
As a result, in addition to being strategically coordinated by markets, firms in 
CMEs are, to a large extent, also coordinated by the state (Berger 1996). 
It could be considered that a specific characteristic of LME economies is the 
ideology of non-intervention in markets. Therefore, when it comes to regulation, the 
LME perspective holds that the state should only intervene to internalize market 
externalities, and, even in this case, the intervention does not occur in a 
coordinated manner, but is highly pluralistic in nature, occurring at many levels 
and with many “voices” involved. Consensus is hampered by competition for a 
representation of the views of the industry and other players, and there is a 
tendency to reject compromise. The result is an adversarial relationship between 
the state, industry, and other stakeholders.  
In a CME, the state-business relations are generally conceived as more amicable 
and constructive. It is not a laissez faire economy, but one in which there is a 
national approach to economic development with the state playing a “passive, 
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facilitative role” (Wilks 1990, p138). Thus, the state’s role is more one of support 
for industry and working with industry to further its objectives and to help 
coordinate its activities. The German state is thus an “enabling state” (Streeck 
1997, p38).  
While firms in an LME desire deregulation and hands-off laissez faire market 
operations, firms in a CME operate more on the basis of consensus-oriented 
negotiation with the state. While “cooperation” with the government has as its goal 
the “capture” of government agencies to meet the goals of the firm in an LME, the 
state sets the agenda more in a CME/ Hence, it could be assumed that German 
firms operate within a collaborative and consensus model for cooperating with the 
state to develop regulations, agree on targets to be met, and establish priorities 
and goals to be achieved (Mikler 2006, p54). 
Regarding the priorities of market forces, it could be assumed that, in CMEs, 
market forces reflect – at least to some extent – the strategies of the firm, whereas 
firm strategies are a reflection of market forces in LMEs. In an LME, there is a 
market-oriented mentality that dominates the strategic thinking of the firm. This 
notion could be helpful for understanding the preference of firms in an LME for the 
state to be “in the background”. In this way, markets are the organizers of 
economic activity and are the primary determiners of production and strategy, with 
the goal being shorter-term profits via competition within them.  
In contrast, in a CME, the markets play less of a strategic organizing role. In this 
case, rather than competition, the organizers of the economic activity have 
obligations to the state and society, as well as high levels of coordination between 
economic actors. As a result, a firm within a CME framework does not focus on 
short-term gains, because it is concerned with establishing a coordinated strategy 
that may impart future benefits for the firm itself, its competitors, and the state. 
On the whole, a preference for deregulated competition in product markets, as 
well as the primacy of competitive market forces as motivators for action, are 
features of LMEs. By contrast, market forces comprise one factor among many for 
firms in CMEs, with a preference for coordination, cooperation, and longer-term 
relationships based on trust, as organizers of economic activity in markets (Mikler 
(2006, p55). 
This renders clear the fact that what drives a firm in an LME is the desire for higher, 
short-term returns rather than stable institutional investors. Therefore, regarding 
financial markets, it could be assumed that, in an LME, firms are expected to be 
profitable in the short term in order to pay dividends to their shareholders. 
In a CME, on the other hand, the banks are regarded as strategic industry partners 
rather than simply financiers (Wilks 1990, p138). Hence, in a CME, firms rely 
more on their reputation for solid performance in the longer term, in addition to 
trust and support from their stable shareholders and financial partners, based on 
their reputation (Hall&Soskice 2001, p23).  
Closer state-business relations for coordinating economic activity are characteristic 
of CMEs. Greater prominence given to cooperative and relational factors means 
that markets are less important. This is true in both financial and product markets, 
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and the result is a longer-term perspective. By contrast, in LMEs, the separation of 
the state from business is characterized by more adversarial relations and leads to 
the support of free markets with state intervention only in cases of market failure. In 
this way, the markets are in charge of coordinating economic activity, and this is 
true in product markets as well as in financial markets. The result, in this case, is a 
shorter-term perspective, focused specifically on paying dividends to shareholders. 
Authors fitting the VOC mold relate these observations to the organizing principles 
of firms at a micro level. 
Necessary to underscore is that firms in an LME organize themselves in a different 
manner than firms in a CME. This is a result of the different ways in which the state 
and the market interact with the firms in the aforementioned capitalist schemes. The 
following table summarizes the key implications of the organizing principles of the 
firms. 
The mandate of making profit and paying shareholders dividends in the short term 
means that managers in an LME need to possess evidence that investment in new 
products is likely to provide tangible returns in the near future. In contrast, 
managers in a CME are more willing to make a “bet” on products that might 
produce some benefit 10 or 15 years down the track, because they can strategize 
more for growth and market share, rather than focusing on immediate profit. 
Mikler (2006, p62) cites the analogy of Hampden-Turner's and Trompenaars' train 
(1993, p75) to better illustrate this issue. Managers in an LME want to catch it 
before it leaves the station, whereas managers in a CME are more willing to invest 
in the process of research and development for a train that may never come – but 
if it does, they hope they will already be on board when it reaches the station.  
Hence, the focus of a firm in a CME is related to intangible notions such as service 
and quality, as stated by Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars: “For Germans, value 
must be deeply imbedded in products of solidity and worth [because] they do not 
like it when money and its enjoyment becomes separated from worthwhile 
artifacts” (1993, p213). Whereas the focus of a firm in an LME focuses on profits 
and margins, in this regard, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars make the point that 
managers of rims in an LME believe that, “if they are profitable, then everything 
else must be alright” (1993, p44). 
Mikler (2006, p62-63) defines the concept of a firm by contextualizing it from the 
different perspectives of an LME and a CME. In this way, he states that a firm in an 
LME is a legal entity, a place where one works for the moment, where hiring and 
firing occurs in response to changing market (i.e. profitability) conditions, where 
management has the power to do this and is expected to, and where there is a 
large gap between managers and workers in terms of their rewards.  
On the other hand, in a CME, the firm is considered to have a more holistic view, 
in which the firm is focused on, besides making profits, the well-being of a wide 
range of stakeholders and endures on the basis of attending to their needs 
(Hampden-Turner&Trompenaars 1993, p32). 
Regarding worker’s interests, Mikler (2006, p65) suggests that, in an LME, the 
concept of achievement is regarded mainly in terms of individual achievement, with 
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cash rewards for success and winning through a competitive process. In this kind of 
firm, the ideas come from the top, and the lower levels are the responsible for 
implementing such ideas. On the other hand, in a CME, it comes from a 
cooperative approach to success over a long period of time, somewhat reflecting, 
in the case of Germany, their legally mandated, negotiated consensus approach to 
coordination.  
Regarding the relations of authority within firms, it should be emphasized that, in 
an LME, the managers have more distance from their employees and more power 
to act unilaterally. By contrast, CME firms are more collective. That is why Mikler 
(2006, p66) states that relations between managers and workers in LME firms are 
generally more adversarial than in CME firms. 
Regarding technological solutions, Mikler (2006, p67) points out that the 
institutional framework of LMEs supports radical, rapid change and innovation, 
because firms have a short-term market focus and can buy and sell subsidiaries 
without concern for long-term stable shareholdings. Meanwhile, top management 
possesses greater power to make decisions and implement them relatively 
unilaterally, including the ability to hire and fire labor. In contrast, the CME 
framework offers better support for incremental innovation over the longer term 
because they have a better focus on more traditional, well- developed markets in 
consultation with suppliers, workers, and other stakeholders. In this sense, Vitols 
(2001, p339) outlines a key distinction regarding the role of technology in LMEs 
versus CMEs when he notes that firms in an LME are radical in their innovation and 
entry into new industry sectors, but behave more conservatively in established ones 
where they compete more on the basis of price. By contrast, firms in a CME 
compete more via non-price competition through incremental innovation.  
Mikler (2006, p70) stresses the fact that the institutional insights of the VOC 
approach, and the implications of them in terms of the role of technology, are the 
result of historical processes. In this way, he considers the VOC approach to be a 
fundamentally historical approach that focuses on the institutional results of 
structures, processes, necessities, and cultural imperatives that have historical roots.  
Following this reasoning, the Prussian state’s drive to unite Germany, the aftermath 
of World War II, and the role of banks in financing growth and the incremental, 
inclusive consensus-approach to decision-making helped to shape its VOC. In the 
case of the UK, the collapse of the gold exchange standard in 1931, along with 
the establishment of the Bretton-Woods agreements, signified its submission to the 
economic project designed by the US (which, some decades later, would reach its 
peak under the mandate of Margaret Thatcher). In this way, the UK adopted the 
stock market as a driver of perceptions of company worth. 
There are many implications of such a historical approach, but the fundamental 
point is that the mainstream approach to understanding capitalist economies (i.e. 
market forces and the roles of government, including those with respect to 
environmental externalities) is one that is particularly in the LME vein, derived from 
historical specificities. However, Germany's different history has produced 
institutions that “deviate from the prescriptions of neoclassical textbooks” 
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(Dore/Lazonick/O’Sullivan 1999, p102). For Mikler (2006, p71), the argument 
above leads to two key implications.  
The first is that a pattern of dependence spreads into the institutions and norms that 
underpin them in each society considered here. The second, which could be 
considered as the opposite of the aforementioned, signals that norms and 
institutions are the result of history and can therefore be changed over time.  
 
7.5.- Synopsis of the Varieties of Capitalist Approaches in Germany 
and the United Kingdom 
 
Before summarizing approach, it would be helpful to outline the institutional 
structures of the United Kingdom on the one hand and Germany on the other, 
drawing on the comparison made by Hoffmann (2004, p6-10) based in the work 
of Hall and Soskice (2001), in which the two nation-states fit perfectly as one case 
of a liberal model and one of a coordinated model of market economies. 
The United Kingdom is characterized as a Liberal Market Economy (LME) 
(Hoffmann 2004, p6) in that: 
- “Ownership” lies at the heart of all economic activity, and hence there is little 
coordination of market relationships and limited state intervention in the economy. 
- The job of effecting coordination for the economic players is performed by 
highly deregulated markets (just what Adam Smith meant with his “invisible hand”). 
- Businesses themselves are unable, or barely able, by means of cooperation 
and coordination, to supply the economy with “public goods” or with basic supply-
side goods such as vocational training and basic research and development, or to 
create the conditions for long-term financing. 
- For this reason, businesses (mainly small ones) recapitalize on the stock 
market and are therefore dependent on the expectations of short-term stock market 
gains. They prioritize profitability rather than growth and employment, and their 
“corporate governance” structures (single board, transparent accounting, 
managerial-CEO-responsibility and remuneration) are geared towards the capital 
markets or to the shareholders’ information requirements and decisions. Employee 
participation is unheard of, both on the shop floor and in the board; shop stewards 
are viewed as opponents. 
- The level of membership in employers’ associations is low; as social partners, 
these associations are either weak or non-existent, and, at the same time, the trade 
unions are organized in a highly pluralistic fashion. 
- This has, in turn led to the economy being structured in such a way that 
industry is, on average, characterized by low-level, “common or garden” 
qualifications and poor wages. Consequently, there is extremely hierarchical 
company organization, use of university graduates in even skilled technical 
positions and as junior managers (Bosch&Knuth 2003), and, in some cases, huge 
wage differentials: 
 
“Where marketable skills, long-term finance, encompassing employer and labor 
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organizations, and investment in technological development are absent, firms are 
forced to concentrate on products that can be produced at low costs using 
standardized production methods” (Wood 2001, p250). 
 
Nor does this picture conflict with the simultaneous existence, in the British 
economy, of sectors that produce high-tech goods using highly qualified workers, 
because according to Hoffmann (2004, p8) 
- Owing to their extreme dependence on the stock market (including access to 
venture capital) and the great flexibility of the external labor market, large 
companies in the UK are able to invest rapidly in product innovation with the aid of 
venture capital, e.g. in the pharmaceutical sector and in financial services (Vitols 
2001). To this end, they buy the requisite skilled labor at high cost on the labor 
market or even develop and maintain “internal labor markets” within companies 
(protection against dismissal based on the principle of seniority and generous pay 
packages for the highly skilled). 
 
Germany, on the other hand, bears all the hallmarks of a typical “Coordinated 
Market Economy (CME)” (Hoffmann 2004, p8), in that: 
- There is extensive structural coordination of economic activity between 
companies and associations through overlapping company shareholdings, through 
the banks’ controlling role in the form of company shareholdings, and through the 
semi-public functions of corporatist associations, trade unions, and the state in 
research, social, and industrial policy. 
- Some 90% of German companies are organized in federations of enterprises 
(trade associations and employer organizations), and it is compulsory for all 
companies to belong to chambers of commerce and industry.  
- Generally speaking, collective agreements are applied sector-wide throughout 
a given region (over 60%) and are normally adopted even by companies that do 
not belong to these associations; the state has powers to order these agreements 
universally applicable. 
- This network of companies, the state, semi-governmental institutions (e.g. the 
chambers) and trade unions enables firms to solve problems of collective action 
through cooperation and coordination, and to secure the supply of “quasi-public 
goods”, such as vocational training, research and development, long-term finance, 
and the dissemination of technology. 
 
“Capital coordination facilitates product market strategies which employ the 
collective goods it makes possible” (Wood 2001, p249). 
 
- Companies are able to do so because they are primarily reliant on long-term 
bank loans (from their own bankers) or, as corporate enterprises, on shareholders 
– the big banks (which manage the investment portfolio), the state, or insurance 
houses – who perceive their role in light of long-term company policy. In other 
words, they are stakeholders and utilize their capital strategically. Because of the 
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separation between the supervisory board and the management board, and thanks 
to employee participation (work councils and worker representatives on the 
supervisory board), company policy is directed towards multiple long-term goals 
(profitability plus a combination of company growth and employment security). 
- The dual system of training (vocational training comprised of both general 
and sector-specific knowledge) is organized on a cooperative, tripartite basis. This, 
combined with protection against dismissal, not only enables companies to invest in 
improving the skills of the workforce without fear of “poaching”, but also, given the 
rigidity of external labor markets, leads to greater internal flexibility within 
companies (Bosch&Knuth 2003), which forms part of the basis for high-quality, 
export-oriented production. 
- It then follows that companies incrementally develop a process of innovation 
as a quality-based competitive strategy, which is why Germany lags behind in the 
field of high-tech production but is able to focus on “medium-tech” production in 
the manufacturing industry. 
- It is also true that, in Germany (as in other CMEs), not only are skill and wage 
levels relatively high, but in comparison with the UK, the wage distribution is 
relatively low – not least on account of the trade unions’ pay policies and the 
redistribution effected by the welfare state. 
Each type of economy, as Hoffmann (2004, p10) puts it, has its own specific 
institutional balance made up of a network of specific institutions (practices, norms, 
rules, market relationships, forms of corporate governance, and trajectories of 
technological innovation), which are closely interwoven and often complementary. 
This, in turn, for both types of economy examined here, has led to very specific 
forms of institutional balance that cannot simply be replaced by “importing” an 
alternative model (Boyer 1997, p92). 
According to Mikler (2006, p72), at the core of the VOC approach is the belief 
that there is no universal rationality that describes firms’ strategic priorities across 
all states. Individual states have developed particular institutions over time, which 
underpin their different varieties of capitalism. As such, “standards for evaluating 
organizational performance and prevalent criteria for judging firms’ strategic 
priorities vary significantly across institutional regimes and cannot be derived from 
a single universal market rationality” (Whitley 1999, p13). From the discussion 
above, Mikler distills some key, linked drivers of firms’ strategic priorities in LMEs 
versus CMEs. 
 1. There are closer state-business relations in CMEs (for Germany, the case 
is a coordinating role for the state) versus the separation of the state and markets 
in LMEs. 
 2. In the case of Germany, a resulting priority for markets as organizers of 
economic activity in LMEs (in both the product and financial spheres) versus 
markets as one of a variety of mechanisms for organizing economic activity in 
CMEs on a more relational, cooperative basis is that the role of society and a 
feeling of responsibility towards it is particularly important, as well as negotiated 
consensus between a range of stakeholders often prescribed by law. 
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 3. A firm may be conceived of as a network of contracts with significant 
power invested in the management in LMEs and that acts on market signals to 
make profits in the short-term and pay dividends to shareholders. This contrasts the 
firm as a collective (as in Germany) in CMEs, which acts to enhance its reputation 
through close relational ties with stakeholders.  
 4. There is a preference for non-price competition via product innovation in 
established industries in CMEs via incremental technological change, versus price 
competition in established industries in LMEs. Radical technological change is 
favored in new industries in LMEs. However, in some cases, CMEs may produce 
quite radical technological advances over time, even in established industries. 
As Mikler demonstrates, these drivers of firm strategies imply a shorter-term 
perspective for LMEs versus a longer-term perspective for CMEs. This is because, in 
the latter, there is less focus on markets, profits, paying shareholders dividends, 
and competing in established industries on the basis of price. A clear preference 
for materialist perspectives on the part of LME-based firms is also implied. This is 
the result of the institutional basis for capitalist relations in LMEs, whereas 
institutions in CMEs lead firms to focus more on a responsibility to society rather 
than shareholders, responsibility to fellow employees rather than economic 
pressures, and market share and influence rather than short-term profit. 
Given the differences identified, the VOC approach also says that firms gravitate 
towards those modes of behavior and action that have institutional support and are 
therefore most efficient. This has implications for traditionally less “core” 
considerations, such as the environment, and suggests a further lesson, which bears 
explicit identification here. It is that universal prescriptions for the “best” 
institutional foundations miss the point. Different cultures within firms and the 
societies that give rise to them mean that similar actions have different 
ramifications. If anti-trust laws were lifted in the UK, would this lead to greater 
cooperation and collaboration to the benefit of society, as is the case in Germany? 
The result is surely no, because the LME form under which capitalist relations 
operate in the UK would surely increase the propensity for exploitation of the 
market to the detriment rather than the benefit of consumers. Should the UK adopt 
the elaborate codification process for workers' and managers' rights and 
responsibilities, and the regulatory framework between the state and business as it 
exists in Germany? This would surely tie the UK system up in more disputation and 
litigation than it currently has, and would potentially rob the UK of its key 
advantage over the Germans: the ability to act rapidly to respond to market 
challenges. Therefore, it could be assumed that value judgments as to whether 
different VOCs are “good” or “bad” are largely futile. The institutional features of 
these states are what they are. They may change over time, or they may not – it is 
hard to tell (Dore/Lazonick/O’Sullivan 1999). Rather than declaring which variety 
of capitalism is better, the point is to tease out the implications of these institutions. 
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7.6.- Final Remarks 
 
The insights of the VOC approach have been delineated in this chapter mainly by 
following Mikler's line of thought, because he focused on finding the environmental 
motivations of firms within each capitalist model. As stated in the introduction to this 
chapter, this approach was considered novel in the sense that, rather than the 
examination of the competitive advantages of states’ industrial bases, or the 
operation of their product, markets, financial markets, etc., what is demonstrated is 
that a state’s variety of capitalism has implications for traditionally less “core” 
considerations, such as the environment. As environmental questions increase in 
importance for business, the point is that institutional differences in capitalist 
relations between states have implications for whether, and how, firms from 
different nation-states address the environmental impact of their operations. An 
incremental approach to environmental concerns could be expected from firms in a 
CME such as Germany – that is, based on consensual cooperation with regulators 
and mindfulness for the concerns of society and the variety of stakeholders. The 
aim of firms will be to balance competing views and interests via gradual and 
incremental measures aimed at ensuring ongoing consensus and cooperative 
coordination, while, at the same time, maintaining profits.  
For firms in an LME such as the United Kingdom, it could be expected that the 
concern for the environment will be expressed more in material terms of market 
forces, profits, and competition (i.e. winning rather than consensus). If firms take 
environmental action, it could be expected that the rationale for this is expressed in 
terms of what consumer demand dictates and what state regulations require. These 
must be addressed in the short-term in order to maintain their market position, 
profits, and shareholder value. 
The major point that Mikler outlined is that there is national variation in motivations 
for responding to environmental challenges on the basis of national institutional 
differences, rather than some global convergence on environmental priorities per 
se.  
The main point of this study, however, is to illustrate that, no matter the variation in 
motivations, the environmental concerns in both varieties of capitalism present one 
common objective, which is: the generation of profit. 
Therefore, this answers the research question and hence validates the hypothesis of 
this study. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This research represents an effort made towards contribute to the critical thinking 
from an analysis of the hegemonic neoliberal ideology, which supports the idea of 
the end of history and the technocratic universalism which in turn implies the 
imposition of a single model of life, denying, in the name of realism and the end of 
utopias, any other alternative possibility. 
This makes it necessary to recover the critical thinking to analyze and understand 
the reality, thus overcoming the ideological barrier towards claiming that things 
can be otherwise.  
It is clear from this research that the discourse of sustainable development has 
unquestionably transformed the context and content of political activity in Europe. 
This discourse has exercised and obvious influence in the Governance processes, 
mainly because it has contributed to the introduction of a new political field, which 
was then promoted, either explicitly or implicitly by policy-makers, researchers on 
the field and practitioners during the last three decades. Though it may be bold to 
affirm that the discourse of sustainable development is the sole driver of these 
whole set of changes, there is no doubt that it has played a key part in the way in 
which the governance priorities have been handled in the European continent. 
The research findings show that the sustainable development is built upon a 
neoliberal ideological construct, which denotes a strong sense of confidence and 
triumphalism, just as ‘the coherent and directional history of mankind’ (Fukuyama, 
1992 p.89), where the basic idea, articulated very clearly is that the way forward 
is through adherence to the political and economic principles of the capitalist 
democracies which are no other than democracy and free market. The research 
highlighted the fact that the Financial Institutions, which are based in Washington, 
institutionalized this discourse all around the world. These institutions have been 
essential for the construction and maintenance of hegemony because they help to 
soften domination by diffusing legitimating ideas and that could be the reason why 
some government agencies and civil servants can participate in a potentially 
lucrative neoliberal agenda even while their peers in government and society do 
not, and thence this fact could be considered as the reason of the quick expansion 
of the neoliberal economic ideology all around the world. 
In this way the dynamics of the market and the pursuit of pecuniary gain above 
everything else are considered as the embodiment of reason and progress. 
Through this, the discourse of sustainable development aims to regulate capital and 
internalize social and environmental costs as is deemed most beneficial to the 
capital and the environment as a whole, thence it is clear that sustainable 
development equals sustainable remuneration, which could be considered a very 
sustainable form of capitalism.  
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As it has been stressed in the research, the environmental euphemism, better 
known as sustainable development gave way to the creation of the green economy 
concept, which is nothing more than a synonym for green capitalism, which has 
been presented as the solution to the problems of economic stagnation and 
unemployment and that is why it has been promoted by governments, international 
agencies and large corporate groups. And that is precisely the reason why it is 
now deeply embedded in the logic of normalization found in global governance 
regulation and is compatible with the neoliberal method of production and 
distribution. 
But, under what conditions is it possible to conceive a lasting platform of capital 
accumulation that is consistent with the improvement of the environment and the 
health of the biosphere in the long term? 
Two pillars support green capitalism. The first consists of a series of goods and 
production processes that would be less harmful to the environment. Recycling and 
greater technological efficiency would be guiding principles throughout the 
production process. The second would be the market as a tool to repair existing 
environmental problems, since the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, to damages in the ecosystems. The market solution would be 
associated with the privatization and commodification of all components of nature. 
In green capitalism, nature is a set of physical objects that may be appropriate and 
valued as any input from the capitalist production process. The notion of natural 
capital would be a component of this vision of growth, which (at least theoretically) 
would be compatible with conservation. This means that the capitalist economy 
would be able to attract and introduce new technologies in the production and 
consumption that would allow, among other things, the reduction of the energetic 
component in the total cost equation.  
In a capitalist economy the transition to a new platform of accumulation of capital 
entails a process of technological transformation of large amplitude. This has to 
rely on a flow of investments that allow the massive introduction of innovations, 
meeting in turn the above criteria. 
In the past, capitalism demonstrated a great capacity for technological change. 
That is why the neoliberal ideology holds that in any given environmental scenario, 
the capital is always able to find technologies that reduce the cost of production. It 
should be stressed that under current conditions, with a global economy dominated 
by finance capital, and in the midst of an international struggle to see who takes 
the role of hegemon (and reorganize the world economy around their interests) it 
may be the case that the capital will not have the aforementioned transforming 
capacity.  
It is also important to note that the interests of finance capital does not favor in any 
case the structural change that would have to take place in the industrial sphere. In 
addition, macroeconomic policy worldwide is directed to look after the interests of 
finance capital, as evidenced by the obsession with 'price stability’. The result does 
not allow the structural change in the real economy. 
Capitalists need to have expectations that their investments with new (green) 
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technologies can be recovered and will be associated with appropriate gains 
associated with a satisfactory timeframe. And this reference to the profit rate 
implies a reference to the wage relation: here we enter an argument that 
proponents of the green economy systematically shun. To talk about capital is 
allowed, but to talk about wages it is not.  
Maintain a stable rate of return implies, in the current situation, to repress the 
growth of wages. But wage repression involves acute problems of commodity 
manufacturing unless it is based on credit. This is what sustained the consumption 
rate over the past four decades in the major capitalist economies, but it should also 
be noted that the aforementioned process led to the 2008 crisis. It is hard to get 
out of this dilemma because the institutions and social norms that led to wage 
stagnation are rigid and cannot easily be changed.  
An additional problem is the overinvestment in almost all-important branches of 
industry worldwide. From the industries that operate near the base of natural 
resources (steel, cement, aluminum, glass, etc.) to the industries that manufacture 
consumer goods (automotive, shipbuilding, electronics, etc.) the standard 
productive capacity exceeds by far the global demand. This will make more 
difficult the transformation because core branches will resist the change until the 
repayments guarantee them an adequate return.  
If green capitalism is the answer, what is the question? Green Capital is not the 
solution to the serious environmental problems, much less growing inequality. It is 
an ideological justification for the need to ensure the continuity of a social relation 
of class exploitation.  
The research also outlined the existence of institutional arrangements, rooted in the 
militaristic-developmental nature of the nation-state, which aims above all at 
conquest, expansion, and control. Therefore, such arrangements will be 
inadequate to understand, let alone address, the dynamics of industrial 
development, and in fact, they actually contribute to legitimize such unsustainable 
industrial development. This fact is of an exceptional importance for the research 
because it suggests what could be expected from both the nation-state and the 
global governance institutions, because it exposes the non-neutrality of such 
dominant actors when trying to address the current and always increasing global 
environmental crisis.  
This makes evident the fact that the so-called ‘global environmental governance’ is 
nothing more that the institutionalization of biased approaches whose objective is 
to foster development opportunities through the rhetoric of sustainable 
development while through environmental regulations they seek to regulate 
markets. Thence it could be assumed that the environment is being adapted to the 
needs of the new global institutions, and no the other way around. 
The research findings stressed that democracy, when understood as a system that 
gives opportunities for people to manage their own affairs, being these collective 
or individuals, is under attack all around the globe, including of course the 
industrialized northern countries. And the same could be said regarding markets; 
all of these issues are rooted in the powerful totalitarian structure of corporations, 
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which have an entangled relation with powerful nation states and, which in turn, 
and at least at some extent, serve as support for those corporations. All of these 
inter-linkages go unnoticed by the average citizen, which is manipulated through 
organized mass opinion, which in turn, is usually broadcasted through the media. 
This manipulation is an imperative feature of the democratic process, and is 
demonstrated each time that the citizens in any part of the world get organized in 
order to find a solution for any given problem which has not had the sufficient 
governmental attention and is catalogued by the neoliberal elites, and therefore by 
the media as ‘a crisis of democracy’. 
Thence, it is clear that democracy refers to ‘top-down’ forms of control, with the 
citizens playing mainly the observer role, without interest in taking part in the 
political arena. 
It should also be outlined the fact that markets are always a social construction, 
and that in the specific form that they are being arranged by social policy they 
should serve to restrict democracy, as in the case of the International Financial 
Institutions, and that is the reason why the World policy is subjected to huge 
Transnational Corporations which have the power to restrict the arena of ‘real 
democratic’ politics.   
 
“The big transnationals want to reduce freedom by undermining the democratic 
functioning of the states in which they're based, while at the same time ensuring the 
government will be powerful enough to protect and support them.“ (2006, p8) 
 
As it was presented in the chapter 4.1, there have been a large number of debates 
about whether capitalism is compatible with democracy, at this point, it should be 
stressed that if we keep to the real existing capitalist democracies, the question is 
effectively answered: They are radically incompatible.  
Regarding environmental issues, the policies and the public attitudes diverge 
sharply, as is often the case in real existing capitalist democracies, where the 
media reports present a controversy between two sides in environmental issues. 
In one hand renowned scientists and academics, as well as professional scientific 
journals claim that global warm is taking place, and that it is leaded by human 
behavior, they stress the fact that the situation is serious and that is only a question 
of time until the process escalates and become irreversible, which of course will 
have severe economic and social consequences, it must be outlined that regarding 
complex scientific issues it is rare to find such a consensus. 
In the other hand, the propaganda campaign present the opinion of skeptics which 
talk about GDP and economic growth, issues that have their roots in the market 
doctrine which is the angular stone of the real existing capitalist democracies, and 
which could be defined as the structural support of the aforementioned 
democracies which serve wealth and power. Though it must be stressed that such 
doctrines present weaknesses, better known as ‘market inefficiencies’ such as the 
failure to take into account the effects on others in market transactions, and this fact 
is particularly true for Financial Institutions because their task is to take risks, 
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calculating of course the potential costs for themselves. What they do not take in 
consideration are the consequences of their losses for the economy considered as a 
‘whole’. The consequences of the aforementioned externalities can be substantial, 
and the current financial crisis provides a clear example; because it is partly 
traceable to the major banks and firms ignoring the possibility that the whole 
system could collapse when they undertook risky transactions. Thence it could be 
considered that through this behavior it is demonstrated the profoundly 
undemocratic character of state capitalist institutions, which function in general 
terms is to socialize cost and risk and privatize profit. This behavior is not limited to 
financial markets, the economy as a whole is based upon the dynamic state sector, 
with much the same consequences regarding cost, risk, profit and decisions, which 
are essential features of the economic and political system. 
And at this point it should underlined the fact that an environmental catastrophe is 
far more serious that the financial crisis, because when referring to the 
environment, the externality that is being ignored by the real existing capitalist 
democracies supported in turn by the Bretton Woods Institutions is the fate of every 
specie that lives on the planet.  
The research discussed the way in which the Environmental Policy emerged in the 
European Union during the course of the seventies, and how it became 
institutionalized through the creation of the single market along with the Single 
European Act, which was then consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty. Thus giving 
way to the creation of a novel set of institutions, principles and practices that are 
now inherent to the European system of environmental governance.  In this way, 
the environmental protection in the European Union was no longer a burden and 
became a potential source of growth at the long-term. This helps to understand why 
policy makers weren’t too much distracted with environmental concerns and placed 
the logic of environmental action in an evident supranational level. Thence, it could 
be said that for the governments, the transnational institutionalization of 
environmental governance was just a process that did not interfered with their 
policy preferences. 
Going back to the system of European governance, it is defined as a system 
because all the components of it are related to one another, but as each country 
has their own way to deal with the environmental policy, and as it has developed 
strong and effective in some areas it shows considerable sings of weakness in 
others, so it could be said that the system is incomplete. In this line of thought and 
as important decisions are made at different tiers of authority (the European Union, 
the national level, the subnational level) and as in order to understand what 
happens in one of the aforementioned levels, it is necessary to understand what is 
happening at the other levels, it could be said that this European system of 
environmental governance is also multi-level. Here, it should be outlined that this 
multi-level characteristic could be considered as a permanent feature of the 
environmental policy making within the European Union. The findings of the 
research also outlined how the European Commission through its capacity to make 
use of symbolic and informal policy instruments demonstrated that it is able to 
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shape the norms and principles that would hereafter underpin a distinctly European 
system of government. From the mid-eighties, Commission, Parliament, and Court 
demonstrated how, whether together or at odds with one another, they could 
influence the environmental agendas and play a leadership role in environmental 
governance.  
Notwithstanding, rater than claiming this to be evidence of a move from passive to 
purposive institutionalism, it could be considered more as recognition of the 
adaptability and malleability of the European Institutions. Although they have the 
capacity to act purposively, they do not always do so. They have at their disposal 
a range of strategies and roles that they might adopt in order to achieve their 
ends. While it could be wrong to see national governments as anything other than 
the most important actors in the environment policy game, establishing the limits 
within which the European institutions can act, then the European Institutions could 
be considered as purposive, and this purposiveness could be considered as 
subjected to nationally imposed constraints, in this way, saying that an Institution 
may be able to act purposively is not the same as saying that the aforementioned 
institution is able to act independently. 
The inter-institutional relationships and the interactions among a wide range of 
policy actors shape patterns of environmental governance at the European level, 
but the European Institutions are not the only actors involved in the environmental 
governance in Europe, even when they play some of the main roles, in this sense, 
national and subnational governments as well as interests groups are also sources 
of considerable influence. Hence, it is clear that the European Institutions play an 
important role and help to delineate the environmental governance. Nevertheless, 
it should be outlined that the Environmental Governance is defined by a 
combination of factors such as the structural and procedural contexts, which in turn 
are based in the principles and values, which permeate the overarching political 
framework in each one of the national states that integrate the European Union. In 
this sense, after analyzing the way in which policy is made, it became clear how 
technical and scientific inputs merge into policy and are blurred within the political 
discourse, which character is established institutionally. This confirms the issues that 
were discussed in the third chapter of the research, because through this analysis it 
is exposed the way in which the hegemony is maintained through the neoliberal 
institutions. 
It is clear from the research that individual Nation-States offer favorable conditions 
for the conformation of modes of regulation based in the institutionalized unit on 
consensus and coercion, and confere consistency and a relative stability to the 
process of capitalist accumulation, it was also stressed that the international 
economic and politic processes are not mere consequences of the joint action of 
isolated national societies, but represent their own structures and dynamics which 
react among each other. Also it was outlined the fact that some Nation-States may 
have opposed perspectives regarding a particular issue and that is the reason that 
in the global capitalist model the processes of accumulation of capital must be 
institutionally and politically regulated, to guarantee a relatively stable exchange 
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of money, workforce and commodities. So, it could not be considered surprising 
the fact that the institutions in charge of such regulation are governments, central 
banks and the international financial institutions.  
Trying to outline the characteristics of what makes the difference between the two 
Nation States, the research focused on an examination of the policy styles and 
principles of each one, on the assumption that these characteristics would reflect 
the underlying institutional influences towards the understanding of how issues have 
been dealt in subsequent periods. From the findings of the research it was clear 
that these tend to relate to general national approaches to policy-making, 
nonetheless, Germany has developed and transformed their principles and styles in 
ways that have responded to key elements of new demands for environmental 
protection and although the Vorsorge prinzip often remains operative only in the 
rhetorical level, it is true that there are cases where the principle at least 
strengthened the case for higher standards of performance.  
The UK, in which the notion of best practicable environmental option derives from 
the consensual style of regulation - its traditional approach-, it priorizes economic 
growth over environmental protection, thence when a proposal for environmental 
protection is made it is questioned the arguing that issues of economic cost should 
always need to be in consideration. 
It is clear that the European Union has influenced the ways in which are being 
handled the environmental affairs, in general terms the changes in policy styles in 
both national States have been developed through the European Union’s pressures 
to adopt the program of ecological modernization, a dynamic which objective 
keeps being the establishment of the single market. 
The manner in which environmental policy is institutionalized cannot be detached 
from the general and overarching institutional arrangements of each Nation-State. 
The most obvious institutional variables in this respect are the constitutional ones. 
Thus, the pattern of institutionalization in Germany is conditional upon the 
constitutional framework, which in general secures a decentralization of power and 
considerable autonomy for subnational authorities. The rapid, if interesting, 
experiments that were such a marked feature of the United Kingdom’s experience 
depended upon British governments having the comparative freedom to ordain 
administrative changes very easily owing to the country’s flexible constitution and 
the absence of a need to appease party sensibilities within a government resting on 
coalitions. 
The variety in the way in which environmental policy is institutionalized has also to 
be placed in the context of the recognition that similar problems of institutional 
design are present in all systems, the most conspicuous of which is how to ensure 
that environmental concerns are diffused around all organizations whose policies 
have environmental implications and not just those parts of the machinery of 
government that have primary responsibility for environmental policy. The 
discussion of this problem, conceived as an issue in the organization of 
government, has been most intensive in Germany. 
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The national differences of administrative evolution appear to be fairly stable over 
time. The most obvious explanation for this is bureaucratic inertia, combined with 
an interest among ministers in maintaining their turf. It might have been reasonable 
to suppose that the coalition governments of Germany would have revealed more 
stable patterns than that of the UK, since complex negotiations over portfolio 
allocations between hard-bargaining coalition partners might have the effect of 
stabilizing ministerial responsibilities. But the coalitional factor cannot explain the 
stability of the British case, where ministerial reshuffles are commonplace and the 
prime minister has the freedom to reorganize the machinery of government, often 
for purposes unrelated to functional requirements.  
It must be stressed the fact that Germany, which before 1982 was often seen as a 
laggard Nation-State regarding international environmental issues, suddenly 
changed its position and became a leader regarding this issues after 1982, thus 
giving more weight to environmental issues in the balance of national interests 
within the European Union. It should also be outlined that Germany did this quick 
conversion because after making a domestic decision about air pollution policy in 
1983, it was anxious that other countries did not gain a competitive advantage 
over it, in terms of their energy costs. Thence it could be said that Germany played 
a very significant role in the emergence and development of the European 
environmental governance. This issue is a clear example of how the environmental 
policy has developed to be a policy area in which competing national priorities are 
being played out. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, often resisted the 
measures that were supported by Germany mainly for the involved costs, while 
also arguing that it contradicted their scientific basis.  
These struggles of priority demonstrate differences in public thought and attitude in 
each Nation-State, differences in the political importance to be given to 
environmental policy over competing political goals, differences of national 
understandings of policy problems, differences over the importance to be given to 
different forms of environmental policy, different traditions of thinking about 
economic development and government intervention, and of course differences of 
economic capacity. This economic capacity reflects the antagonistic national 
positions on the priority to be given to environmental measures, but also reflect 
more general differences of economic philosophy. Within a regulatory-
interventionist mode of policy, arguments for publicly supported developments in 
cleaner technology are more likely to get a hearing than it is possible in a more 
neoliberal ideological context. In this way Germany prioritizes on the ‘steering’ of 
the market by the government, by contrast with the strong anti-interventionist views 
of the Thatcher and successor governments.  
It is no surprising that there is a latent struggle between a liberalizing economic 
policy, which supports the deregulation of markets on the one hand and the 
requirement of environmental policy on the other. One typical argument for having 
a public policy on the environment is that regulatory measures are needed in order 
to cope with market failures. From this perspective, it is being reaffirmed that 
environmental pollution is an economic externality in which the costs or production 
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and consumption are not fully internalized to the transactions of voluntarily 
contracting parties. Under these circumstances, a case for public intervention exists 
on grounds of economic efficiency alone. Correcting for externalities by forcing 
producers to internalize the costs will lead to a better use of resources. When seen 
on such liberal terms, the case is especially strong for the regulation of 
international environmental protection by the European Union. 
Regarding the level of economic development, it cannot be considered surprising 
the fact that Germany pushed for high environmental standards at the international 
level, particularly in the spheres where its world-class engineering industry could 
obtain a competitive advantage. For a large part of the German industry pressing 
for higher environmental standards has been economically advantageous because 
such standards expanded the market for high-quality German engineering. Thence 
it could be considered that the discourse of sustainable development has an 
obvious material basis. 
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8.1.- Main Achievements 
 
Going back to the theoretical framework of the research, it is clear that the 
sustainable development, although being founded as a supposedly environmental 
concern, forms part of a rhetorical neoliberal discourse which unleashes a green 
inertia, in this way National States, International Institutions and Multi National 
corporations (the major actors on international environmental governance) are 
being attracted to represent themselves as ‘green’. Then, considering that the 
Nation-States are subjected to normative factors that constitute capitalist relations 
that become institutionalized over time in their home States, a comparative study 
grounded in the Varieties of Capitalism approach was developed. The drive for the 
development of this comparative study was to try to find out what are the 
motivations of Multi National Corporations towards environmental concerns (with 
the objective to differentiate ‘real’ environmental concerns from ‘rhetoric’ ones) in 
the two selected Nation-States (each one representing a different capitalist 
framework), towards a better understanding of the relation between the 
environmental discourse and the ways in which it is being considered in each one 
of the two capitalist schemes. 
This kind of comparative analysis could be considered innovative (at least at some 
extent), and it may contribute to the Varieties of Capitalism literature because 
rather than examining the operation or competitive advantages of states´ product 
or financial bases, what this comparative study shows is that a variety of capitalism 
has implications for what is conventionally regarded as a less ‘fundamental’ 
consideration such as the environment. 
As environmental questions increase in importance for corporations, the point is 
that institutional differences in capitalist relations between states have implications 
for whether, and how, firms from different states address the environmental impact 
of their operations. 
It should be expected to see an incremental approach to environmental concerns 
from firms in a CME such as Germany, that is based on consensual cooperation 
with regulators and mindful of the concerns of society and a variety of 
stakeholders. The aim of firms will be to balance competing views and interests via 
gradual/incremental measures aimed at ensuring ongoing consensus and 
cooperative coordination, while at the same time maintaining profits.  
For firms in a LME, such as the United Kingdom, it could be expected that the 
concern for the environment will be expressed more in material terms of market 
forces, profits and competition (i.e. winning rather than consensus). If firms are 
taking environmental action, it should be expected to see the rationale for this 
expressed in terms of what consumer demand dictates and state regulations 
require. These must be addressed in the shorter-term in order to maintain their 
market position, profits and shareholder value. 
The major point that Mikler outlined is that there is national variation in motivations 
for responding to environmental challenges, on the basis of national institutional 
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differences, rather than some global convergence on environmental priorities per 
se.  
The main point of this study, however, is to outline that, no matter the variation in 
motivations, the environmental concerns in both varieties of capitalism present one 
common objective, which is: the generation of profit. 
Thence, this answers the research’s question and therefore validates the hypothesis 
of this study. 
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8.2.- Final Thoughts 
 
At the beginning of this chapter it was mentioned that it is necessary to recover the 
critical thinking to analyze and understand the reality, overcoming the ideological 
barrier towards claiming that things can be otherwise. 
This statement could be considered utopic, since what is the case in overcoming the 
ideological barrier and understand the reality if there is nothing to be done against 
the dismantlement of the neoliberal superstructure, which is supported by the 
institutions in charge of the global economy and besides that, is also well 
established all around the globe? 
It must be remarked that an utopic alternative is needed as standpoint to realize 
that what is given is not the only possibility. "We need to radicalize the imaginary 
as an antidote to the total imposition of neoliberal technocratism in the common 
sense." (Lander, 1971) 
In this direction, David Harvey stated: 
“I think that there is always the need to have in mind an utopic vision, (...) a place 
that we want to reach, where we want to be, even if in the end we don’t reach it, 
in a certain sense it does not really matter if we get there or not. But if you have a 
vision, trying to move the things, these things are moved in a direction or the 
other.“ Harvey in (Boulet, 2013) 
So, with this research I hope to contribute to the development of the 
aforementioned utopic vision, what is given is not the only possibility!  
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